signals and experience

i.kurtzer (990719.1530)

>From [ Marc Abrams (990719.1326)]

What I seem to be having a hard time with is this: Are _all_ signals ( i.e.
error, reference, perceptual ) considered your "perception". I thought that
your "perception" was _strictly_ from your input function to the comparator

I think that to identify "perception" with the signals in the model would be
premature. The terms in the theory were chosen to provide a starting point and
a heuristic, but identifying the two would require far more than what we have
presently. For example, i think we could make the rational division of our
experiential world into "is's" and "should's" . This could be applicable to
many different sorts of experiences. We could make a rough matching of "is's"
with perceptual signals and "should's" with reference signals. I personally
don't find much shouldness is the is's. In fact, I sometimes enjoy shedding the
"should's" and just keep the "is's".I don't find the "should's" and "is's" to be
the same. But maybe the "should" of one level-I is the "is" for another
level-I+1above it in the hierarchy.
Intuitively, i agree as a rough outline, but to convince would require some very
tight phenomology. If anyone is interested I talked about this at the '98
conference.
Take home message: i think that perceptual signals and experience can be
loosely identified in private talk but should not be the basis of scientific
arguments.

i.

from [ Marc Abrams (990719.1804) ]

i.kurtzer (990719.1530)

I think that to identify "perception" with the signals in the model would

be

premature. The terms in the theory were chosen to provide a starting

point and

a heuristic, but identifying the two would require far more than what we

have

presently.

Understood. No problem

For example, i think we could make the rational division of our
experiential world into "is's" and "should's" . This could be applicable

to

many different sorts of experiences.

Interesting. What about "maybe's" or "could's"?

We could make a rough matching of "is's"
with perceptual signals and "should's" with reference signals.

Again, an interesting slant. I'm not sure where a "maybe" or a "could" would
fit in.

I personally don't find much shouldness is the is's. In fact, I sometimes

enjoy shedding the

"should's" and just keep the "is's".I don't find the "should's" and "is's"

to be

the same.

They aren't the same. When you "shed" a "should" ( quick, say it fast 5
times :slight_smile: ) aren't you simply replacing one should with another? Isn't
having no reference, in fact a reference for having no reference?

But maybe the "should" of one level-I is the "is" for another
level-I+1above it in the hierarchy.

Yes, that's one of the postulates of Bill P in Chap 15. When a loop is in
"imagination mode".

Intuitively, i agree as a rough outline, but to convince would require

some very

tight phenomology. If anyone is interested I talked about this at the '98
conference.

Thanks for the reference. I'll take a look. I have a problem with
phenomology. I think "It's all perception" and "Objective reality" are
mutually exclusive in that we can _never_ experience objective reality, even
though it might exist. How would we _know_ it (objective reality) if we
experienced it?

Marc

i.kurtzer (990720.1100)

From [ Marc Abrams (990719.1804) ]

> i.kurtzer (990719.1530)

> For example, i think we could make the rational division of our
> experiential world into "is's" and "should's" . This could be applicable
to
> many different sorts of experiences.

Interesting. What about "maybe's" or "could's"?

they exist..as what i don't know..

> I personally don't find much shouldness is the is's. In fact, I sometimes
enjoy shedding the
> "should's" and just keep the "is's".I don't find the "should's" and "is's"
to be
> the same.

They aren't the same. When you "shed" a "should" ( quick, say it fast 5
times :slight_smile: ) aren't you simply replacing one should with another? Isn't
having no reference, in fact a reference for having no reference?

i think you can make a logical puzzle out of it, but i don't think that
would be accurate or fruitful because i can say that everything is either
marken or not-marken. Wwe can then each pick our favorite
thing/not-thing and we haven't made much progress.
Also, on experential grounds there is a difference between
no-marken and . The second was logically but not
experientally not-marken. Also, scientifically there is a enormous
difference between having a no-reference (ex. no-marken) and having no
reference ( ). As soon as one gets into the regime of marken then
the first system will full throttle push its world back into no-marken
while the other simply doesn't care, i.e will not vary its outputs.
Finding very little marken in the world one can easily confuse the two,
and its been a running debate on this net which
one is more accurate in explaining the lack of PCT's acceptance.

>

>But maybe the "should" of one level-I is the "is" for another
> level-I+1above it in the hierarchy.

Yes, that's one of the postulates of Bill P in Chap 15. When a loop is in
"imagination mode".

but i need some phenomolgical argument to identify "should's" and "is's"
with particular signals. and that argument is currently lacking.

> Intuitively, i agree as a rough outline, but to convince would require
some very
> tight phenomology. If anyone is interested I talked about this at the '98
> conference.

Thanks for the reference. I'll take a look. I have a problem with
phenomology. I think "It's all perception" and "Objective reality" are
mutually exclusive in that we can _never_ experience objective reality, even
though it might exist. How would we _know_ it (objective reality) if we
experienced it?

