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At 07:48 AM 7/10/2004 -0600, Bill Powers wrote:
At 10:49 PM 5/31/2004 -0400, Bruce Nevin wrote:
At 10:13 PM 6/2/2004 -0400, Bruce Nevin wrote:
At 02:16 PM 6/23/2004 -0400, Bruce Nevin wrote:
At 11:13 PM 7/9/2004 -0400, Bruce Nevin wrote:
At 03:33 PM 7/14/2004 -0400, Bruce Nevin wrote:
A digression on equivocation:
Rick Marken (2004.07.15.0830)–
I think “equivocation” is the
latest
in a long line of slogans that have been developed as a way to
challenge PCT by those who can’t challenge it using modeling or
experimentation.
Rick, why do you think I am challenging PCT? Exposing muddled thinking
and terminological confusion is not a challenge to PCT. You may take it
as a challenge to you to clear up the muddled thinking about what is
“the same” when people are in conflict and to use technical
terms like model and simulation in consistent and unambiguous ways. Or
you may ignore it. But to pretend that I am an enemy of PCT is just
foolish.
Bill, you protest that I am claiming that perceptual signals in two
people are identical, or that I am claiming direct knowledge of the
reality of those signals, or that I am claiming direct knowledge of
environmental variables.
But it does not matter if the perceptual signal CV is a different rate
(or pattern) of firing in your brain and in mine.
It does not matter if the lower level perceptions input to constructing
that perceptual signal are not the same, or are not combined in the same
way, in the perceptual hierarchies of the two people.
It does not even matter if the ultimate nature of the really real reality
of which we assume that our perceptions CV are our respective perceptions
is different for each of us.
If we are each able to control a perception CV in such a way that each
additionally perceives that the other is also controlling what we
perceive as CV (where CV is a perception inside each of us), that
concurrence is a reality of our social interaction, real enough to go on.
Problems may arise, but our control of the perception suffices for all
practical purposes. Problems may arise because after all it is my
perception CV within me and it is your perception CV within you, and
neither of us has any access other than the perception CV to the really
real reality of EV. But problems may arise with any perceptions.
Floorboards may be rotten, doorknobs may come off in our hands. We fix
the floorboard, we put the doorknob back on and tighten the setscrew, we
renegotiate the concordance of our respective perceptions CV. The
ultimate really real reality behind the perceptions is irrelevant, the
really real neural signals do not need to be the same, we only need to
perceive, each of us, that the other is controlling that which we
perceive as CV, a perception which we project into our perceived
environment and naively presume is real.
Bill Powers (2004.07.15.0737 MDT)–
At 08:22 AM 7/15/2004 -0600, Bill Powers wrote:
Bruce Nevin (2004.07.15 08:14 EDT)–
Have you decided that theories and guesses are
not perceptions?
If theories and guesses are perceptions (and I can’t see how they are
not),
then a theory of someone else’s perceptions is a perception of
someone
else’s perceptions.
You never perceive anyone else’s perceptions but your own.
I never perceive my own perceptions as something to be perceived. I
simply perceive. The separation suggested by words like “perceiving
my perceptions” is an illusion, a projection of the separateness of
word and referent.
I never perceive that doorknob as anything distinct from my perception
which I call “doorknob”.
I do perceive my cat standing there, and I perceive that he wants to go
out, even though I cannot see the other side of the cat, nor can I
palpate his desires. Those are my perceptions, not the actual entirety of
the cat, nor the actual perceptions that he is controlling.
Even what you
believe to be your perception of someone else’s perception is strictly
your
own perception.
Of course. What else could it be? I never said my perception of anything
was actually the thing perceived.
