Thank you for your comments, even though, as you will feel in my reaction, you managed to disturb some of my controlled variables!
I’ve been reading (and dreaming ) about PC for 4 months FULL TIME! I agree, I’m far from knowing or having integrated everything AND I still believe there is a chance for me to contribute a tiny bit with my thesis.
I have given up conventional way of thinking about behavior long time ago (before reading about PCT) when I learned about another theory that explains the onset and healing of physical illness using the main principles of PCT e.g. purposeful negative feedback control systems, without them knowing about PCT. (but that’s material for another thesis). I studied and worked as a civil engineer and then worked for many years as a psychotherapist (focussing on personal growth for non-clinical population) before going to Psychology University and so before being polluted by what is currently thought there. So I don’t think I have to “unlearn” so many things. Although I don’t feel like a real engineer, I do have a logical brain that, during all those years of learning and practice of so many different therapeutic techniques (not the most conventional ones), was focussing on the common change factor underlying those practices.
I do understand “controlled variables” in your demo’s, my question in my document was regarding more upper level perceptions that don’t have a physical aspect in the environment. To continue with your example of “relationship”: could you say that the “controlled variable” in the outside environment that corresponds with the inner perception of “high trust in relationship” is a list of descriptions of visible aspects of “hight trust in relationship”, e.g not looking into each other’s phone?
It’s not my intention to compare PCT with any other theory. I really believe PCT (that is still evolving) is THE unifying theory that can explain so many phenemona, because it addresses the basic principles of life. But Bill admitted that some parts of the process of reorganisation, described by him, are hypothesis. And so, rather than comparing PCT with anything else, I only am looking for existing theories, combined with my therapeutic experience, that might help get more clarity about one form of reorganisation.
To me it doesn’t feel like I’m defending any idea (except that I’m defending now the idea that I’m not defending existing ideas ) What I’m trying to do is to get more clarity about a particular part (the process of reorganisation) of a big theory (PCT), using an existing neuroscientific studied process of neurological change (memory reconsolidation). Since, according to PCT, reorganisation covers all processes of learning and change, there must be some link there…
Ideally, to make that link between reorganisation and memory reconsolidation, one should study (and try to experience consciously) both phenomena in depth. And that’s the problem I’m facing with my project and my questions: When I ask questions to the PCT community, I don’t know of anyone who has studied and worked with the process of memory reconsolidation in depth; when I ask questions to Memory Recosolidation people, I don’t know of anyone who has studied and worked with PCT and reorganisation in depth. So I’m already grateful that you, Rick, and other people form this forum are willing to answer some questions I had in the PCT column of my document. If someone in this community IS also willing to study memory reconsolidation in depth in order to help me with discussing the link, let me know and I’ll give you the minimum literature (and maybe experience) I believe you need to go through to “get” it. (just like PCT, it takes a while to “get” memory reconsolidation)
Rick is correct that it usually does take a while to really “get” PCT, and that when you do, you see differently a lot of what you thought you knew. As long-time participants in this forum and its predecessors know, Rick and I seldom see eye to eye about what is important. But in this case, I think what he writes makes a lot of sense.
Yo wanted to know why I said that most of what you say is about conscious perception. Lets start on page 1, MR column: “Both target learning and counter learning have to be in awareness at the same time”.
Bottom of same column: episodic memory is necessarily conscious, procedural memory is not.
P2 PCT column: What do you mean by “maybe the whole (inner part of) control loop is stored in memory”? It sounds as though you imply that the person is consciously aware of the value of the perception being controlled, the reference value for it, and the mechanism whereby the error can be reduced. But may be you mean something else.
Reference level: In just about any form of PCT I can think of, reference levels are set in the reorganized (non-conscious) hierarchy by the result of combining in what I call a “Reference Input Function” the output values from one or more higher-level controllers, but you say “they are set by conscious choice”. Let’s take a Powers example. If you want to control the position of your car i its lane, you cannot at the same time independently control the angle of the steering wheel.
MR column: Everything down to “Emotional semantic learning…” is in conscious awareness, or so it seems.
Why would error be ever stored in memory? If you are controlling successfully, the error is transient and kept near zero, whether you are controlling consciously or in the non-conscious reorganized hierarchy. If you are controlling unsuccessfully, the error may well be conscious while you seek a better way, but even then, why should it be stored in memory of any kind?
Memory Reconsolidation: you talk about being aware of the target and the current experience. (By the way, neither “prediction” nor “expectation” error has a place in conventional PCT.)
Need I go on? But finally, in the elegant multilevel diagram with which you finish, just about every box refers to conscious awareness of some aspect of control.
What I mean is that to consciously elicit the process of memory reconsolidation in therapy you have to first bring the target learning into awareness and then also a counter learning. Just like in MOL you let people talk about the problem and use disruptions to let people become aware of reference levels. That doesn’t mean that in current day live those learnings are conscious or that memory reconsolidation cannot happen outside therapy in an unconcious way.
same for episodic memory: Most people in therapy are not conciously aware of the episodic memory on which the semantic memory is based. They can become aware of it in therapy.