One's faith in an "extra" is actually tangential to this distinction of
phenomology and science. I think the "extra" is very consistent with what
we know of science, less so for phenomology. I should makes sense that we
have "sweet" and "bitter" insofar that their causal counterparts
are generally things that have sugar and things that have spoiled. That
doesn't give a reason why "bitter" and "sweet" are of the same sort of
experience rather than "bitter" and "table" but there should be a
partioning experientiallly if the enviromental partion is important to our
survival. (Note to easily tweaked individuals, this not "affordances"
just vanilla evolutionary theory with one extra step, the phenomological
"witness".) Anyway, phenomology is, or rather should be, concerned with
the logical relations of experience of which there are no falsifying
instances. Science is concerned falsifiable logical
relations/explanations. That seems pretty conservative.

i.

i.kurtzer (990721.1210)

[From Rick Marken (990721.0850)]

i.kurtzer (990719.1530) --

> I think that to identify "perception" with the signals in the
> model would be premature.

Marc Abrams (990719.1804) --

> Understood. No problem

Then you guys are going to be very disappointed when you find that
"perception", in PCT, is identified as "a perceptual signal (inside
a system) that is a continuous analogue of a state of affairs
outside the system". (B:CP, p. 286). This identification of
"perception" with one particular signal inside the model (the
"perceptual signal") was made by Bill in about 1973.

Should i reference Hobbes who made the same point that "reasoning is but
reckoning" in 1651? Come on. This issue is a metaphysical commitment
that dates back to Decartes and was not given a new twist by Powers that
I am aware of. I do think that it can be fruitfully researched, but
that would be a project out of my league.

i.

[From Rick Marken (990721.0850)]

i.kurtzer (990719.1530) --

I think that to identify "perception" with the signals in the
model would be premature.

Marc Abrams (990719.1804) --

Understood. No problem

Then you guys are going to be very disappointed when you find that
"perception", in PCT, is identified as "a perceptual signal (inside
a system) that is a continuous analogue of a state of affairs
outside the system". (B:CP, p. 286). This identification of
"perception" with one particular signal inside the model (the
"perceptual signal") was made by Bill in about 1973.

I'm off to the meeting to keep more people from accepting PCT.
You guys now have time to make up for all my (so far remarkably
successful) efforts to keep people from accepting PCT.

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

i.kurtzer (990721.1350)

[From Bruce Nevin (990721.1302 EDT)]

i.kurtzer (990721.1210)--

Looks to me like this is one of those "special assumptions" that you try to
minimize in a science, an assumption about matters that we can't know
directly by any means that we are aware of, but which we believe are
reasonably inferred from properties such as consistency of perceptions with
internally and mutually consistent verbal and symbolic constructs
(theories) to which we then attribute reality. Modelling is an especially
strong form of validation. Seems to me that Rick's right to identify it as
a fundamental assumption of PCT; Isaac's right to emphasize that it's not a
fact, it's an assumption.

You're right. What is one person's assumption is another person's question.

One way to test part of it would be to isolate a signal and track it along
with a person's subjective report of a perception that you think
corresponds to it.

That is not the same as the form of the percept. To that presumably there a
set of qualitatively distinct operations that demarcate the Perceptual Input
Functions of one level from another, that corresponds to whatever qualitative
differences exist from one level to another.

Has anyone ever got up close and personal with the first
half of that? This would test whether "signal" correlates with "perception"
but of course not whether "perception" or "signal" correlates with reality.

Some stuff certainly depending on what one calls a signal.

i.

from [ Marc Abrams (990721.1415)]

[From Rick Marken (990721.0850)]

i.kurtzer (990719.1530) --

> I think that to identify "perception" with the signals in the
> model would be premature.

Marc Abrams (990719.1804) --

> Understood. No problem

Then you guys are going to be very disappointed when you find that
"perception", in PCT, is identified as "a perceptual signal (inside
a system) that is a continuous analogue of a state of affairs
outside the system". (B:CP, p. 286). This identification of
"perception" with one particular signal inside the model (the
"perceptual signal") was made by Bill in about 1973.

Geez Rick. Another great example of petty and small. Isaac was making a
statement about the "truthfulness" ( the degree that you may believe
something is in fact true ) of tieing the word "perception"( as it is
currently understood in CSGnet ) to "neural signals.". Can we deferenciate
in a neural signal the difference between a "perceptual" neural signal and
one of another kind?
This _not_ to say that Bill's position is a false one. Nor is it an attack
on someones credibility. It is somply a statement of what is known and some
might consider "fact".

_Lighten up_ :slight_smile:

Isaac said and I agree with

I do think that it can be fruitfully researched, but that would be a

project out of my league.

I'm off to the meeting to keep more people from accepting PCT.
You guys now have time to make up for all my (so far remarkably
successful) efforts to keep people from accepting PCT.

Is the conference going that well? :slight_smile:

Marc

from [Marc Abrams (990721.1448)]

i.kurtzer (990721.1350)

> [From Bruce Nevin (990721.1302 EDT)]
>
> i.kurtzer (990721.1210)--
>
> Looks to me like this is one of those "special assumptions" that you try

to

> minimize in a science, an assumption about matters that we can't know
> directly by any means that we are aware of, but which we believe are
> reasonably inferred from properties such as consistency of perceptions

with

> internally and mutually consistent verbal and symbolic constructs
> (theories) to which we then attribute reality. Modelling is an

especially

> strong form of validation. Seems to me that Rick's right to identify it

as

> a fundamental assumption of PCT; Isaac's right to emphasize that it's

not a

> fact, it's an assumption.
>

You're right. What is one person's assumption is another person's

question.