That diagram you keep drawing is a perception
in your head
– I know how I see it, but I don’t know how you see it. You may have
a
guess (which is a perception of yours) about what someone else is
perceiving, but it is still a guess in your own head, and is not in
the
other person’s head. If two people have guess-perceptions about a
third
person’s perceptions, and they are different (as they are most likely
to
be), is the third person having both perceptions at once? Or are only
the
perceptions that have passed a rigorous, final-word, Test to be
considered
perceptions of someone else’s perceptions, while the others are
misperceptions?
Or is it just conceivably possible that every person has a unique
internal
representation of the world, unlike anyone else’s, yet capable of
satisfying every test of mutual agreement?
If it satisfies every test of mutual agreement, who cares if they are
different? And why do they care?
Please, prove to me that this is impossible.
I’d love to believe that, but
not just because I’d love to believe it.
Why do you care?
Who cares if the physical basis of the concurrence is unprovable. The
physical basis of anything that you could name is unprovable. Are you
worried that someone might be deceiving you? Skepticism is a necessary
virtue of science. I am not asking you to accept what someone offers you
as concurrence between you and that person. I am asking you to accept
that a proper subject of study for PCT is two people engaging in such
concurrence. Whether they are deceived or mistaken about it, whether the
physical basis of their concurrence is ultimately provable, is
immaterial. The interaction that leads to concurrence and a perception of
mutual trust for coordinated effort, that is a proper subject for PCT.
There is a modicum of social engagement that is necessary for science.
What does it mean to “show” something?
As I said, and I think we concur in this, it is clear that we know, and
can know, nothing about “really real reality” or “boss
reality” other than our perceptions. Science eliminates lots of
things that cannot be true of reality, so that we rely (with ever
increasing reliability) on
the whole discipline of physics, so to raise
doubts about this knowledge you would have to supply a workable
alternative to the world-view of physics. I’m not talking about hunches
and guesses here, but about the application of the most reliable of human
models which fail so seldom that they are held up as the standard of
knowledge, of what it means to know something.
The context of that remark was
Bill Powers (2004.07.07.2140 MDT)–
At 11:10 PM 7/7/2004 -0600, Bill Powers wrote:
Bruce Nevin (2004.07.07 21:22 EDT)
The experimenter
finds out, or himself arranges, that a disturbance of
known behavior is moving the target.
“A disturbance of known behavior”: a perception (referred to by
the word
“known”) about a disturbance, that is, about a perception of a
relationship
between the CV-perception and a perception of another aspect of the
environment. The relationship is such that it “should” change
the CV in the
“known” way.
Yes, and what is the basis of this knowledge and expectation? It’s the
whole discipline of physics, so to raise doubts about this knowledge you
would have to supply a workable alternative to the world-view of physics.
I’m not talking about hunches and guesses here, but about the application
of the most reliable of human models which fail so seldom that they are
held up as the standard of knowledge, of what it means to know something.
Despite what you said when I attempted to affirm the social
character of science …
At 05:38 PM 7/4/2004 -0600, Bill Powers wrote:
Bill Powers (2004.07.07.2140 MDT) –
The CV is shown to
resist disturbances. Is shown to whom?
To the observer.
… and despite your defense of the individual locked up in his isolated
universe of private perceptions unknowable to others (what Bill Williams
attacks as solipsism), these models of physics and other sciences were
not built by isolated individual scientists showing things to themselves.
They were built by scientists showing things to each other.
And it is clear that you expect us to show things to each other,
viz.:
Bill Powers (2004.07.14.1924 MDT)–
At 08:25 PM 7/14/2004 -0600, Bill Powers wrote:
Bruce Nevin (2004.07.14 17:39 EDT)–
As a first step, I am not saying that the
equation is true. Statements like
"two systems in conflict are controlling the same variable with
different
reference values" say that it is true.
But that’s only an hypothesis, not an observation. It has nothing to
do
with reality until you show that it does.
You can have no knowledge of whether or not I have shown something to
myself. Necessarily, what you are demanding here is that I show it to
you.