I think, unlike your car example, there are many situations where the system is not able to bring the error to zero at the end, with unprocessed emotions as a result (actually any unresolved trauma, e.g unresolved traumatic loss of a loved one, …) It seems like a survival mechanism to me that not only the perception is stored in memory but also the error (as a measure for importance of this memory for survival). The bigger the unresolved error, the more important it is to remember. Does that make sense?
I’m referring to the highest level of a subsystem: I think the reference level is usually set by memory, but couldn’t it be hat you can also consciously choose a reference level, e.g “I want to be an honest person”, without there being a memory or higher level that drives that reference level?
Again, I meant “becoming” aware. This is what therapy is all about: bringing the unconcsious into the conscious to facilitate some sort of reorganization (and a specific kind according to me is reorganization through memory reconsolidation).
As I wrote before, this client was aware of nothing of this before the session started.
ML: Thank you for your comments, even though, as you will feel in my reaction, you managed to disturb some of my controlled variables!
RM: Yes, I’m sorry. But I think teaching necessarily involves disturbing controlled variables. If it sets off reorganization (rather than just resistance) then learning can occur. If not, then not. One of Bill’s favorite sayings was: A person convinced against their will is of the same opinion still. One way of defending against disturbances is to simply say “I agree” when you don’t. A better way is to test the disturbing comment yourself; I try to make my disturbances testable.
RM: You have to learn what controlled variables are, in fact, and how to identify them in both the simple demos on the net and, perhaps more importantly, in everyday life
ML: I do understand “controlled variables” in your demo’s, my question in my document was regarding more upper level perceptions that don’t have a physical aspect in the environment.
RM: I agree that this – understanding higher order controlled variables – is the hardest thing to “get” about PCT – and the most important. In order to get it you have to understand what the term “perception” means in PCT. A perception (or, better, a perceptual variable) is a FUNCTION of variables external to the nervous system, those variables being the “environment” of the nervous system (so some are inside the skin). Perceptual variables are, therefore, constructions based on variables outside of the nervous system. Controlled variables – even the lowed order ones – are not a representation of what is “really” out there.
ML: To continue with your example of “relationship”: could you say that the “controlled variable” in the outside environment that corresponds with the inner perception of “high trust in relationship” is a list of descriptions of visible aspects of “high trust in relationship”, e.g not looking into each other’s phone?
RM: Controlled variables are not “in the outside environment”; they are FUNCTIONS of of physical variables in the outside environment – actually, of the sensory effects of those variables. “Trust in a relationship” could certainly be a controlled variable; it might be a perception of the probability that the relationship – such as a faithful marriage – will be violated; high trust being a perception of a low probability of violation and low trust would be a perception of a high probability of violation. The basis of that perception would be what you say – a perception, for example, of how many times you’ve seen or heard of the spouse being unfaithful. Ultimately, all perceptual variables are assumed to be a function of the sensory effects of physical variables – light, sound, etc. And, in the case of perceptual variables defined over time, like the trustyness of a relationship, perceptual variables are a function of both present time and past sensory effects of the environment. So high level perceptual variables are constructed from lower level perceptual variables that are occuring in real time and are stored in memory (see the model of the construction of a sequence perception in B:CP).
ML: It’s not my intention to compare PCT with any other theory. I really believe PCT (that is still evolving) is THE unifying theory that can explain so many phenemona, because it addresses the basic principles of life. But Bill admitted that some parts of the process of reorganisation, described by him, are hypothesis.
RM: Actually, Bill “admitted” that the whole damn theory is a hypothesis to be TESTED; not just reorganization but the proposed hierarchy of control of different TYPES of perceptual variables, the idea of a hierarchy itself, the idea that thinking is control of imagined perceptions, the idea that consciousness is involved in reorganization, etc. The only aspect of the PCT model that you can take to the bank is the idea that what we see as “behaviors” are organized around the control of perceptual variables.
ML: And so, rather than comparing PCT with anything else, I only am looking for existing theories, combined with my therapeutic experience, that might help get more clarity about one form of reorganisation.
RM: Yes, that’s what I understood you to be doing. I do think you might be able to get some clarity about reorganization by looking at your therapeutic experience. But I think looking for clarity in existing theories is worse than useless. All existing theories that I know of – even the ones that purport to be based on an understanding of behavior as purposeful – are based on the idea that “behavior” is caused output. So whatever these theories say about “change” is bound to be wrong.
RM: However, it could be useful to look at some non-PCT-informed research on “change”. In my area I have found some good examples of research studies that were informative about the controlling done by participants. But there is not much of such research. So I would recommend that, instead of trying to get clarity about reorganization by looking at other theories, why not approach getting clarity by proposing (or actually doing) a research project like the one’s suggested at the end of Bill’s consciousness paper. That’s the way to get clarity on Bill’s hypotheses about reorganization!
ML: Ideally, to make that link between reorganisation and memory reconsolidation, one should study (and try to experience consciously) both phenomena in depth.