You're both right. ( Isn't there some law that states that not more then two
people can agree on any one thing on CSGnet at any one time :slight_smile: )

Marc

[From Bruce Nevin (990721.1302 EDT)]

i.kurtzer (990721.1210)--

Looks to me like this is one of those "special assumptions" that you try to
minimize in a science, an assumption about matters that we can't know
directly by any means that we are aware of, but which we believe are
reasonably inferred from properties such as consistency of perceptions with
internally and mutually consistent verbal and symbolic constructs
(theories) to which we then attribute reality. Modelling is an especially
strong form of validation. Seems to me that Rick's right to identify it as
a fundamental assumption of PCT; Isaac's right to emphasize that it's not a
fact, it's an assumption.

One way to test part of it would be to isolate a signal and track it along
with a person's subjective report of a perception that you think
corresponds to it. Has anyone ever got up close and personal with the first
half of that? This would test whether "signal" correlates with "perception"
but of course not whether "perception" or "signal" correlates with reality.

  Bruce Nevin

···

[From Rick Marken (990721.0850)]

i.kurtzer (990719.1530) --

> I think that to identify "perception" with the signals in the
> model would be premature.

Marc Abrams (990719.1804) --

> Understood. No problem

Then you guys are going to be very disappointed when you find that
"perception", in PCT, is identified as "a perceptual signal (inside
a system) that is a continuous analogue of a state of affairs
outside the system". (B:CP, p. 286). This identification of
"perception" with one particular signal inside the model (the
"perceptual signal") was made by Bill in about 1973.

Should i reference Hobbes who made the same point that "reasoning is but
reckoning" in 1651? Come on. This issue is a metaphysical commitment
that dates back to Decartes and was not given a new twist by Powers that
I am aware of. I do think that it can be fruitfully researched, but
that would be a project out of my league.

i.

[From Bill Powers (990730.1730 MDT)]

Back from the CSG meeting followed by a six-day trip to and through the
Canadian Rockies. There were 18 at the MOL session before the CSG meeting,
and about the same for the "main" meeting. Both meetings were well worth
attending.
I'll reply to a smattering of the 190 posts that arrived while I was gone.

i.kurtzer (990720.1100)

but i need some phenomolgical argument to identify "should's" and "is's"
with particular signals. and that argument is currently lacking.

A "should" is a reference signal isn't it? German engineers, in fact, use
the term "Sollwert" for this signal -- "should-be." The perceptual signal,
on the other hand, is what we experience as the world -- it's what "is", as
far as we can know.

Phenomenologically, we experience a "should" as a pseudo-perception,
similar to a real one but not originating in current lower-level
perceptions. "Should" describes an experience contrary to what is actually
being experienced, and carries the implication that a person is expected or
obligated to bring the described pseudo-perception into real existence.
This, of course, requires accepting the described "should" as one's own
reference condition -- without that, a "should" carries no force.

Is that what you're asking about?

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (990730.1731 MDT)]

i.kurtzer (990721.1210)

This identification of
"perception" with one particular signal inside the model (the
"perceptual signal") was made by Bill in about 1973.

Should i reference Hobbes who made the same point that "reasoning is but
reckoning" in 1651? Come on.

Come on what? Do you understand Hobbes to have meant by "reckoning" the
existence of a signal in a perceptual pathway, a signal the magnitude of
which is an analog of some other quantity? If so, how did you arrive at
that interpretation? I would maintain that nobody on earth understood
"analog" in this way until about the 1940s, when electronic analog
computing came into being.

Also, what does either "reasoning" or "reckoning" have to do with perception?

This issue is a metaphysical commitment
that dates back to Decartes and was not given a new twist by Powers that
I am aware of.

I'll admit that I didn't invent analog computing, but you'd have a hard
time proving that Descartes did, either. Descartes thought, or at least
proposed, that the warmth of a fire pulled on a sensory nerve rather like a
bell-pull, opening pores in the ventricles of the brain and letting _elan
vital_ flow into the muscles, pumping them up to produce behavior that
removed the affected limb from the fire. Exactly which part of this
corresponds to the perception of warmth in Descartes' model? As far as I
know, he didn't even try to account for perception.

Anyhow, why are we worrying about what anyone said in 1651? "Reasoning is
but reckoning" is gobbldegook, any communicable meaning having been lost
through more than 350 years of language drift. You don't know what Hobbes
meant by those words any more than I do.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (990730.1956 MDT)]

Bruce Nevin (990721.1302 EDT)--

One way to test part of it would be to isolate a signal and track it along
with a person's subjective report of a perception that you think
corresponds to it. Has anyone ever got up close and personal with the first
half of that? This would test whether "signal" correlates with "perception"
but of course not whether "perception" or "signal" correlates with reality.

