[From Bryan Thalhammer (2005.03.30.0920 CST]
Yes, even though I am batting at "pesky mosquitoes," I knew I would get there.
--Bryan
[Bill Powers (2005.03.29.1953 MST)]
Bryan Thalhammer (2005.03.29.1945 CST) --
>Even though his real experiences don't map on the real experiences most
>other people have, they are real. Yes.Yes. There you go, as Chester used to say on Gunsmoke (prehistoric TV show).
Best,
Bill P.
[From Bryan Thalhammer (2005.03.30.0935 CST)]
Bruce,
Agreed, as another sub-thread has worked out, just because a reported perception
is an outlier (Y, Z) doesn't mean that it is bad, unlikely, or screwy. Rather,
it is an outlier, and therefore could be considered categorically different (not
anywhere near the mean [X's]). Still subjectively real to the one experiencing
it, but not the mean, and possibly not even a real mode.
X X
XX XXX
XXXXXXXXX
Y........XXXXXXXXXXX......Z
One of my subjective perceptions, in addition to X, could be that Y and Z are
not my X, and not the X of many of my friends. Again, it doesn't have to be a
value judgement, but by golly, I can also have yet another subjective perception
that Y and Z are downright wacky. All of the above are real to me. And of
course, I would admit that the owner of Y and Z might have an equally subjective
(yet real) perception that owners of X are missing the point altogether! :))
--Bryan
[Bruce Gregory (2005.0330.0628)]
> Rick Marken (2005.03.29.1730)
>
>> Martin Taylor (2005.03.29.17.26)
>
>> Bruce, I can understand where you are coming from, but I'm with Rick
>> on this. I think -- figure that one out -- that you are
>> misinterpreting what Rick is saying.
>
> Great post, by the way, Martin. It makes me realize that we have both
> benefited enormously, in terms of "getting" PCT, from having been
> students
> of perception.Needless to say, there are no right perceptions or wrong perceptions,
there are simply perceptions. Since PCT does not include a labeling
mechanism, the discussion of Nicole Kidman properly falls into the
domain of APCT. In that domain I defer to you and Martin as students of
perception.A true believer knows the solution before he understands the problem.
[From Bill Powers (2005.03.30.0944 MST)]
Martin Taylor 2005.03.30.08.24--
On the contrary, there is probably no other theory in the whole of science that describes what we observe as well as does quantum theory.
There is, however, one other model that also does a very good job of describing the observed world: General Relativity.
But there are also other theories that seem to work, such as the idea that in order to move from one place to another, an object has to pass through all intervening points (continuity). If quantum theory didn't seem to violate any other well-tested theories, we wouldn't have any problems with it, would we?
Has anybody ever raised the point that the "particles" in particle physics are really ensembles, averages over many particles, so the laws might apply to the ensembles yet not apply to the individual particles? All the quantum experiments I've seen described involve doing an experiment over and over, thousands or hundreds of thousands of times, so it really makes no sense to speak of the behavior of "the" photon or "the" particle. Maybe that's where the wedge could be inserted.
Another thought: if you adopt a frame of reference moving in the direction of a photon at the velocity of light, the photon itself disappears. There is no time lag between emission and absorption of the photon, no distance between the point of emission and the point of absorption, and no energy transfer (according to special relativity). Do I have that right? If so, then photons are a product of the viewpoint one adopts.
Why should we have ANY expectation that the models and concepts that allow us to control our perceptions on the scale of millimetres to miles and times of part-seconds to years might be relevant on scales of attoseconds or megayears, parsecs or femtometres?
Good point, although one would expect some sort of transition zone instead of an abrupt discontinuity. I guess there are areas where macro effects shade into micro effects.
I think most scientists expect that current theories are wrong in some fundamental way, don't they?
As a matter of principle, yes. Some theories, however, haven't caused any trouble yet, so we use them while they work.
Best,
Bill P.
[From Bill Powers (2005.03.30.1000 MST)]
Bruce Gregory (2005.0330.0923)--
Oh, I get it. It's Rene Descartes with a slight twist. Do you draw the same inference from this indisputable fact that Descartes did? I favor the version that goes, "I think therefore thoughts are."