RM: I think neither reorganization nor memory consolidation are phenomena. Both are theories designed to explain phenomena. The phenomenon explained (or hypothesized to be explained) by the theory of reorganization (the E. coli random walk variation in control parameters) is “change” in the ability to control. I presume the theory of memory consolidation is an explanation of what I can no longer do: remember things. PCT has its own theory of memory, which involves “consolidating” reference signals in memory. It is not part of the theory of reorganization – at least in theory;-) – but, again, that would be something that could be subjected to test.
RM: Now that I think about it, there might be an interesting connection between memory and reorganization. I am reminded of this wonderful story Freud tells in “The Psychopathology of Everyday Life” of his encounter with a friend who incorrectly remembers a Latin saying. Freud’s free association session with his friend makes a pretty convincing case that the memory error was made purposefully to avoid consciousness of an unpleasant conflict. Freud’s theory was pretty nuts but he actually made some great observations.
RM: I really think the best course for you, relative to PCT, is to think about what observations you have made (or could make) that would test the reorganization theory of therapeutic change. I think doing some informal versions of the studies Bill suggested at the end of his “Systems Approach to Consciousness” paper – studies you could do using some of the demos available on the net – would be a good way to evaluate the reorganization model of therapeutic change and would be a nice addition to you thesis.
I'm not at all disputing that people do control in consciousness. I
just try to make sure that the difference between control as
reorganized into the Powers hierarchy, and normally done
non-consciously, is the main subject of PCT. Powers was never clear
about the role of consciousness beyond asserting that he thought any
conscious perception was first built in the reorganized hierarchy.
As you will see below, I think that’s like saying that a cake is
just a collection of ingredients assembled from a cake recipe.
Let's look at some essential differences between conscious
perception and the reorganized hierarchy. What you see consciously
is a huge set of objects (or abstract entities that function like
objects). In the hierarchy or consciously, one never controls these
objects; one controls properties of the objects. The Powers
hierarchy has room for complex perceptions, but not, so far as I can
see, for objects that have myriads of potentially perceptible
properties.
An object can have a vast array of perceptible properties of
different kinds. Consider a teacup. Among other properties it has
location in a 3-D space (3 properties), location relative to a
saucer, a tale, or perhaps a mouth (minimum of 3 more, though if you
also perceive the locations of the saucer, tale, or mouth, these 3
are not independent), velocity in 3-D space (3 more), predominant
base colour (3 unless the perceiver is colour-blind), thermal
conductivity through different parts of the cup (quite a few
properties), fragility, price to purchase or to sell, manufacturer,
date of manufacture, similarity of shape and ornamentation to other
teacups in the mental field of the perceiver etc. etc. Not all of
these perceptible properties are easily or at all controllable, but
all are the kind of things you might control for if you were wanting
to buy a teacup.
That teacup is consciously perceived as existing somewhere in a big
complex perceived environment. Its relationships with other objects
in that environment are also potentially controllable perceptible
properties. But the objects, as objects, so salient in conscious
perception, are not controllable. Their shape and other properties
may be controllable — a lump of clay can be formed into a bowl, a
cup, or a statue without ceasing to be that same lump object, the
shaped clay may be baked to change its hardness property, and so
forth But the object’s properties change while the object itself
does not. It is still the same lump, albeit perhaps having lost
slivers of clay in the processing.
Contrast that control of properties in context with what goes on in
the hierarchy envisaged by Powers. In the hierarchy, a single value
of a property is controlled within any one control loop. Certainly
that property perception is in a context provided by all the loops
at levels above and below that contribute to its reference and
perceptual values, but that context is not itself perceived anywhere
in the hierarchy. It is, or might be, perceived consciously, and I
suppose the Powers hierarchy could be modified to allow direct
perception of those contexts, but that would be a different flavour
of PCT.
Now when in your document you talk about reorganization, that term
is ordinarily applied to changes of properties of the hierarchy, not
to changes of consciously perceived relationships among the objects
and abstractions that are the salient features of our conscious
world. The zones are different, however much they may interact, as
they do in MoL or in consciously learning to do something that with
enough practice you learn to control non-consciously, like playing a
musical scale on your chosen instrument.
The distinction between conscious and non-conscious (in the
reorganized hierarchy) control is often slurred over in discussions
of PCT, but it is important. When you talk about “expectation” or
“prediction”, you most probably are talking about something
consciously expected or predicted. You may not be, because
predictability has a mathematical basis that can be applied when we
analyse the working of the hierarchy. We can predict, for example,
that a nanosecond, or even a millisecond in the future your hand
will be very close to where it is now, and that a week from now it
could be anywhere in the range of places you might travel and within
in the range of movements you can make with your hand. But that’s
not usually what people mean when they use those words. (The
Predictive Coding theorists are an exception, since they base their
predictions on complex analyses of the way the world works ad its
current state. But we are talking about PCT.)
An interesting philosophical question might be why our conscious
perceived world contains objects that consist of objects and that
combine to make objects, whereas we can control only the properties
of objects, not the objects, even in conscious perception.