Yes. The amount of evidence is not great, since getting it requires
stimulating or inserting measurement electrodes in the brain of an awake
human being. However, Penfield and Roberts (1959: Speech and Brain
Mechanisms. Princeton: Princeton University Press) did quite a lot of it in
connection with diagnosing brain problems. B:CP contains numerous
references to Penfield's experiments (pages 123, 124, 128, 134 and 135 are
indexed). These experiments show that perceptions can be evoked by
generating signals in afferent locations of the brain, perceptions which
are extremely vivid in some cases. There is no proof that the exact point
stimulated is the critical location, but we can be pretty sure that signals
_somewhere_ in the brain resulting from stimulation give rise to subjective
experiences that are just like ordinary perceptions of the world.

In other experiments (with animals such as monkeys), it has been shown that
imagined (i.e., anticipated) perceptions give rise to neural activity in
the same neurons that become active when the same perception actually
occurs because of lower-level sensory activity. Some assumptions are
involved but I see no reasonable alternative explanations. Of course this
gives us no subjective report -- animals can't describe their experiences
-- but again I see no reasonable alternative to assuming that a human being
in the same situation would first consciously imagine, then conscously
perceive the item in question, and that both experiences would involve
activity in the same neural pathway. Some of these experiments are
referenced on pp. 226-227 of B:CP. Since the 1970s and continuing to the
present, the same sorts of experiments have been done with brain-scan
techniques in humans and show the same result: the imagined perception and
the real one go with activity in the same part of the brain. Spatial
resolution is not high in brain-scans, but the latest data certainly remain
consistent with the model I offered.

These experiments, even with human beings, do not tell us whether the
perceptual signals correspond to objective features of reality. They tell
us only that when the test subject is presented with a given environment,
signals reliably occur when we, the observers, are observing identifiable
things in our own experiential worlds. That's as close as we will ever get
to reaching agreement about reality.

Best,

Bill P.

i.kurtzer (990730.2100)

[From Bill Powers (990730.1730 MDT)]

>i.kurtzer (990720.1100)

>but i need some phenomolgical argument to identify "should's" and "is's"
>with particular signals. and that argument is currently lacking.

A "should" is a reference signal isn't it? German engineers, in fact, use
the term "Sollwert" for this signal -- "should-be." The perceptual signal,
on the other hand, is what we experience as the world -- it's what "is", as
far as we can know.

Phenomenologically, we experience a "should" as a pseudo-perception,
similar to a real one but not originating in current lower-level
perceptions. "Should" describes an experience contrary to what is actually
being experienced, and carries the implication that a person is expected or
obligated to bring the described pseudo-perception into real existence.
This, of course, requires accepting the described "should" as one's own
reference condition -- without that, a "should" carries no force.

I agree. In fact I heartily agree. But some people's toothpicks are coming up
with a logical relation--besides cooincidence-- between our experiences and a
scientific description. Its just my toothpick.

i.

i.kurtzer (990730.2150)

[From Bill Powers (990730.1731 MDT)]

>i.kurtzer (990721.1210)
>
>> This identification of
>> "perception" with one particular signal inside the model (the
>> "perceptual signal") was made by Bill in about 1973.
>>
>
>Should i reference Hobbes who made the same point that "reasoning is but
>reckoning" in 1651? Come on.

Come on what? Do you understand Hobbes to have meant by "reckoning" the
existence of a signal in a perceptual pathway, a signal the magnitude of
which is an analog of some other quantity?

Analgue is irrelevant. He was very clear that the experience was identified with
a material process that has a formal structure. That you like an analogue
mapping is one thing..But the point is the same and not new.

I'll admit that I didn't invent analog computing, but you'd have a hard
time proving that Descartes did, either.

Analogue is not the issue. That is a particular computional approach after the
more general metaphysical commitment of identifying the signals with experience.
Its a very rational identification, but not novel, and not without a buggera-boo
of quandries, though they are peripheral to most scientific programmes.

Anyhow, why are we worrying about what anyone said in 1651? "Reasoning is
but reckoning" is gobbldegook, any communicable meaning having been lost
through more than 350 years of language drift. You don't know what Hobbes
meant by those words any more than I do.

That statement was within a context of thought that he worked at pains to make
clear, as much as "behavior the control of percption" could be misconstrued but
means something very particular if you take the time to learn.

i.

[From Bill Powers (990731.0809 MDT)]

i.kurtzer (990730.2150)--

Do you understand Hobbes to have meant by "reckoning" the
existence of a signal in a perceptual pathway, a signal the magnitude of
which is an analog of some other quantity?

Analgue is irrelevant. He was very clear that the experience was

identified with

a material process that has a formal structure.

Are those Hobbes' words or your attempt to put his words into modern terms?
"Material process that has a formal structure" seems like an oxymoron to
me: a material process is one thing (neurotransmitters, voltages, calcium
ions), and a formal structure is a mental concept, a completely different
thing.