A digression – or actually popping up from the present digression to
summarize the central argument of this thread:
The thing that you are demanding that I show is not an empirical claim,
it is a logical entailment. You and others have affirmed many times, in
many places, that “two systems in conflict are controlling the same
variable with different reference values”. I have asked what
variable is the same when two people are in conflict. You have been
unable to answer. Is it the environmental variables EV? Rick has
explained that CV is a function of environment variables. Then you are
asserting something about the environment that is unknowable to you. But
your multi-control demonstration shows to you that the control systems
could be constructing a perception of “the same” EV as
functions of what the model tells you are “really” (within the
model) different variables. Is it the perception labeled CV? Then you are
asserting that a perception in one individual is “the same” as
a perception in another. So what variable is it that is the same when two
autonomous control systems are in conflict? To crystallize this dilemma,
I have said that the assertion “two systems in conflict are
controlling the same variable with different reference values” is an
assertion of the equivalence
CV(observer) == EV ==
CV(controller)
That is a logical entailment. When you assert that “two systems in
conflict are controlling the same variable with different reference
values” you are asserting the above equivalence. So when you expand
this (Bill Powers 2004.07.14.1441 MDT, timestamped 02:37 PM) –
CV(obs) <–Perc Hierarchy(0bs)<-- EV
–>Perc Hierarchy(Ctrl) → CV(Ctrl)
and ask “What is your proof that the two perceptual hierarchies are
identical?” that is a question for you to answer yourself. Or if you
don’t like that question, then what variable is “the same” when
two people are in conflict?
I think that your multi-control demo may compel you to weaken the above
statement about interpersonal conflict. Or can you still claim that EV is
the same for both of the conflicting parties?
OK, returning now to your defense of the individual locked in his
isolated universe of private perceptions, and whether scientists
“show” things to each other or only to themselves. You yourself
have frequently talked of “showing” things in the former sense.
For example:
At 07:23 PM 7/14/2004 -0600, Bill Powers wrote:
Bill Powers (2004.07.14.1849 MDT)]
At the meeting I will show you the difference between force control
and position control. There is no conflict. If I am controlling the force
my hand is applying (as I sense it), I can’t also control the position of
my hand. If I am controlling the position of my hand, I can’t also
control the force I apply.
At 08:41 AM 7/10/2004 -0600, Bill Powers wrote:
Bill Powers (2004.07.10.0803 MDT)–
I showed the program to my eye surgeon, who was delighted and got it
immediately, although of course the wrong rectangle looked yellow to
him
since it was the one seen by my right eye. He had never before known
how
the world looked to a cataract patient, although he does about 18
surgeries
a week.
Bill Powers (2004.07.08.1051 MDT)
For those driving from O’Hare to the meeting,
attached is a map showing how
you get off I90 onto Fullerton Ave.
Bill Powers (2004.07.04.1655 MDT)
At 05:38 PM 7/4/2004 -0600, Bill Powers wrote:
This year, as I promised last year, I have the
multicontrol model working with reorganization. The input functions are
reorganized in a way that I’m fairly sure is tending to make the
perceptual input functions orthogonal, reducing the amount of mutual
disturbance. This is shown by the fact that control gets better with
time, while the total amount of output being used for control over all
systems decreases drastically. There is much yet to learn from this
model.
Indeed, what is a demo if its purpose is not to show something to someone
other than yourself?
To show another is to enable them to show themselves, but only if they
actually do so. In that subtle difference between showing yourself
something and showing another something lies the future success of PCT,
or its oblivion until others discover and work out the application of
negative feedback control to the sciences of living things. Does that
give you some motivation to consider that interactions that lead to
concurrence and a perception of mutual trust for coordinated effort are a
proper subject for PCT? Will you trust me that I am not trying to
subvert, or steal, or divert, and work with me on this? Or will you
continue to try to paint me as “one of those” who are
“doing that again”, e.g.
