I am hoping to gather together a working group of PCT-researchers who are interested in the ethical implications of PCT. I see three broad research questions:
Philosophical project: Using the guiding ideas of PCT, can we develop a theory about what makes behaviour morally right or wrong? What should a control-based ethics say about high-level principles like autonomy, impartiality, equality, and universal moral rules?
Psychological project: Does a control-based ethics reflect how people actually think about moral situations?
Practical project: does a control-based ethics result in ethically better outcomes? We can consider applications to therapy (i.e. MoL), rehabilitation, medical ethics, teaching, customer service, parenting, and working relationships.
Some basic theory
A foundational idea is how a control-based ethics can conceive of interpersonal conflict and its resolution along the same lines as intra-personal conflict. Thus we get the following PCT approach to conflict resolution:
Agents are benefitted by having control over their reference values.
Conflict between agents is caused by incompatible reference values.
A moral outcome is one in which agents manage to align their reference values.
Alignment is achieved by an iterative process of higher level value reorganisation.
All agents achieve control over their new higher-level reference value.
Example
Two passengers are taking a long car journey together. A wants the radio on while B wants quiet while they read. Which of the following solutions is ethically better?
A buys headphones so that he can listen to music without disturbing B.
A and B agree to alternate between music and quiet.
Note that in both scenarios, both agents get control, so they are both basically ok. Yet I believe that (2) is ethically superior to (1) because it involves the mutual reorganisation of their reference values. Unlike (1), (2) strengthens the relationship between A and B, and it does not merely avoid conflict by inputting additional resources.
Great topic and a very clear framing of the problem. I would like to raise one structural objection, however, which seems essential if a control-based ethics is to move beyond idealized thought experiments and handle real-world conflict.
The proposed model—including the car-journey example—rests on an implicit assumption of symmetry and good faith: it assumes that both agents share a compatible higher-level reference (such as maintaining a good relationship or reaching a common destination together), and that the conflict exists solely at a lower level (music versus quiet). In such a cooperative setting, mutual higher-level reorganization can indeed align their reference values.
In real social, institutional, and professional environments, however, we frequently face a qualitatively different structure—an asymmetric or adversarial interaction, where one party acts in bad faith or treats the negotiation process itself instrumentally:
Absence of a shared higher-level reference: What happens when Agent A’s superordinate reference (e.g., integrity, safety, or autonomy) is structurally incompatible with Agent B’s superordinate reference (e.g., maximizing private gain at another’s expense, or manipulation)? In such cases, there is no common higher-level loop where reference values can be “aligned” without destroying the integrity of one of the agents.
Exploitation of unilateral reorganization: If Agent A attempts to “ethically” reorganize their values toward compromise while Agent B holds a rigid, opportunistic reference and merely simulates willingness to align, the outcome is not an ethical resolution. In control-theoretic terms, it is simply a shift of the controlled variable in favor of the adversarial party—a loss of control by the agent open to reorganization.
Limits of “strengthening the relationship”: To follow up on Bruce’s question about what it means to strengthen a social relationship: in collective control frameworks (such as Martin Taylor’s), genuine collaboration requires a shared higher-level goal. Attempting to build or strengthen a relationship with an agent who exploits trust is not an ethical solution; it is an architectural flaw that exposes the system to continuous disturbance.
Therefore, across both the philosophical and practical projects, a key question arises: what boundary condition must a PCT-based ethics specify to distinguish situations that call for mutual reorganization from situations where the only ethical and stable response is to firmly defend one’s own reference signal and sever the interaction loop? Without such a boundary condition, the theory risks prescribing unilateral capitulation to adversarial agents.