As to analog being irrelevant, I beg to differ: it's the whole ball game.
If you perceive a square object, its squareness is not represented by a
square neural signal or a square pattern of neural signals. In PCT, it's
represented by a one-dimensional neural signal that can vary only between
zero impulses per second and some maximum number of impulses per second
standing for (and experienced as) the maximum possible squareness. This is
true of every experience ranging from the intensity of a light to the sense
of one's own bravery. All neural signals are basically alike: one
dimensional, standing for only one dimension of experience. To an
electronic measuring instrument, these impulses do not look like the
experiences they represent. To the brain containing these signals, they
_are_ the experiences.

In an analog computer, a variable is not represented by a symbol but by
another physical variable of a standard type: a voltage in an electronic
analog computer, a frequency of firing in a brain. Computations are carried
out not by manipulating symbols according to rules, but by neural circuits
having properties that produce the right relationships between voltages or
frequencies. In PCT, none of the systems below the level of categories ever
produces a symbol as an indication of its output. All operations take place
in terms of one signal being a continuous function of others, with the
outputs also being continuous signals.

That you like an analogue
mapping is one thing..But the point is the same and not new.

If you state any two propositions abstractly enough, they will appear to be
the same because you subsume them under the same generalization. But this
does not mean they have anything to do with each other; it means only that
you prefer not to see the differences.

I'll admit that I didn't invent analog computing, but you'd have a hard
time proving that Descartes did, either.

Analogue is not the issue. That is a particular computional approach

after the

more general metaphysical commitment of identifying the signals with

experience.

Its a very rational identification, but not novel, and not without a

buggera-boo

of quandries, though they are peripheral to most scientific programmes.

Only philosophers, apparently, have trouble with analog computing.
Engineers and scientists have used that method for at least 5 decades. In
PCT it's used all the time, although our analog computers exist as programs
in digital ones. What's the alternative? It's to treat experience as a
collection of verbal propositions which are either true or false. While any
proper model must allow for that mode of experience, it is certainly not
the only or even the primary mode.

The committment to a signal model of experience is not at all metaphysical.
It's a matter of studying the relationships between human experiences and
sensory/neural equipment in the body, a kind of information not available
to Hobbes or Descartes. It's quite clear, now, that experience of the
present-time world cannot happen without neural signals in the afferent
channels. This isn't a metaphysical matter; it's a matter of forming the
simplest theory that explains and predicts observations. I explain your
visual experiences in part by referring to your optic nerve, and I predict
that if your optic nerve ceases to function you will have no more visual
experiences of the present-time world. That reasoning is not metaphysical;
it's just physical.

Anyhow, why are we worrying about what anyone said in 1651? "Reasoning is
but reckoning" is gobbldegook, any communicable meaning having been lost
through more than 350 years of language drift. You don't know what Hobbes
meant by those words any more than I do.

That statement was within a context of thought that he worked at pains to

make

clear, as much as "behavior the control of percption" could be

misconstrued but

means something very particular if you take the time to learn.

But how could Hobbes have meant something, or been clear about something,
about which he knew nothing? He may have had some vague ideas about brain
operation, but whatever he meant, it was not what we would now mean when we
use the same words. It couldn't have been. Meanings come from experiences,
and he couldn't have had the experiences necessary for him to understand
the world as we now understand it. You would run into the same objections
if you were to claim that alchemists anticipated chemistry or quantum
mechanics.

Best,

Bill P.

i.kurtzer (990731.0809)

[From Bill Powers (990731.0809 MDT)]

i.kurtzer (990730.2150)--

>> Do you understand Hobbes to have meant by "reckoning" the
>> existence of a signal in a perceptual pathway, a signal the magnitude of
>> which is an analog of some other quantity?
>
>Analgue is irrelevant. He was very clear that the experience was
identified with
>a material process that has a formal structure.

Are those Hobbes' words or your attempt to put his words into modern terms?

That is a consensus of historians and philosophers and is quite obvious becuase
of the bevy of materialistic metaphors that were pervasive at the time. Of
course, they refered to technologies of their time.

"Material process that has a formal structure" seems like an oxymoron to
me: a material process is one thing (neurotransmitters, voltages, calcium
ions), and a formal structure is a mental concept, a completely different
thing.

This is getting way out of hand. The description of peanut butter can be
realized by many symbol systems. Now, I don't think that is the taste of peanut
butter. Either way thats a metaphysical commitment. And most genenral
commitments have been drawn out about three centuries ago.

As to analog being irrelevant, I beg to differ: it's the whole ball game.
If you perceive a square object, its squareness is not represented by a
square neural signal or a square pattern of neural signals. In PCT, it's
represented by a one-dimensional neural signal.

WHAT neural signal!!This is confusing a particular coding scheme with the thrust
of PCT. PCT is not married to a coding scheme, its married to 1)a
phenemonon-control and 2) a process --the formal elements necessary for control.

that can vary only between
rzero impulses per second and some maximum number of impulses per second
standing for (and experienced as) the maximum possible squareness. This is
true of every experience ranging from the intensity of a light to the sense
of one's own bravery. All neural signals are basically alike: one
dimensional, standing for only one dimension of experience.

This is based on a reading of the literature of three decades ago. It is
inaccurate and you will not convince anyone of the process of control by marrying
ANY particular coding scheme.