Bill Powers (2004.07.13.1604 MDT)–
I can see that if I were to prevail, you would
lose something of great value that concerns your chosen profession, or
the category of social science to which it belongs: the idea that it
stands above all other scientific endeavors in its ability to determine
what is going on in Real Reality. I do not think you will get much
agreement on this except from other social scientists who would also
enjoy thinking that they had a special place among
scientists.
Again, you are very confident not only about my words but also about the
unspoken assumption in them. But you have forgotten the words. Perhaps
you are passing them through a filter that prefers to admit the familiar.
I have no standing in linguistics or the social sciences. I have no
interest vested in preserving or promoting them as presently constituted.
I do have an interest in a PCT investigation of social and cultural
phenomena, including language.
Bill Powers (2004.07.13.1604 MDT)–
At 04:37 PM 7/13/2004 -0600, Bill Powers wrote:
![d18a7a6.jpg]()
This is what I am talking about. This is how I think of the observer
doing the test
OK. At least some of the arrows in this diagram are also perceptions of
the Observer who is doing the Test to identify the CV. If the Observer is
doing the Test, then the observer perceives and measures the controller’s
outputs qo(Controller) and the observer’s own outputs qo(Observer) and if
the model of the Controller is to include a value for the reference input
to the comparator the Observer must measure the input quantity
qi(Controller).
In your diagram, the Observer perceives a model of the Controller and of
the environment. But there is another modeler outside the diagram, the
referent of “my” in “my model of the observer’s
perceptions”. So what we see is a model of a modeler.
So let’s include in our model that which the modeler (in the model) is
modeling. Now put the observer, the observed system, and their
environment into the same model together.
![12370555.jpg]()
We have a model of the environment (including EV), and in it the
Controller and the observer, which in turn contains (as above) a model of
the controller and of the environment. The Observer inside this model can
only perceive the Controller as a black box in his or her environment.
However, EV is also in the environment along with the Controller. The
Observer’s perception CV is a function of perceptual inputs from EV in
the environment.
I have not cluttered this diagram with arrows showing where the
perceptions of the controller, qo(controller), qi(Controller), and other
perceptions of the environment come from. The Observer cannot perceive
the control structures inside the Controller, so the perception of the
Controller inside the Observer is a black box. (That would be represented
by an arrow from the exterior of the box labeled Controller to the box
labeled Perception of Controller inside the Observer.) Models are built
from the omniscient point of view of theory, however, so the model of
this dyad does represent the Controller as a control system, including
all the necessary structures to perceive EV and to control a perception
of it.
Within this model, EV is really present in the environment shared by the
Controller and the Observer and is really the same EV for both of them.
The Observer cannot know that and cannot prove that. Nonetheless, the
model asserts that. It is this tacit assumption that I have been working
to expose.
Bill Powers (2004.07.14.1924 MDT)–
The problem here is one of points of view, as
Martin Taylor once pointed
out. We are asking questions about what one party to a relationship
can
know about the other party, but you’re offering analyses from the
standpoint of an omniscient third party. That third party is imaginary,
and
can’t be considered equivalent to either of the real parties. What such
a
third party can know is irrelevant to what either of the real parties
can
know. If you’re going to come up with a relevant conclusion, it has to
be
in terms of what one person can know, not what we can imagine that a
nonexistent omniscient observer can know.
The omniscient observer is the modeler, outside the frame of the model.
It is you, looking at that diagram above. Actually, it is theory that has
the omniscient point of view, and the modeler is informed by (possibly
mistaken) theory. With the expanded diagram above we propose to model the
relationship between the observer and the observed control system during
the Test. In the above diagram, we can model how the observer may control
his perception of the arrow that points into the black-box perception of
the Controller, closing the control loop through the environment outside
the Observer (but still inside the above model). The Observer may cut off
or disturb that perceptual input in order to show that the Controller is
indeed perceiving what the Observer perceives as CV. And so on.
If you look at your email at the Conference, we can pursue this
further.
/Bruce
Nevin