What I am saying is that although what you have in your linked
document may be correct science, it is not PCT when it deals with
conscious perception. PCT needs to be developed so that it smoothly
incorporates consciousness, but so far as I know, that has not
happened. Concepts such as yours might be pointers to how it may be
done, but then again, they may not. It’s worth pursuing, I think.
MT: I’m not at all disputing that people do control in consciousness. I
just try to make sure that the difference between control as
reorganized into the Powers hierarchy, and normally done
non-consciously, is the main subject of PCT.
RM:I have never heard of that being the main subject of PCT. Indeed, I didn’t even know it was a subject of PCT. I think the main subject of PCT is the controlling done by living organisms. Consciousness is certainly involved in control and Bill has proposed some hypotheses about what might be going on there; but conscious versus unconscious control is certainly not the main subject of PCT because we don’t know much about it.
MT: Powers was never clear
about the role of consciousness beyond asserting that he thought any
conscious perception was first built in the reorganized hierarchy.
RM: I don’t recall him “asserting” anything like this. The PCT hypothesis is that consciousness (which he hypothesized to be made up of awareness and volition) is involved in learning, of the reorganizing sort (see pp. 201- 203 in B:CP, 2005).
MT: …In the hierarchy or consciously, one never controls these
objects; one controls properties of the objects. The Powers
hierarchy has room for complex perceptions, but not, so far as I can
see, for objects that have myriads of potentially perceptible
properties.
RM: Actually, it does. In PCT an object (like a book or a car) IS the state of a lot of different “properties” (called perceptual variables in PCT). You control objects by varying the states of those properties.
MT: But the objects, as objects, so salient in conscious
perception, are not controllable.
RM: To paraphrase a famous line from that that great cult classic “Night of the Living Dead”: Control the properties and you control the object. At least, that’s the way it works in PCT.
MT: Contrast that control of properties in context with what goes on in
the hierarchy envisaged by Powers. In the hierarchy, a single value
of a property is controlled within any one control loop.
RM: Actually, in the hierarchy each control loop controls a single “property” (perceptual variable), not a single value of a property.
MT: Now when in your document you talk about reorganization, that term
is ordinarily applied to changes of properties of the hierarchy, not
to changes of consciously perceived relationships among the objects
and abstractions that are the salient features of our conscious
world.
RM: News to me. In PCT, reorganization refers to changes in functions in a control loop, which would mean changes in the input and/or output functions in a loop. A change in the input function would result in a change in the “property” (perceptual variable) that the system controls; a change in the output function would result in a change in the way the system sends reference signals to lower level systems or, if the system is at the bottom of the hierarchy, how the system’s output affects the environment.
MT: The distinction between conscious and non-conscious (in the
reorganized hierarchy) control is often slurred over in discussions
of PCT, but it is important.
RM: That;'s because no one has actually done any studies to see what might be different about conscious and non-conscious control.In his paper on “A systems approach to consciousness” Bill made some excellent suggestions about experiments that might reveal the difference he hypothesized to exist between conscious and unconscious control. But you don’t really care for research, do you?
I refuse to be drawn into a rerun of old-style pointless
disagreements for the sake of disagreement when I am trying to help
a PCT novice who is making an honest attempt to do science and
trying to determine how PCT helps to understand the issues involved.
If you want to have such an argument, take it to another corner of
the forum.
MT: Rick,
I refuse to be drawn into a rerun of old-style pointless
disagreements for the sake of disagreement when I am trying to help
a PCT novice who is making an honest attempt to do science and
trying to determine how PCT helps to understand the issues involved.
If you want to have such an argument, take it to another corner of
the forum.
RM: I’m sure your reply to Malou was an honest attempt to help a PCT novice just as I think your branding me an “enemy of PCT” some time ago an honest attempt to save PCT from my unscientific clutches. But I’m afraid that I found your attempt at helping a novice (just as I found your branding me an enemy of PCT) to be wrong. So I corrected you. Feel free to correct me back.
ML: I want verify one more thing:
On this picture from Powers B:CP book: is input quantity = controlled variable you are talking about?
RM: Yes! But I think a better representation of it is in the figure I used in the zoom class:
RM: This is taken from an article by Powers that was published in the journal Science in 1973. What I like about this version of the diagram is that it shows that the input quantity or controlled variable (symbolized q.i(t)) is a FUNCTION of physical variables (the v’s). That function is defined by the input (also called the perceptual) function, I. This captures the fact the controlled variable is not necessarily a physical entity in the environment; it is more often a function of many physical variables.
RM: In B:CP Bill explains this using the example of the taste of lemonade. That taste is the reference state of an input (controlled) variable – called it “lemonadeness” – that is a function of several different physical variables – chemicals including sugars, acids, oils and water. (B:CP, 2005, p 112). The taste called lamonadeness is the variable you control (bring to the reference state “great lemonade”) by mixing together these different physical variables in the proper proportions. But, as Bill notes “however unitary and real this vector [lemonadeness] seems, there is no physical entity corresponding to it”.