To an
electronic measuring instrument, these impulses do not look like the
experiences they represent. To the brain containing these signals, they
_are_ the experiences.

Metaphysical commitment again OUTSIDE the issue of coding schemes and PCT.

In an analog computer, a variable is not represented by a symbol but by
another physical variable of a standard type: a voltage in an electronic
analog computer, a frequency of firing in a brain.

Dude, seriously. This is backed by the flimsiest evidence. If there is any
consensus in computational neuroscience. Its that this is seriously inadequate.
I am not suggesting you brush up on computational neuroscience. Instead you
should realize that you are fighting a windmill here. This issue is outside PCT
per se.

Computations are carried
out not by manipulating symbols according to rules, but by neural circuits
having properties that produce the right relationships between voltages or
frequencies. In PCT, none of the systems below the level of categories ever
produces a symbol as an indication of its output.

And in PCT this has ZERO evidence. You are falling from one propostion that is
tangential and has no evidence to another that is tangential and has no
evidence. This will systematically shoot PCT in the gonads. We need to realize
what are the substantial battles and what are windmills that have accreted over
time as fact or essential parts of the theory.

i.

from [ Marc Abrams (990731.1710) ]

i.kurtzer (990731.0809)

A _very_ thought provoking post.

I'll stay away from the arguments I have little knowledge of ( meaning, most
of it :slight_smile: ) and focus on the issues for me raises some interesting questions

> [From Bill Powers (990731.0809 MDT)]

> In an analog computer, a variable is not represented by a symbol but by
> another physical variable of a standard type: a voltage in an electronic
> analog computer, a frequency of firing in a brain.

Dude, seriously. This is backed by the flimsiest evidence. If there is

any

consensus in computational neuroscience. Its that this is seriously

inadequate.

I am not suggesting you brush up on computational neuroscience. Instead

you

should realize that you are fighting a windmill here. This issue is

outside PCT

per se.

I am staying away from the analog argument and computational neuroscience.
The issue of fighting "windmills" is important. Isaac, I know that you feel
very strongly about PCT and much less so about HPCT ( The Hierarchy ). The
main reason being that for all intents and purposes, the Hierarchy in _any_
form has as yet been "validated" by "scientific" evidence. Yes. some of the
lower levels have been researched but the higher ones have not. Am I correct
in this assumption?

If so how do you propose to bridge the "pre-scientific" with the
"scientific". I don't mean you personally :slight_smile: At what point does something
move from the "pre-scientific" to the "scientific"? When does Galilleo move
from an inventor/tinkerer to a scientist? Can he do one without the other?.
I think you are being a bit harsh on Bill. Yes, very little "data" is
currently present to validate the entire Hierarchy. But does that mean it's
not worth testing? Does that make the hierarchy a "windmill". I don't think
so. Even the extrodinary data provided by the tracking experiments doesn't
rule out other possibilites that might "account" for that data.

But a bigger issue that you raise, and one far more important you raise
below. _What_ is PCT, and who gets to define what it should or shouldn't
encompass?

You suggest that PCT is a phenomenon and a Process. You failed to mention of
what? Bill has clearly delineated what _he_ feels PCT encompasses and why.
Has everything that Bill has proposed been validated? Of course not. But
does that again, make it into windmills. I agree that we must be _very_
careful about aspects of the theory that have accreted over time as fact or
essential parts of the theory. But I don't think that that in and of itself
creates the windmills. You need to add a bit of hyperbole and inflexability
toward others for it to become dangerous.

Bill has laid a pretty darn good foundation. It is up to others to validate
the various aspects of his proposal. This validation will not, and can not
start out as very narrowly focused scientific research.
Hell ,we are not even sure what form some of the data takes. ( like memory )
I think it's a bit harsh, because nothing has been _invalidated_ elsewhere.
Much work needs to be done. Most of it initially probably not of the
"Kurtzer School of Scientific Validity". But that doesn't make it bad,
wrong, or stupid. It only means that it's _incomplete_. That's not
necessarily a bad thing.

Marc

Bill:

> Computations are carried
> out not by manipulating symbols according to rules, but by neural

circuits

> having properties that produce the right relationships between voltages

or

> frequencies. In PCT, none of the systems below the level of categories

ever

> produces a symbol as an indication of its output.

Isaac:

And in PCT this has ZERO evidence. You are falling from one propostion

that is

tangential and has no evidence to another that is tangential and has no
evidence. This will systematically shoot PCT in the gonads. We need to

realize

what are the substantial battles and what are windmills that have accreted

over

time as fact or essential parts of the theory.

WHAT neural signal!!This is confusing a particular coding scheme with the

thrust

of PCT. PCT is not married to a coding scheme, its married to 1)a
phenomenon-control and 2) a process --the formal elements necessary for

control.

i.kurtzer (990731.1810)

>From [ Marc Abrams (990731.1710) ]

> i.kurtzer (990731.0809)

> > [From Bill Powers (990731.0809 MDT)]

I am staying away from the analog argument and computational neuroscience.
The issue of fighting "windmills" is important. Isaac, I know that you feel
very strongly about PCT and much less so about HPCT ( The Hierarchy ). The
main reason being that for all intents and purposes, the Hierarchy in _any_
form has as yet been "validated" by "scientific" evidence. Yes. some of the
lower levels have been researched but the higher ones have not. Am I correct
in this assumption?