I don't know what to make of it. It's just a phenomenon.
Who is this "you" who cannot be mistaken? Again we are in the domain of APCT where I pretend no understanding.
Tell me who the "we" and the "I" are and I'll tell you who the "you" is. I thought I was talking to somebody. I don't think this subject has anything to do with PCT or APCT-- it's just something we can notice about our own existence. Do you have experiences which you doubt are happening while they happen? That's almost a self-contradiction, isn't it?
Best,
Bill P.
[From Bill Powers (2005.03.30.1007 MST)]
Martin Taylor 2005.03.30.08.21 --
Recursion is the word I think we should apply to all this "I think I see" stuff. What I perceive is what I perceive, even if a component of that is something else I perceive. What "I think" I see is itself a perception, of myself perceiving. Tentatively, I'd argue that this kind of recursion is probably limited to the logical reaches of the perceptual system (category level and above, if you go along with HPCT).
How about sensations?
...
In fact, isn't it only at the higher levels that we can even have any doubts about the reality of what we experience? ...
You write as if you want to contradict something I posted, but in reading your message, all I can see is an eloquent restatement of what I tried to suggest was possibly the case. I said "tentatively", whereas you put it as rather more definite. That's the only difference I can see.
Oh, OK, I thought you were saying that indisputable perceptions only appeared at the higher levels. It was thoughts about such perceptions you meant, I guess, and I agree.
Best,
Bill P.
[From Bruce Gregory (2005.0330.1225)]
Bill Powers (2005.03.30.1000 MST)
Tell me who the "we" and the "I" are and I'll tell you who the "you" is. I thought I was talking to somebody. I don't think this subject has anything to do with PCT or APCT-- it's just something we can notice about our own existence.
I was simply noting that "I," "we," and "you" play no role in PCT. I've looked at the equations and the diagrams very closely and see no signs of them. The tests of PCT do not include models of "I," "we," or "you." In APCT this absence is conveniently ignored by appealing to "something we can notice about our own existence." That's fine, but I am trying to keep the distinction between model and speculation clear.
A true believer knows the solution before he understands the problem.
[From Bryan Thalhammer (2005.03.30.1045 CST)]
Well, I don't think that is right. It doesnt make sense to think of adapting PCT
to quantum theory. And to look at the universe in terms of a quantum mechanics
theory, one doesn't have to put it in terms of PCT (would be nice, but not at
all necessary). From the little I understand ;-), PCT (or CT) studies human
perception, not quantum theory. One of those perceptions could be the quantum
mechanics theory of the physical universe, Newtonian physics, Einsteinian,
Hawking, or string theory. But from the point of view of theory-making, I don't
think it would make sense to change a specific theory on the basis of another,
differently-intended specific theory. Maybe I am wrong, but what you wrote
doesn't follow according to the methods I know.
Finally, what is the point of contrasting QM with CT/PCT? What is the goal, and
what is your hypothesis about the results of combining the two theories? Just
asking, k?
Rae book (which one, or both?):
Rae, Alistair I. M. (2004) Quantum Physics: Illusion or Reality?
Rae, Alistair I. M. (1992) Quantum Mechanics
--Bryan
>[Ely A. Dorsey (2005.03.29.2050 EST)]
The reason I use CT instead of PCT is because the interpretations of quantum
theory will ultimately reside in some form of PCT, but before that domain
can come into the dialogue, quantum theory has to be cast in control theory
terms. The theory of explanation will intersect the domain of PCT. We will
adapt PCT to quantum theory.The Rae book will help here.