RM: In many cases we can experience the variables other people are controlling because we have the same perceptual input functions as they do. But one of the main goals of PCT research is to understand the nature of the perceptual functions that produce the perceptual variables people control. In the case of lemonadeness, for example, we would want to know what the function is that produces that taste, which includes knowing what the arguments to the function are (in this case it would be some measure of how the proportions of sugars, acids, oils that are combined in water result in the perceptions of lemonadeness).
If you want to repeat your comments on a different, appropriately
named, thread, I’m perfectly willing to do that. But I think to do
it in response to a serious enquiry by a novice would be unhelpful.
As I said in my first response to the enquiry, nobody should take
for granted the accuracy of what anyone states as fact (including
me). I agreed with you that the first step should be to develop a
good understanding of the nature of hierarchic control. When that
understanding has been established is the time to start evaluating
opposing understandings of where PCT belongs both as a science and
as an explanation of ones own experiences and observations.
As to the difference between conscious and non-conscious control, I
probably should not have mentioned it, as to evaluate the issues
involved is not something one would expect a novice to be able to
do. I do disagree with some of your interpretations of what I wrote,
but that’s not germane to helping Malou work out how perceptual
control might relate to memory reconsolidation, a topic I don’t
remember having been discussed on CSGnet or this forum.
MT: If you want to repeat your comments on a different, appropriately
named, thread, I’m perfectly willing to do that. But I think to do
it in response to a serious enquiry by a novice would be unhelpful.
RM: I was making it in response to some of your comments about PCT that were wrong. This seems like the right thread in which to do that. Actually, if you had just said “these are my ideas about the relationship between consciousness and control” I wouldn’t have chimed in at all.
I disagree that this is a proper place to carry on our long history
of non-resolvable disputes that seem to me to exist only for the
purpose of disputing. When dealing with a novice, it surely would be
better to concentrate on the areas of agreement. As I said, start
another thread by copying your disputatious message, and I might be
willing to engage for a short while.
I would like to add thee words to your comment, as follows: "* RM:
I was making it in response to some of your comments about PCT
that* in my opinionwere wrong ."
Malou has no way of judging who is right or wrong, and I think it
grossly unfair to ask . I stand by what I wrote in my initial
message, which can be paraphrased as “* whatever anyone tells you
about PCT, including me, be skeptical* .” Malou, I include Rick
among “anyone”, and if Bill Powers were still here, I would include
him, too.
MT: I would like to add three words to your comment, as follows:
RM: I was making it in response to some of your comments about PCT
that* in my opinionwere wrong ."
RM: Good addition.
RM: By the way, I re-read your post that I commented on and I see that I was wrong to correct your statement about conscious and non-conscious control in PCT ; your statement was actually correct. You said:
MT: I’m not at all disputing that people do control in consciousness. I
just try to make sure that the difference between control as
reorganized into the Powers hierarchy, and normally done
non-consciously, is the main subject of PCT.
RM: I read it incorrectly as your saying that the difference between the controlling done by the hierarchy and that done non-consciously is the main subject of PCT,. That is, I took you to be saying that the main subject of PCT was conscious control. But, of course, your didn’t say that so my criticism of that part of your post was wrong. Sorry.
RM: But my opinions about the rest of your opinions in that post remain pretty much the same.
MT: Malou has no way of judging who is right or wrong, and I think it
grossly unfair to ask . I stand by what I wrote in my initial
message, which can be paraphrased as “* whatever anyone tells you
about PCT, including me, be skeptical* .” Malou, I include Rick
among “anyone”, and if Bill Powers were still here, I would include
him, too.
RM: Of course people should be skeptical of what they are told. But we all have to be able to try to teach the theory and if teachers think other teachers are getting it wrong they have to be able to say what they think is wrong. I agree that this might make it confusing for students but what’s the alternative? The first answer to a student’s question is considered ground truth? Only one person should be considered the one who gives the correct answers?
RM: While I think everyone who feels qualified should feel comfortable about answering student questions and/or correcting other teachers, I do think some teachers can be considered more authoritative (more likely to be accurate) than others. I think Bill Powers must certainly be considered the most authoritative PCT teacher and his books must be considered the best source for learning what PCT is. But now that Bill’s not here we’ve got a lot of people vying to be considered the most authoritative PCT teacher. I think students will just have to make up their own minds about who is the most authoritative on PCT based on whatever criteria they consider important. Let’s hope they choose PBS rather than Fox;-)
So far I’ve just been able to watch this marvellous conversation from the side. Let me add my welcome and my delight in your avid and rapid progress picking up PCT, Malou, and your way of engaging your particular interests as you learn.
This was my experience, too, Malou. Rick’s dictum has truth particularly for those trained in what a distant cousin of mine called ‘scientific psychology’. For the rest of us who have been fortunate not to be subjected to such indoctrination there are still the snares of the unexamined ‘common sense’ which (like white supremacy) suffuses all aspects of our culture. We explain what others do in terms of causes, not so often in terms of purposes, and we may overhear ourselves saying things like “look what you made me do”. We talk of motivation, and of ‘motivating’ people. We think in terms of carrots and sticks, rewards and punishments, and we all have experienced controlling to increase access to pleasurable experiences and to avoid unpleasant or painful experiences. I think this is very much related to most of control being without awareness. When we confuse control with consciousness of controlling, it is easy to attribute external causes to behavior that controls purposes of which we are not conscious–and that is most behavior. (I’ll elaborate on these things presently, so a response would be better deferred to that place rather than here.)