Very accurate assment of my take.

If so how do you propose to bridge the "pre-scientific" with the
"scientific". I don't mean you personally :slight_smile: At what point does something
move from the "pre-scientific" to the "scientific"? When does Galilleo move
from an inventor/tinkerer to a scientist? Can he do one without the other?.
I think you are being a bit harsh on Bill. Yes, very little "data" is
currently present to validate the entire Hierarchy. But does that mean it's
not worth testing?

No, its VERY much worth testing. But until then it is an interesting hypothesis
without any validation. As far as transitions to science. No, its not a single
step. But a slow, painful, process with 1000 dead ends. But it is cumulative
and focused and so far that is almost completely absent in PCT. I appaud anyone
that can make a better widget in their field with PCT. That is what its for.
For _them_ to make better widgets. Not for us to waste our time arguing about
why we can't play with anyone and the "revolution" and other boo-hoo stories.

Does that make the hierarchy a "windmill".

The "hierarchy" is not the windmill. But it isn't nuts and bolts PCT either.
PCT is plenty contential on its own. Introducing other contentious propositions
that are tangential does not help. To the side, this is repeating what Greg
Williams said 5 years ago.

But a bigger issue that you raise, and one far more important you raise
below. _What_ is PCT, and who gets to define what it should or shouldn't
encompass?

Thats a biggie, but it isn't Bill or Rick, or Tom, or Phil, or me..and it isn't
us shaking hands. I think that what it is is a very rigid and general theory,
that includes a methodology. The theory is expressable in a few lines of
algebraic equations and the methodology in 5 repeating steps. Very basic. And
the basic are pretty darn tight.

i.

[From Bill Powers (990801.1419 MDT)]

i.kurtzer (990731.0809)

Are those Hobbes' words or your attempt to put his words into modern terms?

That is a consensus of historians and philosophers and is quite obvious

becuase

of the bevy of materialistic metaphors that were pervasive at the time. Of
course, they refered to technologies of their time.

Why should modern historians and philosophers understand any more about
control theory and brain models than Hobbes did?

"Material process that has a formal structure" seems like an oxymoron to
me: a material process is one thing (neurotransmitters, voltages, calcium
ions), and a formal structure is a mental concept, a completely different
thing.

This is getting way out of hand. The description of peanut butter can be
realized by many symbol systems. Now, I don't think that is the taste of
peanut butter. Either way thats a metaphysical commitment. And most

genenral

commitments have been drawn out about three centuries ago.

Sorry, that doesn't impress me. Any idea that's three centuries old is due
at least for a major checkup, if not a complete valve and ring job. I'm not
into ancestor worship.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (990802.0035 MDT)]

Marc Abrams says:
Isaac, I know that you feel very strongly about PCT and much less so about
HPCT ( The Hierarchy ). The main reason being that for all intents and
purposes, the Hierarchy in _any_ form has as yet been "validated" by
"scientific" evidence.

Isaac:
Yes.

Marc:
some of the lower levels have been researched but the higher ones have not.
Am I correct in this assumption?

Isaac:
Very accurate ass[ess]ment of my take.

Let's be careful about what we mean by "scientific evidence." I don't
believe that "scientific" evidence is different from any other kind: either
there is evidence or there is not.

Consider what we accept as evidence of control. If we see someone acting in
such a way as to maintain some variable in a given state despite
disturbances that, without those actions, would change the state of the
variable, and after we have ruled out illusions and coincidences, we say
that the variable is controlled by the person. This is what we in PCT have
_agreed_ to mean by control. Therefore the only "evidence" we require in
scientific terms is evidence that the action and its relationships to
disturbances did actually take place as reported. In short, all we require
is an honest report of what happened, along with the universal scientific
assumption that if any person could have seen it happen, it must have
happened in reality. That latter assumption is the weakest point of science
itself, but we manage to get by nonetheless.

Now consider what we might accept as evidence of hierarchical control.
Hierarchical control takes place when the action involved in controlling
some particular variable is itself observed to involve the control of other
variables which we call the "means" of control. If most of the means of
control are observable as control processes in themselves as in the
paragraph above, then we agree to say we are observing hierarchical
control. The only "evidence" required is evidence that an honest observer
reported relationships among variables that anyone could see, and that the
observed relationships were those of hierarchical control.

The evidence for hierarchical control is of exactly the same nature as the
evidence for control. It is a report by an honest and competent observer
that certain well-defined relationships among variables were seen. To that
we can add all the usual provisos: that the conditions of observation can
be reproduced by anyone with the requisite skill and equipment, and that
when they are reproduced the same observations are made, and other such
details that we have learned from experience are important.

This sort of evidence simply establishes the reality and replicability of a
phenomenon. It does not offer any explanation for it, but no explanation is
required if the only purpose is to establish the observational reality of
the phenomenon. I believe that in PCT we have adequate evidence for the
observational reality of both plain control and hierarchical control, and
that if anyone falls into a state of doubt about either of these phenomena,
a few minutes of systematic observation of almost _any_ behavior will
eliminate the doubt.