[Bryan Thalhammer (2005.03.29.1945 CST)]
And, the drunk aware that he is hallucinating, or hallucinating and clearly
schizophrenic, has real experiences. The subjective experiences are the
reality
he experiences, including movies starlets and pink elephants. Even though
his
real experiences don't map on the real experiences most other people have,
they
are real. Yes.The darned thing is we are talking about what we can do science on, and not
talking philosophy, but it's true, I think, you can do science on what many
people might call a hallucination.--Bryan
[From Bruce Gregory (2005.0330.1233)]
Bill Powers (2005.03.30.0944 MST)
Has anybody ever raised the point that the "particles" in particle physics are really ensembles, averages over many particles, so the laws might apply to the ensembles yet not apply to the individual particles? All the quantum experiments I've seen described involve doing an experiment over and over, thousands or hundreds of thousands of times, so it really makes no sense to speak of the behavior of "the" photon or "the" particle. Maybe that's where the wedge could be inserted.
One click, one photon. The experiments are repeated to determine the probabilities which are difficult to ascertain with a single data point. I see that having solved the problems of psychology you seem to feel ready to set the world of physicists straight. Is mathematics next? If so I suggest you start with set theory. Infinite sets violate our intuitions, no? I mean how is it possible that the set of even numbers contains the same number of elements as the set of even and odd numbers? Something very fishy here.
A true believer knows the solution before he understands the problem.
[From Bill Powers (2005.03.30.1100 MST)]
Bruce Gregory (2005.0330.1225) --
I was simply noting that "I," "we," and "you" play no role in PCT. I've looked at the equations and the diagrams very closely and see no signs of them. The tests of PCT do not include models of "I," "we," or "you." In APCT this absence is conveniently ignored by appealing to "something we can notice about our own existence." That's fine, but I am trying to keep the distinction between model and speculation clear.
I don't know what you think a model or a theory is. You may have noticed that neither Newton's laws of motion or Einstein's laws of relativity mention planets, gravitation, cars and airplanes, and so on. Yet nobody hesitates to use those laws, where appropriate, to help us understand and work with all the physical processes in which these laws play a part. Does the fact that the dynamics of flight is not part of the laws of motion mean that the dynamics of flight is just a speculation? Or does it mean that flight is an observable phenomenon to which we apply the laws of motion to analyze its dynamics?
I think of the discussions we're been having here in the last few days are about phenomena. Observations. Martin Taylor has done a nice job of linking these observations to PCT as far as we can do so. Saying that one can't be mistaken about an experience is simply a fact, which I challenge you to dispute (even by disputing it, and knowing that you dispute it, you support it). We can also observe that some of our thoughts are about other thoughts, and that we can adopt varying points of view within the totality of what is available to experience. these are not speculations. They are observations to be explained.
How does this relate to PCT? It has obvious links to HPCT, which helps us make sense of the concept and experience of "point of view," and the hierarchy of control helps us to understand that some points of view are superordinate with respect to others, and are therefore preferred positions when trying to change things in ourselves. The whole unsorted jumble of experiences that we grow up with makes more sense, to me at least, when I perceive it through the ordering principles of HPCT. The relationship between the universe of experience (the set of all perceptual signals potentially in consciousness) and the hypothetical external reality is clarified for me by the whole PCT model. Isn't that the name of the game? Don't we make theories as a way of increasing our understanding of ourselves and the world in which we find ourselves?
If we needed a separate theory for every individual phenomenon we come across, we would have millions of totally useless theories. I've been trying to show how a theory of emotion can be built our of the materials already in PCT, and how a theory of consciousness can be founded on the way we experience a control hierarchy from inside it, and so on. If we can explain every detail of a phenomenon using an existing theory (as in the case of emotion), why do we need to reify the phenomenon or have a separate theory to explain it? Of course you can argue that some aspects of the phenomenon have not been satisfactorily explained, but that would be a productive argument in itself, if laid out in detail.
With respect to consciousness, awareness, knowledge of reality, and that sort of stuff, we don't know very much, but we can at least look for links with the models we do have. I think we've made a little progress.
Best,
Bill P.
[From Bill Powers (2005.03.30.1130 MST)]
Bruce Gregory (2005.0330.1233) --
One click, one photon.
Sometimes. Sometimes the detectors don't pick up anything after the click. Are you saying that the photon still was produced, unobserved?
I see that having solved the problems of psychology you seem to feel ready to set the world of physicists straight. Is mathematics next? If so I suggest you start with set theory. Infinite sets violate our intuitions, no? I mean how is it possible that the set of even numbers contains the same number of elements as the set of even and odd numbers? Something very fishy here.