I especially like this suggestion, because if opens the door to imagination which is so essential when you are guessing what variables are being controlled; when you are verifying that the subject is in fact perceiving the ‘same’ variables more or less as you perceive them, and that the subject’s actions can modify the state of these variables; and when you imagine and test a variety of ways in which your interventions can modify their state in a way that would be a disturbance if they are under control.
And thank you, Rick, for emphasizing this crucial insight. Without it, we can get into deep confusion as to where the ‘controlled variable’ lies. To identify and experimentally disturb the subject’s CV (a perceptual variable), we must construct a corresponding perception in ourselves based on the same physical variables in the environment.
Memory is a big subject that is not well understood. It is stored at every synapse, and yet interactions between certain parts of the brain are instruments of creating, strengthening, and changing (reconsolidating) memories.
Emotion plays a large role in memory formation. The limbic system is not only a vital part of these memory processes, to understand emotion we need better understanding of traffic between ‘snap judgement’ limbic perceptual control and control by slower ‘rational’ cortical functions. Our limbic processes can very quickly control the location and orientation of our means of sensory input–our eyes, ears, and hands, and other, less obvious inputs. We experience this as ‘attention’. (Obviously, ‘rational’ functions may direct our attention as well.) Diverse input functions receive these inputs, each input function constructs a perceptual signal which goes to higher-level input functions, and so on up the hierarchy. In the past, control of some of these evoked perceptions has resisted disturbances which have required unusual exertion, or which have required shifting from one strategy of resistance to another in order to retain control, or perhaps control has failed outright. On the basis of such memory, limbic functions prepare the body for action. When the somatic perceptions that result arise to awareness, we construct from them percpetions that we experience as emotions.
Because emotions arise from subconscious processes, they seem to be out of our control. A result is that it is very easy to construct a perception that they have external causes. “He made me feel that way.” Because they are often intimately part of perceptions that we feel an urgent need to control, and indeed often control without awareness, it is very easy to perceive those imagined external causes as the causes of our behavior. It is very easy to imagine that such perceptions as we experience them are descriptive of what is happening with other people: that environmental events cause behavior.
In the above, and elsewhere, I am trying to help us see the features of a PCT baby in the very muddy bathwater of the behaviorists and other ‘scientific psychologists’. These process are what they try to study by overwhelming the ability to control and observing the results of reorganization.
Martin, I am not sure what you mean when you say that we can become aware of errors and reference values.
SFAIK we can only become aware of perceptual signals in the form of our subjectively experienced perceptions. (Another very important distinction!) Consequently, reference values can reach awareness only by being copied to perceptual input (imagination). Error signals do not themselves become perceptual signals, but their somatic and emotional consequences via limbic functions are perceived as sensations in the body and as emotions, and it is those perceptions which can come to awareness. We can construct a perception of a goal (copying reference signals to perceptual input is not the only way to do so) and a perception of disparity between that goal and current perceptual input, but that perception of disparity is not an error signal.
Memory is stored at every synapse. Is that what you mean?
Distinguish the error signal from perceptions associated with it.
Poor control or loss of control has somatic consequences perceived as ‘frustration’ or the like, and these are retained in memory in association with the control loop in which the error occurred.
On the face of it, Martin started to make a comparison between control and something else, got sidetracked by elaborating important attributes of control (“reorganized into the Powers hierarchy, normally done non-consciously, is the main subject of PCT”) and never completed the comparison with something else. As is, the sentence is incoherent. If you delete the words “the difference between”, which lacks its second object, that sentence places you two in perfect agreement.
Maybe you could recover your intended thought, Martin, with reference to the following attempted reconstruction:
What is X as distinct from control? As to Y, do you just want us to keep this difference in mind?
MartinT:
I’m not at all disputing that people do
control in consciousness. I
just try to make sure that the difference between control as
reorganized into the Powers hierarchy, and normally done
non-consciously, is the main subject of PCT.[BN
[BN] On the face of it, Martin started to make a comparison
between control and something else, got sidetracked by elaborating
important attributes of control (“reorganized into the Powers
hierarchy, normally done non-consciously, is the main subject of
PCT”) and never completed the comparison with something else. As
is, the sentence is incoherent. If you delete the words “the
difference between”, which lacks its second object, that sentence
places you two in perfect agreement.
What’s missing is just two words, “that and” after “difference
between”.
MartinT:
It may take a bit of training to become
conscious of signals (perceptions, errors, reference values) in
the reorganized hierarchy.
[BN]:Martin, I am not sure what you mean
when you say that we can become aware of errors and reference
values.
Have you never known what you
wanted and that the world has not (yet) provided it for you? In a
classical tracking study, do you not know where the cursor should
be compared to where it actually is?