The particular hierarchical relationships among perceptions that I have
proposed are of exactly the same nature. I claim, for example, that in
order to _control_ a configuration of a constant kind, it is always
necessary to _vary_ one or more sensations, and that to _control_ a
sensation of a constant kind, it is necessary to _vary_ one or more
intensities. In each case, the presence of disturbances is assumed.
Likewise for all the other levels I propose: for example, in order to
_control_ a principle (to act in such a way as to keep it true in
perception), it is always necessary to _vary_ some programmatic processes
(reasoning, prediction, logic, rule-following, etc.).

As always, the "evidence" that is needed is a report that any honest
observer can see the required relationships among variables. It doesn't
matter in the least whether the observed variables are inside or outside
anyone's skin; there is no requirement for _simultaneous_ observation by
different observers; only that different observers acting independently
will report the same phenomenon. If simultaneity were a requirement,
scientific journals would be useless. Science is about achieving agreement
among observers, after each observer has independently examined the world
of experience and acted upon it as prescribed. If I report that sticking a
pin into my hand hurts, and you report that sticking a pin into your hand
hurts, and all honest observers report the same thing, we can take "hurt"
as an established phenomenon, and sticking a pin in a hand as an operation
that will produce the phenomenon -- all this despite the fact that only one
person can observe each hurt.

Now, what about explanations? Given that we have established the reality of
a phenomenon, how do we go about explaining it -- stating why it occurs as
observed? We now leave the realms of observational evidence and enter the
world of modeling.

To say why a phenomenon occurs in the sense of explaining it does not mean
asking for its higher-level motivation (why did I drive the car downtown?
Because I needed to buy a computer). The why we are after in modeling is of
the nature of the answer to the question, "why does the light turn on when
I flip the switch?" We are asking about underlying mechanisms which, if
they really existed, would make the phenomena we observe into logical
necessities. If the switch is wired to the light-bulb, and all the laws of
electricity are true, and all other necessary conditions have been
established (for example, there has been no power failure), is it
_necessary_ that the light become bright when the switch contact is closed:
nothing else could possibly happen under the given conditions.

That's how a model works. If the model corresponds sufficiently well to the
underlying reality, then the phenomenon we experience under given
conditions MUST occur. It is a logical necessity, meaning that for it not
to occur would amount to a logical self-contradiction.

Note that this is not a claim that any model is correct. It is a
description of the nature of a correct model. In an incorrect model, the
model itself is just like a correct model, in that it sets up relationships
making a certain outcome _necessary_. But of course we can set up the
required conditions and find that what the model necessarily does doesn't
happen in reality, or happens differently from what the model leads us to
predict. That's how we tell that the model is wrong: what it predicts
doesn't happen, or happens differently. But it definitely predicts
_something_.

Right or wrong, we can tell we have a true model if the model implies
setting up specific conditions, and predicts a behavior which _necessarily_
follows from the structure of the model and the conditions under which it
behaves.

The PCT and HPCT models are clearly true models, in that they propose
underlying mechanisms from which observable behavior _necessarily_ follows.
We generally present specific models with free parameters; these parameters
allow us to adjust certain details of the model to fit individual
characteristics of the real systems being modeled. But these parameters do
not alter the structure of the model when they are varied. Thus when we can
make a model with a fixed structure fit all individuals' behavior, we have
shown that at least this structure constitutes a valid explanation of how
the tested group of individuals is internally organized.

Finally, what about neural circuit-tracing in the brain? We can clearly
identify control phenomena, and we can clearly propose and test models to
explain these phenomena, without circuit-tracing. If a model works --
predicts correctly -- we know that however the underlying circuitry is
connected, it must accomplish the same end-result that the model
accomplishes, and by means that are at least functionally equivalent to the
means the model proposes.

Indeed, it is usually the case that the model tells us what we are looking
at when we get to the level of circuit-tracing. Anyone who has had
experience with troubleshooting electronic systems knows that without a
schematic diagram, and without an understanding of the model behind the
schematic diagram, it is essentially futile to try to figure out what a
complex circuit is supposed to do -- how it is supposed to behave when it's
not broken. The idea that we could figure out how the brain works strictly
through circuit tracing is sufficient evidence that its proposer has never
done any actual circuit tracing in even a modestly complex system. Even
repairmen for such simple systems as television sets have to go to school
to learn the theory of television before they can hope to diagnose
problems, and diagnosing problems means knowing what you're _supposed_ to
observe in a properly functioning circuit. It means knowing what various
subsections of the circuit are supposed to accomplish -- what they _must_
accomplish if they're working correctly.

Without a reasonably correct model, circuit-tracing is futile. You simply
won't understand what you're looking at, and you'll just be making wild
guesses if you try to go ahead. That's about the state of neurology today.

You must have a model that correctly explains behavior before you can get
anywhere with tracing circuits in the brain. So data about neural
connections is NOT, bu itself, evidence about control.

Best,

Bill P.