Gosh, I didn't realize there were topics about which I'm not supposed to think or shouldn't comment on. It would help if you could make out a checklist for me. If you would just list all the subjects about which no further discussion is needed, or which are better left to licensed experts (I have only an undergraduate physics/mathematics degree), I could try to avoid having ideas about them, or at least keep them to myself.
I could, but I don't really think you believe I would. Or even that you would want me to. I think something got the better of you for a moment.
Best,
Bill P.
A true believer knows the solution before he understands the problem.
[From Bruce Gregory (2005.0330.1402)]
Bill Powers (2005.03.30.1100 MST)
I don't know what you think a model or a theory is. You may have noticed that neither Newton's laws of motion or Einstein's laws of relativity mention planets, gravitation, cars and airplanes, and so on.
I did notice that. I also noticed that the laws involved are mathematical relationships involving force, mass, and acceleration.
Yet nobody hesitates to use those laws, where appropriate, to help us understand and work with all the physical processes in which these laws play a part.
Indeed. So long as we can describe a situation in terms of force, mass, and acceleration, we are free to use Newton's laws. We cannot use them to describe happiness, despair, and anger because these states cannot be specified in terms of force, mass, and acceleration.
Does the fact that the dynamics of flight is not part of the laws of motion mean that the dynamics of flight is just a speculation? Or does it mean that flight is an observable phenomenon to which we apply the laws of motion to analyze its dynamics?
Just as long force, mass, and acceleration are the parameters, we can describe the dynamics of flight in terms of Newton's laws.
I think of the discussions we're been having here in the last few days are about phenomena. Observations. Martin Taylor has done a nice job of linking these observations to PCT as far as we can do so. Saying that one can't be mistaken about an experience is simply a fact, which I challenge you to dispute (even by disputing it, and knowing that you dispute it, you support it).
I don't dispute it, I simply point out that it cannot be modeled in PCT. It does not involve the elements p, r, o, that occur in the equations defining PCT.
We can also observe that some of our thoughts are about other thoughts, and that we can adopt varying points of view within the totality of what is available to experience. these are not speculations. They are observations to be explained.
Agreed. But PCT does not explain them for the reasons I just stated.
How does this relate to PCT? It has obvious links to HPCT, which helps us make sense of the concept and experience of "point of view,"
I don't see this. Point of view does not involve, p, r, o. So I think the relationship is purely an analogy. I find the analogy lacking.
and the hierarchy of control helps us to understand that some points of view are superordinate with respect to others, and are therefore preferred positions when trying to change things in ourselves.
The only way a PCT system can change its operation is by reorganization. At least to my knowledge only e-coli reorganization has been modeled.
The whole unsorted jumble of experiences that we grow up with makes more sense, to me at least, when I perceive it through the ordering principles of HPCT.
That I believe. But making sense to you and being a mathematical model that can be tested are two entirely different animals.
The relationship between the universe of experience (the set of all perceptual signals potentially in consciousness) and the hypothetical external reality is clarified for me by the whole PCT model. Isn't that the name of the game? Don't we make theories as a way of increasing our understanding of ourselves and the world in which we find ourselves?
I'm afraid that you are greatly over-interpreting the model. Remember, only, p, r, and o.
If we needed a separate theory for every individual phenomenon we come across, we would have millions of totally useless theories. I've been trying to show how a theory of emotion can be built our of the materials already in PCT,
The theory of emotion is speculative and fails to account in a way I find persuasive for many emotions. Empathy for example.
and how a theory of consciousness can be founded on the way we experience a control hierarchy from inside it, and so on.
Consciousness involves much more than control. Unless, that is, you have decided that everything _must_ be an example of control. In that case control virtually means nothing. (I am controlling for the moon to be round. I am surprised (error) if it appears to be square.
If we can explain every detail of a phenomenon using an existing theory (as in the case of emotion), why do we need to reify the phenomenon or have a separate theory to explain it? Of course you can argue that some aspects of the phenomenon have not been satisfactorily explained, but that would be a productive argument in itself, if laid out in detail.
My experience is that such efforts are not welcomed on CSGnet.
With respect to consciousness, awareness, knowledge of reality, and that sort of stuff, we don't know very much, but we can at least look for links with the models we do have. I think we've made a little progress.
The links are weak analogies as far as I can tell. Further they suggest no modifications to the underlying model which can only be tested by performance.
A true believer knows the solution before he understands the problem.
From Ely Dorsey 2005.03.30.13:59 EST
Bill Powers et.al.
The Rae book gets into this with vigor. The purpose of any paradigm is to
further insight. All models are welcome. PCT is valuable AFTER the control
engineering is done on QT. PCT is valuable in many other domains. I am
just asking that we perform/describe a control engineering thought
experiment on the Mermin experiment with respect to QT, then apply PCT to
the interpretations.
Bill, give it a go. You can do it.
Ely
-----Original Message-----
From: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)
[mailto:CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu] On Behalf Of Bill Powers
Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2005 1:25 PM
To: CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu
Subject: Re: Quantum Theory and Control Theory
[From Bill Powers (2005.03.30.1100 MST)]
Bruce Gregory (2005.0330.1225) --
I was simply noting that "I," "we," and "you" play no role in PCT. I've
looked at the equations and the diagrams very closely and see no signs of
them. The tests of PCT do not include models of "I," "we," or "you." In
APCT this absence is conveniently ignored by appealing to "something we
can notice about our own existence." That's fine, but I am trying to keep
the distinction between model and speculation clear.
I don't know what you think a model or a theory is. You may have noticed
that neither Newton's laws of motion or Einstein's laws of relativity
mention planets, gravitation, cars and airplanes, and so on. Yet nobody
hesitates to use those laws, where appropriate, to help us understand and
work with all the physical processes in which these laws play a part. Does
the fact that the dynamics of flight is not part of the laws of motion mean
that the dynamics of flight is just a speculation? Or does it mean that
flight is an observable phenomenon to which we apply the laws of motion to
analyze its dynamics?
I think of the discussions we're been having here in the last few days are
about phenomena. Observations. Martin Taylor has done a nice job of linking
these observations to PCT as far as we can do so. Saying that one can't be
mistaken about an experience is simply a fact, which I challenge you to
dispute (even by disputing it, and knowing that you dispute it, you support
it). We can also observe that some of our thoughts are about other
thoughts, and that we can adopt varying points of view within the totality
of what is available to experience. these are not speculations. They are
observations to be explained.
How does this relate to PCT? It has obvious links to HPCT, which helps us
make sense of the concept and experience of "point of view," and the
hierarchy of control helps us to understand that some points of view are
superordinate with respect to others, and are therefore preferred positions
when trying to change things in ourselves. The whole unsorted jumble of
experiences that we grow up with makes more sense, to me at least, when I
perceive it through the ordering principles of HPCT. The relationship
between the universe of experience (the set of all perceptual signals
potentially in consciousness) and the hypothetical external reality is
clarified for me by the whole PCT model. Isn't that the name of the game?
Don't we make theories as a way of increasing our understanding of
ourselves and the world in which we find ourselves?
If we needed a separate theory for every individual phenomenon we come
across, we would have millions of totally useless theories. I've been
trying to show how a theory of emotion can be built our of the materials
already in PCT, and how a theory of consciousness can be founded on the way
we experience a control hierarchy from inside it, and so on. If we can
explain every detail of a phenomenon using an existing theory (as in the
case of emotion), why do we need to reify the phenomenon or have a separate
theory to explain it? Of course you can argue that some aspects of the
phenomenon have not been satisfactorily explained, but that would be a
productive argument in itself, if laid out in detail.
With respect to consciousness, awareness, knowledge of reality, and that
sort of stuff, we don't know very much, but we can at least look for links
with the models we do have. I think we've made a little progress.
Best,
Bill P.
[From Jason Gosnell (2005.03.30 1310CST)]
Bill…my sincerest thanks for the feedback–it helped me to clarify most all of these points. I am still learning PCT and it proves helpful at times to do this communication.
Bill Powers (2005.03.29.1905 MST)
Or, does he have the possibility of investigating the hallucinations using other senses, such as touch, and >>possibly using reason and seeing if it matches his visual sense?
I think that once a person starts such an investigation, the investigation itself puts the person on the right track. It’s blindly >accepting all experiences as objectively real that gets us into serious mental problems. Not the only cause, of course, but a >big contributor.
I wonder if when a person begins a sincere investigation–to find out “what is”–if they haven’t already begun to go up a level at that point. I mean when the spirit of inquiry arises and attention is turned directly on those perceptions, if that doesn’t really require an expansion of awareness in the first place? This may not be an important point to resolve–just musing. Of course, I suppose it is possible that one may inquire and attend but not go up a level, or whatever happens when awareness seems to deepen or expand, and therefore just get trapped in the current relationship with the phenomena. Then, without that shift, in the case of thought-emotion for someone in a mental health crisis, it may become an issue of ongoing self-torture…repetitive, ongoing conflict.
Respectfully, Jason Gosnell
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[From Bill Powers (2005.03.30.1347 MST)]
Bruce Gregory (2005.0330.1402)--
I don't dispute it, I simply point out that it cannot be modeled in PCT. It does not involve the elements p, r, o, that occur in the equations defining PCT.
You're look only at the variables that are part of the model, and overlooking the structure, which is also part of the model. It's important where the signals come from and where they go, and what functions convert some signals into other signals. That involves a lot more information than just the three values p, r, and o.
We can also observe that some of our thoughts are about other thoughts, and that we can adopt varying points of view within the totality of what is available to experience. these are not speculations. They are observations to be explained.
Agreed. But PCT does not explain them for the reasons I just stated.
No. It doesn't "explain" them. But it provides a place for them to exist in relationship to a physical model. Newton's laws don't explain airplanes, either. But given airplanes, wherever they come from, Newton's laws tell us a lot about how they behave.
How does this relate to PCT? It has obvious links to HPCT, which helps us make sense of the concept and experience of "point of view,"
I don't see this. Point of view does not involve, p, r, o. So I think the relationship is purely an analogy. I find the analogy lacking.
Point of view has to do with the structural relationships of HPCT in which perceptions at one level represent global properties of sets of perceptions at lower levels, and also with the way higher systems determine the settings of the reference signals of lower systems that define what a "right" perception is. True, that doesn't have much to do with the particular values of p, r, and o, but it has a lot to do with the way control systems are organized and with the way a hierarchy of control is organized. Point of view is about the way p at one level is a function of p's at lower levels, and about how r at one level depends on e's (r - p) at higher levels. In MOL sessions, the p's that come into view seem to show this hierarchical relationship, and the goals or intentions also seem to show it. Even the theory of conflict seems very congruent with real conflicts that people experience.
and the hierarchy of control helps us to understand that some points of view are superordinate with respect to others, and are therefore preferred positions when trying to change things in ourselves.
The only way a PCT system can change its operation is by reorganization. At least to my knowledge only e-coli reorganization has been modeled.
I wish you wouldn't keep claiming that this is the only way reorganization can happen. I've investigated several other ways, including the "artificial cerebellum" demo and, with Rick, a higher-order system that can reverse the sign of the output in a lower-order one. A PCT system can do all sorts of things we haven't investigated yet. I've explained quite a few times about control by adjustment of parameters, but you go right on as if I'd never said that. I wish you'd investigate some of them instead of just making blanket judgements about what other people haven't done, while doing essentially nothing yourself..
The whole unsorted jumble of experiences that we grow up with makes more sense, to me at least, when I perceive it through the ordering principles of HPCT.
That I believe. But making sense to you and being a mathematical model that can be tested are two entirely different animals.
Well sure, but do you think PCT sprang full-blown from my brow like Juno as soon as it was conceived? Most of the ideas that are well-developed now and for which we have demonstrations were once just possibilities being considered along with many others. You seem to be demanding the impossible: every idea that is offered has to be mathematically modeled immediately, or dropped.
The relationship between the universe of experience (the set of all perceptual signals potentially in consciousness) and the hypothetical external reality is clarified for me by the whole PCT model. Isn't that the name of the game? Don't we make theories as a way of increasing our understanding of ourselves and the world in which we find ourselves?
I'm afraid that you are greatly over-interpreting the model. Remember, only, p, r, and o.
NO NO NO. p, r, and o -- and the entire model in which those are just three classes of variable. You are greatly oversimplifying the model.
If we needed a separate theory for every individual phenomenon we come across, we would have millions of totally useless theories. I've been trying to show how a theory of emotion can be built our of the materials already in PCT,
The theory of emotion is speculative and fails to account in a way I find persuasive for many emotions. Empathy for example.
What is emphathy but having an emotion and thinking it is like someone else's? What theory do you offer in place of mine? Any?
And what is speculative about saying that emotions consist of experiences of somatic states plus experiences of goal-related perceptions? I didn't think that was even controversial.
and how a theory of consciousness can be founded on the way we experience a control hierarchy from inside it, and so on.
Consciousness involves much more than control. Unless, that is, you have decided that everything _must_ be an example of control.
And a control hierarchy consists of a lot of components that carry out perception, comparison, and action -- what do you have in mind that doesn't fall into one of those categories? Tell me what more it involves than perception, comparison, and action, and I'll try to work on it some more.
In that case control virtually means nothing. (I am controlling for the moon to be round. I am surprised (error) if it appears to be square.
Perception and comparison, but no means of action. No control system. But who ever said that all perceptions are controlled? I've said many times that not all perceptions are controlled. Consciousness is mainly about perception anyway; the part concerned with action is usually called volition.
If we can explain every detail of a phenomenon using an existing theory (as in the case of emotion), why do we need to reify the phenomenon or have a separate theory to explain it? Of course you can argue that some aspects of the phenomenon have not been satisfactorily explained, but that would be a productive argument in itself, if laid out in detail.
My experience is that such efforts are not welcomed on CSGnet.
Who has laid out such an argument in detail? The so-called arguments that are not welcomed on CSGnet have consisted of sneering, name-calling, and referring to great ideas that will soon be announced, but never are, or statements of dissatisfaction offered without any justification or evidence. that's not productive argument, it's just carping and bluffing.
With respect to consciousness, awareness, knowledge of reality, and that sort of stuff, we don't know very much, but we can at least look for links with the models we do have. I think we've made a little progress.
The links are weak analogies as far as I can tell. Further they suggest no modifications to the underlying model which can only be tested by performance.
Weak analogies? Analogies of what to what? What is weak about the link between perceptual signals in a neural hierarchy and consciousness? What is weak about the link between a mobile awareness and the shifting experience of different aspects of brain function? And what do you think an MOL session is but a test of these hypotheses through performance in an interactive setting?
A true believer knows the solution before he understands the problem.
You keep attaching this to your posts. What is it that you so truly believe? You seem to know what is NOT the solution before you understand the problem.
Bill P.
getting irritated, if you care.
[From Bill Powers (2005.03.30.1436 MST)]
Ely Dorsey 2005.03.30.13:59 EST --
I am just asking that we perform/describe a control engineering thought
experiment on the Mermin experiment with respect to QT, then apply PCT to
the interpretations.Bill, give it a go. You can do it.
I'm flattered by your faith in me, but I'm really stumped. What is it about this experiment that has something to do with control engineering? The only control system I can see in it is the guy standing around with his hand on the switch that turns the apparatus on. The apparatus doesn't have any controllers in it. Do you want me to speculate that God has intentions for how this experiment should turn out, and manipulates the events so it comes out right?
Should I speculate about ESP, or psychokinetics?
If you can see the answer, please reveal it. I don't even know where to start.
Best,
Bill P.
[From Bill Powers (2005.03.30.1443 MST)]
Jason Gosnell (2005.03.30
1310CST) –
How come you turn up blue?
I wonder if when a person
begins a sincere investigation–to find out “what is”–if they
haven’t already begun to go up a level at that point. I mean when the
spirit of inquiry arises and attention is turned directly on those
perceptions, if that doesn’t really require an expansion of awareness in
the first place?
I think you’re exactly right. Well, at least I think the same
thing you do, so that’s two to nothing so far. Something has to
happen before a person goes up a level, so when we see it happening, it’s
already happened. You know what I mean.
Best,
Bill P.
[From Bruce Gregory (2005.0330.1923)]
Bill Powers (2005.03.30.1347 MST)
Bill P.
getting irritated, if you care.
That is not my intention. Consider the matter closed.
A true believer knows the solution before he understands the problem.
[From Rick Marken (2005.03.30.1700)]
Bruce Gregory (2005.0330.1640) --
Most of us have not studied the evidence in sufficient detail to draw
and defend our own conclusions. Instead we accept evolution (except
for Rick) because it is naturalistic and sounds plausible.
I accept the facts of evolution (gradual and consistent changes in fossil
types across geological strata, evidence of prior structures providing the
basis of current structures, etc.). What I don't completely accept is the
Darwinian model of those facts. I prefer an important variant of the
Darwinian model that is based on (what else?) control theory; what we call
the E. coli approach, where mutation rate in a Mendelian population is
proportional to the ambient level of error (deviation of intrinsic variables
from their genetically specified references) in the population.
--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400
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[From Bill Powers (2005.03.30.1837 MST)]
Rick Marken (2005.03.30.1700)--
What I don't completely accept is the
Darwinian model of those facts. I prefer an important variant of the
Darwinian model that is based on (what else?) control theory; what we call
the E. coli approach, where mutation rate in a Mendelian population is
proportional to the ambient level of error (deviation of intrinsic variables
from their genetically specified references) in the population.
I agree, of course. What I suspect is that with a truly Darwinian model (random mutations, elimination of unfavorable ones by death) the convergence to specialized forms would be far too slow. Comparing the e. coli method with the random method of selection (in simulation) shows a really huge advantage for the e. coli method -- orders of magnitude faster convergence.
But how to get these views into the community at large? Before anyone will listen we need to know what we're talking about concerning the rival theories. I don't really know enough to make a convincing case. We need information from the Genetic Algorithm approaches to see if there isn't something we're missing. My impression from limited reading is that all the examples employ external guidance -- giving an organism the benefit of the doubt, as it were, simply for showing tendencies in the right direction rather than demanding actual success (like the cockroach actually getting to the food). When there is an external selection criterion that doesn't demand complete success, the GA can be very powerful. But I think that's because as implemented it actually uses something close to the E. coli method of sensing improvements and basing continuation of the line on them.
There may be examples in which complete success is required. We should find out how well they work. I think that the weakness of the natural selection model invites magical theories which are neither more nor less believable than natural selection. We need a theory that can withstand the criticism that it is too inefficient to produce the observed results. Basing our preference for the Darwinian solution on faith isn't a very promising approach.
Best,
Bill P.
--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
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[Martin Taylor 2005.03.30.22.35]
[From Bill Powers (2005.03.30.0944 MST)]
Martin Taylor 2005.03.30.08.24--
On the contrary, there is probably no other theory in the whole of science that describes what we observe as well as does quantum theory.
There is, however, one other model that also does a very good job of describing the observed world: General Relativity.
But there are also other theories that seem to work, such as the idea that in order to move from one place to another, an object has to pass through all intervening points (continuity).
That's a pretty good example, because it seems to hold at the mesoscale of humanly controllable perceptions. But if it worked on the nanoscale, would we have Josephson junctions and all the technology (mesoscale) that they enable? Wouldn't there be intermediate states between the orbitals of electrons in an atom? Would Plank's Law (mesoscale) hold?
If quantum theory didn't seem to violate any other well-tested theories, we wouldn't have any problems with it, would we?
Other than General Relativity, what other well-tested theory does quantum theory violate? What observations or measurements are consistent with another theory but inconsistent with quantum theory? Isn't that kind of question the appropriate test?
Martin