I realize that these are
examples from conscious control, but one can extend that into the
reorganized hierarchy if the Powers inter-level “perceptual value
goes to the higher level perceptual function input” is replaced by
the mathematically equivalent connection “reference and error
values go to the higher level perceptual input function”, proposed
by Seth and Friston (2016)1 and discussed in a CSGnet
thread a few months ago. With that connection, all three of the
lower-level variables reference (the output of the Reference Input
function), perception (the output of the Perceptual Input
Function) and error (the output of the Comparator Function) are
available to higher levels of the hierarchy, augmenting without
altering the functionality of the classic Powers hierarchy.
This, I think, is a topic beyond
Malou’s pay grade at present.
[1] Seth A. K., & Friston K.
J. (2016), Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain.
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 371: 20160007.
The error signal output from a comparator (the rate of firing which results from synapsing its inhibitory perceptual input signal together with its excitatory reference input signal) is not the same as the relationship perception which the comparator controls.
When I have a perception of what I want (e.g. cursor at target), I am controlling that relationship perception in imagination. The current model of imagination posits that a copy of the reference signal is taken up as perceptual input. (This may involve copying reference signals at lower levels to perceptual signals sent up from those levels, depending upon how detailed and vivid the imagining is.)
Is it possible to control the relationship through the environment at the same time as controlling the relationship perception in imagination? The answer is not immediately obvious to me. If this can occur, it seems to me that it would require parallel systems with the same reference signals controlling the same perceptual input.
It appears that I can observe perceptual input from the environment (e.g. that distance between cursor and target) while knowing that it is not the desired state but not while simultaneously imagining that desired state (controlling zero distance between cursor and target in imagination). The “knowing that it is not the desired state” is awareness at the level above, at the comparator or comparators which is/are employing that relationship (zero distance between cursor and target) for its/their purposes.
This is my subjective experience. If the Friston-derived proposal would permit an error signal to be copied to perceptual input, I think that would predict subjective experience that contradicts mine.
I am sometimes swamped by other obligations and at those times do not keep up with CSGnet traffic. I did not delve into the Friston discussion. If this is mathematically equivalent to the perceptual signal going to the higher level perceptual input function, it is because they are synapsed together in that perceptual input function, correct? Specifically, it does not follow that the error signal is a distinct perceptual signal of which we can be aware.
One or other of us is seriously confused.
I am confused as to why you bring imagination into a conversation
about control within the hierarchy.
I am confused about why you say: "* If the Friston-derived proposal
would permit an error signal to be copied to perceptual input, I* think**that would predict subjective experience that contradicts mine ."
Could you explain how you could possibly tell the difference, given
that the two proposals give the same mathematical result for the
output of any perceptual function at the next higher level, while
the Seth-Friston connection offers extra possibilities that do
conform to my conscious perceptual experience.
I am confused about whether you are talking about one or two levels
of control when you say: “* The error signal output from a
comparator (the rate of firing which results from synapsing its
inhibitory perceptual input signal together with its excitatory
reference input signal) is not the same as the relationship
perception which the comparator controls* .” If you are talking
about a single level that controls a relationship, it is a
tautology. If you are using the word “relationship” to refer to the
relationship between the perceptual and the reference signal values,
I don’t know where “which the comparator controls” fits into any
form of perceptual control theory.
I am confused about why you treat conscious perceptions as though
they were perceptions in process of being controlled in the
reorganized hierarchy.
Are you confused about what the Seth-Friston connection makes
possible, or do you think there is some evidence against it that you
did not state? If you want to refresh your mind about it, it is
described and contrasted with the Powers connection in [Martin
Taylor 2017.07.11.10.35], which presumably you can find in the
CSGnet archive.
I just noticed that this message was in response to "On 2017/07/9
6:16 PM, Bruce Nevin wrote:
The B:CP view of imagination is that a copy of the reference
signal (here, the reference for a missing bit of input) branches
across to create a perceptual input signal returning to the
originator(s) of the reference signal. B:CP depicts this as a
switch actively making and breaking a neural connection. This
has seemed implausible to me, so I proposed that the imagination
signal is always present. When there is actual perceptual input,
the copy of the reference signal augments it; when there is not,
then the copy of the reference signal provides some (weak) input
of that perception* ." The Seth-Friston accords with this
comment without the need for a special switch.
In brief, I liked this way of having imagination always ‘on’, constituting the perceptual signal in the absence of perceptual input from below, and having negligible influence on the perceptual signal when there is perceptual input from below. More sophisticated than the way of doing it that I suggested in my chapter of the Handbook. I thought it might take a while to suss out unforeseen complications.
But the question at hand is not how the imagination signal is generated, but rather, can you perceive an error signal. In the Friston/Taylor proposal the imagined perceptual input results from synapsing error and reference together. The error signal never by itself constitutes a perceptual signal. (And error is zero when the perception is entirely imaginary, with no perceptual input from below, right?)
The ‘classical’ view is, no, you can’t perceive an error signal and you can’t be aware of an error signal; that is still my view. So you asked
This actually echoes questions that I asked and which you quoted in that 2017 thread that you referenced.
Yes, I can direct my attention to an imagined perception of the desired state of affairs from the point of view of the comparator which sets that reference signal. In a tracking example, that comparator is above the relationship level, setting a reference for ‘cursor at target’ as means of controlling its purpose, ‘satisfy the experimenter,’ perhaps. And I can direct my attention to the actual spatial relationship between cursor and target. To do that, my attention is from the point of view of the relationship comparator. Can I attend to both perceptions at once? Perhaps, but more likely my attention shifts between them.
The disparity between the imagined perception (the reference value for the relationship) and the ‘actual’ perception could conceivably be perceived as some kind of relationship perception, but that is not the error signal.
It may be confusing sometimes that we do perceive the somatic consequences of error. I believe this ‘affect effect’ is extremely important for clinical applications, and have suggested that to Eva.
Over the years I have occasionally heard phrases like ‘experiencing error’ and it has seemed to me that these phrases express this confusion. At the heart of it is the very important and puzzling distinction between perception-as-experienced and perceptual signal.
The experience of perceiving is all we directly have. Indirectly, inferentially, we have theories and models. ‘Perceptual signal’ is an experienced perception for a neuroscientist under certain experimental conditions, but for the most part, ‘perceptual signal’ is a theoretical entity in a model, and though the relationship between the former and the latter has been demonstrated in certain experiments it is more often assumed. We have a good grasp of each end of the relationship between ‘perceptual signal’ and ‘perception-as-experienced’, but the presumed bridge between them is quite foggy. The reason it is foggy is that intellectual constructs and immediate experience seem to be incommensurate in character. The point of science is to use the former to explicate the latter, and use the latter to test and refine the former.
The error signal is firmly on the theoretical construct side, with some few glimpses perhaps by neuroscientists, and our awareness of feelings and emotions is firmly on the experiential side. Feelings are perceptions in the somatic branch of the hierarchy and emotions are perceptions interpreting those feelings at levels above the divergence of the behavioral and somatic branches.
…
But the question at hand
is not how the imagination signal is generated, but
rather, can you perceive an error signal. In the
Friston/Taylor proposal the imagined perceptual input
results from synapsing error and reference together. The
error signal never by itself constitutes a perceptual
signal. (And error is zero when the perception is entirely
imaginary, with no perceptual input from below, right?)
No, it’s the actual perceptual signal that is synthesized (not
synapsed) from the reference value and the error value, not the
imagined perceptual signal. That synthesis is presumed to be a part
of the processing done by the next higher level perceptual functions
to which the perceptual signal would contribute in the Powers
version.
And error is zero when the perception is
entirely imaginary, with no perceptual input from below, right?
I don’t see why that would be necessary, or even usual. Imagined
error is certainly not incorporated into my diagram, but I don’t see
any reason why it couldn’t be.
I the connection circuit that I based on the Seth-Friston proposal,
the error signal and the reference signal are values that can go
anywhere, not just one place. A function that takes both as inputs
can create from them what would be the perceptual value in the
Powers hierarchy (apart from caveats discussed in the old CSGnet
message).
What might the error signal do by itself? For one example, it might
contribute to variation in the rate of reorganization in that part
of the hierarchy, which has sometimes been supposed to depend in
part on the absolute value of the error and its derivative summed
over a larger or smaller part of the hierarchy. It might function as
a perception that could be made conscious. I expect that modellers
might well find other uses for it, but I think that’s enough to make
the point.
The ‘classical’ view is,
no, you can’t perceive an error signal and you can’t be
aware of an error signal; that is still my view. …
The error signal is
firmly on the theoretical construct side,
As is the entire perceptual control hierarchy, in any specific form,
and perhaps in general, though the construct of perceptual control
as the source of behaviour seems to be necessarily implied if one
believes in the general correctness of classical mechanics as an
approximation appropriate to the scales of human perception and
output forces and chemical emissions. Since you can’t have
perceptual control without controlling perceptions to some intended
(reference) values, I don’t see any form of perceptual control that
does not include an error signal.
Everything is theoretical construct except one's conscious
perceptions. You can’t get away from the truth that all you know or
can know depends on whatever you are conscious of. That includes all
theories of perception and of behaviour, as well as of physics and
neuroscience. So to describe something as just a theoretical
construct is hardly a valid argument for its lack of value within
the context of a theory that is accepted for the sake of argument.
I cannot experience your experiences. For myself, I can't think of
an instance in which I am consciously aware of a perception and of
its optimum value to me when I am not also conscious of any
discrepancy between those two values.
I do lean toward the Friston inter-level circuitry in preference to
the Powers version, but that is because it seems to explain
observations that the “classic” connection ignores entirely. But I
have no expectation that it actually describes what goes on in the
brain, even at the coarse level of “neural bundles” and “neural
currents”.
) What I’m trying to do is to get more clarity about a particular part (the process of reorganisation) of a big theory (PCT), using an existing neuroscientific studied process of neurological change (memory reconsolidation). Since, according to PCT, reorganisation covers all processes of learning and change, there must be some link there…
MartinT: