Watching your p's and q.i's (was Re: Kenneth J. W. Craik on levels of perception and control)

[From Bruce Nevin (2017.01.04.16:39 ET)]

I try to remember and control for a general principle that people do the best they know how, and that we all are capable of learning so that we know better. I believe that Boris means well, according to his lights, and is doing the best that he knows how. But he can learn to know better.

In the canonical control diagram the dotted line separating the organism from the environment is generally understood to coincide with the skin of the organism, where sensors initiate the firing of neurons and where physical movement brings limbs with their sensor-bearing skin into contact with things in the environment., exerting measurable forces on them In a study of motor control, q.i is a measurement of the state of something in the environment, a perception of which the subject is controlling, and q.o is a measurement of force upon that something in the environment resulting from physical movement or exertion by the subject. Both q.i and q.o are quantitative measurements taken by an observer. However:

“I consider the behaving system to be the nervous system, and everything else, including the muscles and the body they operate, and effects on the outside world, the environment. The input boundary consists of all the sensory receptors; the output boundary, all the motor nerve-endings. This division allows me to treat all levels of control alike, with the feedback loop always being completed by a path from output to input through the environment.”

– William T. Powers 7/29/85 letter to Phil Runkel [repr. pp. 2-3 of Dialogues Concerning Two Life Sciences]

Obviously, q.o as a quantitative measurement taken by an observer, is not at the output boundary so defined. That is, q.o is not the rates of firing at the motor nerve-endings, except in some of Henry Yin’s work. In the usual way of doing e.g. a tracking experiment, the output and input boundaries are at different physical locations. The sensory receptors (or perhaps the nerve-endings connecting to sensory receptors) terminate e.g.in the skin of the hand or in the retina, but the motor nerve-endings terminate in muscles under the skin.

The context of this statement is that it is part of Bill’s explication to Phil of “Quantitative analysis of purposive systems: Some spadework at the foundations of scientific psychology”, Psychological Review 85 (5):417-435 (1978) [repr. Living Control Systems 129-165]. It may be that when he says “I consider” thus and so, he means that this is what he assumed in that particular ground-breaking 1978 paper. Or it may be that when on other occasions he spoke of the dotted line in the diagram as coinciding with the skin he was speaking loosely. His stated motivation is to simplify the description, but isn’t the same simplification available if the output boundary is where ‘effectors’ (his word, on other occasions) exert forces in the environment?

I recommend exposure to the variety of ways that Bill and others have written about control over the years–various books and papers, the published correspondence with Phil (the book cited above), the CSGnet archive.

One reason for bringing this up is to show the folly of demanding fidelity to the specific words that Bill used in a particular discussion of control. We need to be careful how we use words, yes, but the words are secondary to the dynamic relationships to which they refer. Mathematical formulations are more precise, but they are derivative of language, in equations that are routinely ‘read out’ using language, and they, too, are secondary to the relationships that they describe. Studying the quantitative relations in the many demos, with help of the equations and of the accompanying verbal explanations, is an exquisite guide. But you have to actually do that studying so that you know what the words and the equations are saying. Then, given an apprehension of those dynamic relationships, alternative means of description are perfectly adequate; but given a failure to apprehend those dynamic relationships, the most precise descriptive statement is inadequate for the recipient, until she or he lets go of the pointing finger and grasps what it is pointing at.

···

On Mon, Dec 25, 2017 at 10:29 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.12.25.1930)]

Rupert Young (2017.12.23 17.55)–

RM: Hope that’s all perfectly clear!

    RY: Broadly, yes. Though I think there is

still some terminology that needs some clarification. For the
moment can we forget about the observer, to simplify things by
removing some variables from the discussion, such as q.i.

RM: OK, I’ll give it a try. Â

      RY: What external variables are

stabilised?

    RM: Depends on what you mean by "external variables". See

below. Since I take “external variables” to be synonymous with
“aspects of the environment” then vertical optical velocity,
d(arctan(z/(x-fx)/dt and horizontal displacement, arctan
(y-fy)/(x-fx) are external variables that are not only
stabilized, they are controlled.

      RY: So, here is a bit of confusion for me as you

appear to be using “external” in two different ways (perceptual
variables are not external to the fielder, yet are “external
variables”). Would you clarify?

RM:Â Bill used the term “external variable” or “variables external to the controller” to describe perceptual variables that are experienced as being “out there”. When a fly ball is hit towards you, you can see its vertical and horizontal movement as being “out there” where the ball is. Higher level perceptions, like the perception of the degree to which someone is carrying out the principle of being honest in his dealings with the electorate, for example, seem more “internal”, like cognitions. But both “external” and “internal” perceptions are perceptual aspects of the physical environment – environmental variables.Â

Â

  RY: Is it correct that vertical optical velocity and horizontal

displacement are perceptual variables (i.e. perceptual signals) on
the internal side of the perceptual function, of the controller?

RM: Yes, a perceptual variable is assumed to be the output of a perceptual function.Â

Â

  RM: As I said. "aspects of

the environment" is synonymous with “perceptual variables” but
this phrase is used when we want to avoid giving the impression
that we are referring to a perceptual signal in a particular
individual; “aspects of the environment” are perceptions that can
be had by anyone with the appropriate perceptual functions.
Indeed, “aspects of the environment” are things like the colors,
shapes, movements, events, relationships, principles – that is,
the things we see as “external variables” in the world.

RY: Perhaps, then, the terminology of         "aspects of the environment"

is only relevant if we are including the “observer” in
the discussion?

RM: I don’t think so. “Aspects of the environment” describe possible functions of environment variables – the later being the variables of physics and chemistry that we believe to be what is actually out there. These functions exist whether anyone is actually computing them or not. Area is an example; it is a function of environmental variables that it is possible to compute, whether anyone – observer or controller – is computing it or not.Â

  RY: Are environmental variables the same as

external variables (if we are omitting the observer from the
discussion)? If so, would it be correct to say that, in this case,
no external variables are controlled?

RM: I try to limit the term “environmental variable” or “environment” to the physical variables that are thought to be what s actually “out there” while I try to use “external variable” to refer only to functions of environmental variables that seem, when experienced, to be external to the perceiver. What Bill (and I) call an “external variable” could correspond to an environmental variable. For example, I think the “intensity” perception of weight is pretty directly proportional to a force vector created by gravitational acceleration. But once you get above intensity perceptions, I think we are dealing with external variables in the sense of functions of physical variables that, when computer by our perceptual functions, are experienced as being external to us.

  RY: It would be useful if we could clear up these points before

getting back to including the observer’s perspective.

RM: I think “external variable” is a rarely used term. I think the clearest way to think of this is that, in PCT, “environment” or “environmental variable” always refer to physical variables external to our sensory systems; “perceptual variable” always refers to a function of environmental variables, whether this function is actually being computed by a perceptual function in an observer, controller, machine, etc or not. And “external variable”, when it is used, refers to a perceptual variable that is experienced as being out there, in the environment.

RM: Here’s another way to think of it. Think of “environmental variables” as a time varying spatial array of random intensity pixels, like the noisy picture on a TV when there is no signal. Perceptual variables are all the possible different functions of this times varying array. Obviously, there are a gazillion possibilities. It turns out that, unlike the TV noise, the environmental variables that are the array of pixels that surround us do not vary randomly (they are not a booming, buzzing confusion; this is what Gibson realized); they are apparently structured so that some functions of this array are better to control than others. The functions that are better to control – that, when controlled, result in behavior that is more “adaptive” – are the perceptual variables that we are familiar with as “the real world”. They are the perceptual variables that you are trying to give to your robots so that they control int he same way people do. We know what a lot of those perceptual variables probably are – perceptions of distance, of shapes (objects), of rates of change, etc. In PCT we just want to map out those perceptual variables more precisely and find out how control of one kind of variables is used as the means of controlling others. At least, that would seem to me to be the first step.

RM Merry Xmas to all. What’s not to like about a holiday where you celebrate the birth of a nice Jewish boy! Mazeltov!

BestÂ

Rick

Â

  Regards,

  Rupert


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[From Rick Marken (2017.12.20.1340)]

···

Martin Taylor (2017.12.19.23.28)–

MT: No. p(t) = f(q.i, t), where f might involve a delay, some

time-smearing such as a leaky integral, and/or a nonlinear
transform.

RM:  When I say that p = q.i I am speaking from the point of view of one who builds PCT models to account for observed phenomena. One of the phenomena I have observed is that people are able to control either the area or perimeter of a rectangle (see http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Size.html). When a person controls the area of the rectangle, the controlled quantity, q.i, is q.i = h * w, where h and w are the height and width of the rectangle, respectively. When the person controls the perimeter of the rectangle, q.i = h+w.Â

RM: A PCT model that accounts for this behavior assumes that the person controlling these variables has perceptual functions that can produce perceptions of the area and perimeter of a rectangle. This is the model implemented in the spreadsheet that I sent out. The PCT model of area control controls a perception of area – p = h * w – and the PCT model of perimeter control controls a perception of perimeter – p = h + w.Â

RM: So in the PCT model of control of these variable, the perceptual signal, p, is equivalent to the quantity being controlled. When q.i = h * w (area), p = h * w (area) and when q.i = h + w (perimeter), p = h + w (perimeter). This is simply a product of the way PCT modeling is done; we give the model a perceptual function – the function that defines p – that is equivalent to the function of environmental variables that defines q.i. So when we observe that area is controlled (q.i = h * w) we pick a perceptual function that produces a perception of area (p = h * w); and when we observe that perimeter is controlled (q.i = h + w) we pick a perceptual function that produces a perception of perimeter (p = h + w).Â

MT: Even that is not strictly accurate, because the signal is

in the form of neural firings, and is therefore noisy. So it is
better to put p(t) = f(q.i, t) + n(t), where n(t) represents a noise
waveform… But I agree
with the general import of what Rick is trying to say.

RM: And I agree with the point you are making. Certainly the actual perceptual signal in the nervous system is not exactly equal to the function that exactly defines q.i; the value of p is affected by non-linearities, noise and lags. But the most important thing to understand about controlling, from a PCT perspective, is what variable is being controlled (that is, determine q.i using the test for the controlled variable) and how is that variable controlled (that is, build a control model that can control q.i the way the organism does).Â

RM: To improve the fit of the model you may have to add some non-linearity, noise or lag but my experience is that, once you get the right definition of the controlled quantity, q.i, you can get a nearly perfect fit of model to data by setting the perceptual function that defines p – the perceptual function – to the function that defines q.i . That is, just by setting p = q.i you can account for 99%+ of the variance in the observed behavior.

MT: The problem is, as it has been for years, in the precise definition

of “control”.

RM: I don’t think so. In PCT control is defined as maintaining a variable (q.i) in a fixed or variable reference state, protected from disturbance. This defines the phenomenon that PCT explains. There is no other way of defining control from a PCT perspective.Â

Â

MT: A disagreement in which each disputant uses a

different definition of the word in dispute is inherently
irresoluble. Boris likes the concept of control as in theory
bringing some variable toward a commensurate reference variable,
whether or not either variable can be observed.

RM: That’s not a definition of control in PCT; that’s a (not quite accurate) description of the theoretical explanation of control.Â

Â

MT: Rick doesn't dispute

that as a possibility,

RM: Sure I do. That’s not a possibility; it is a profound misunderstanding of what PCT Is about.Â

MT: but includes as "control" the appearance that

an observable variable seems to be brought toward and maintained
near some unobservable virtual reference value, which can be deduced
only by observing the variable said to be controlled. At least
that’s my understanding of the bone of contention. It’s not a
dispute about PCT, but about the correct writing of a dictionary
definition.Â

RM: No, it’s not a dispute about a dictionary definition of control. It is a dispute about what PCT Is about. I say it’s about understanding an objective phenomenon called control – a phenomenon that, according to PCT, is a fundamental characteristic of the behavior of living systems – that has been ignored or rejected in psychology and the rest of the life sciences. Others say it’s not. There’s the problem!

Best

Rick

Â

It is much the same as would be a dispute about the word

“perception”, in which one party claimed that a perception is
everything of which he was consciously aware and nothing else, while
the other claimed it meant a signal within a control system that
depends on real or imagined sensory input and is capable of being
controlled. Such an argument would never be resolved, either.

RM:Â The fact that the controlled quantity (q.i)Â * must
be sensed* Â means that it is external to the control
system. The “inner model” of that controlled quantity is i* n
the form of a signal, * which is the perceptual signal
(p). So Bill is making the point here that I make with the
attached spreadsheet; the controlled quantity, q.i, is
represented in the system in the form of a signal. p: in
other words, p=q.i.Â

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Martin Taylor 2017.12.20.17.10]

[From Rick Marken (2017.12.20.1340)]

Isn't that what I said, on the assumption that Rick Marken is the

Ultimate Authority on what is or is not PCT? I proposed a hypothesis
about what Boris perceives to be the meaning of the
word. Since you are the Ultimate Authority on what Boris perceives
to be the meaning of a word, my hypothesis is thereby disproved.

OK, my hypothesis on that was wrong. According to the Ultimate

Authority on PCT, control does NOT occur when some
process brings some variable toward a commensurate reference
variable. The reduction of (r-p) by means of action through the
environment on whatever p represents is not an example of control. I
stand corrected (but will fall down before long).

No, Obviously it isn't, since I have now learned that everyone uses

the same definition of control, no matter what THEY
perceive to be the definition of control that they use in talking
about it. There can’t be any dispute about that, because they DO NOT
perceive what they think they perceive.

Well, I suppose solipsism ensures that you are the ultimate

Authority on everything. OK. Boris is using your definition of
control, because you say he is. Since he is a figment of your
imagination, you have every right to put that perception into his
head. The rest of us are, too, as I have often observed when you
write about what I believe or have said I perceive.

What is "it" here? I've been dealing with the reason for the

long-standing nature of the dispute, and I thought that was what you
were talking about. But now I see you weren’t. “It” now has morphed
into PCT itself.

Boris, and I venture to guess, everyone else that has been long on

CSGnet, probably agrees with that. So how can the dispute be
anything to do with what you say here. Until Boris says otherwise, I
continue to believe he has a more restricted view of the meaning of
the word “control” than you do, or that his meaning of “control” is
not encapsulated within yours (since he believes that reducing the
difference between a perception and its reference value while you
now say you don’t), and that difference of definition is the reason
for this very boring clutter on CSGnet.

Martin
···

Martin Taylor (2017.12.19.23.28)–

            MT: A disagreement in which each

disputant uses a different definition of the word in
dispute is inherently irresoluble. Boris likes the
concept of control as in theory bringing some variable
toward a commensurate reference variable, whether or not
either variable can be observed.

          RM: That's not a definition of control in PCT; that's a

(not quite accurate) description of the theoretical
explanation of control.

            MT: Rick doesn't dispute that as a

possibility,

          RM: Sure I do. That's not a possibility; it is a

profound misunderstanding of what PCT Is about.

            MT: ... that's my understanding of

the bone of contention. It’s not a dispute about PCT,
but about the correct writing of a dictionary
definition.

          RM: No, it's not a dispute about a dictionary

definition of control.

It is a dispute about what PCT Is about.

          I say it's about understanding an objective phenomenon

called control

          -- a phenomenon that, according to PCT, is a

fundamental characteristic of the behavior of living
systems – that has been ignored or rejected in
psychology and the rest of the life sciences. Others say
it’s not. There’s the problem!

[From Rick Marken (2017.12.20.1830)]

···

Martin Taylor (2017.12.20.17.10)

MT: What is “it” here?

 RM: “It” is PCT.Â

MT: Boris, and I venture to guess, everyone else that has been long on

CSGnet, probably agrees with that.

RM: Well that would be great. But it seems unlikely since Boris (and and just about everyone else on CSGNet) seems to think that it’s only perception that is controlled and that variable aspects of the environment are only controlled as a side effect of controlling perception. This gets things exactly backwards in the sense that it puts theory before observation (phenomena). What I’m saying above is what Bill said in his letter to Phil Runkel that was just quoted by Bruce Nevin:  “First we must establish control as a phenomenon. This is not a theoretical matter. We have to show that organisms actually do stabilize external variables of all degrees of complexity against disturbances, maintaining them recognizably near reference conditions that we can identify experimentally.” Do you agree with this?Â

MT: So how can the dispute be

anything to do with what you say here. Until Boris says otherwise, I
continue to believe he has a more restricted view of the meaning of
the word “control” than you do, or that his meaning of “control” is
not encapsulated within yours (since he believes that reducing the
difference between a perception and its reference value while you
now say you don’t), and that difference of definition is the reason
for this very boring clutter on CSGnet.

RM: Well, one person’s clutter is another’s essential reading. This discussion of the relationship between the fact of control – the fact that organisms actually do stabilize external variables (q.i’s) of all degrees of complexity against disturbances, maintaining them recognizably near reference conditions that we can identify experimentally – and the theory that explains this fact (control theory), which says that the observed control of q.i is accomplished by controlling an internal “model” of q.i in the form of an afferent neural signal, is fundamental to an understanding of how to do the science of PCT – how to study and understand the behavior (controlling) done by living organisms. That science has to be anchored in fact – the fact of control (per the subtitle of LCS III). I have seen no evidence that you have an interest in anything other than theory. Indeed, you have suggested that observation – the experimental identification of the external variables that organisms control to which Bill alluded – is not even feasible. This could certainly account for why you consider these discussions to be clutter. From my point of view, the only clutter on CSGNet comes from attempts to suggest changes or “improvements” to the theory for no reason other than because they seem nice and you don’t have to leave your armchair to do it.Â

BestÂ

Rick


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

          RM: I say it's about understanding an objective phenomenon

called controlÂ

          RM: -- a phenomenon that, according to PCT, is a

fundamental characteristic of the behavior of living
systems – that has been ignored or rejected in
psychology and the rest of the life sciences. Others say
it’s not. There’s the problem!

[From Bruce Nevin (2017.12.21.08:46 ET)]

Martin Taylor (2017.12.20.17.10) –

Rick Marken (2017.12.20.1830) –

Maybe a clue to the fruitless root of this bickering isÂ

RM: When I say that p = q.i I am speaking from the point of view of one who builds PCT models to account for observed phenomena.

It appears to me that there are different points of view involved. People shift from one point of view (pov) to another, but tend to have a preferred or most familiar pov.

My guess (hypothesis, if you will) is that Rick’s present pov is as stated above, that of a modeler, Martin’s pov is of one steeped in the dynamics of perceptual input and motor output in living things, Bill’s pov in the cited passage is of communicating and gaining acceptance of PCT, and Boris’s pov is of one who assumes the theory as a fact and projects from there what must necessarily be the correct way of talking about it. There are glimmers suggestive that in his background he has learned something about endocrine and other non-neurological systems. These glimmers are in his complaints that our discussions of PCT don’t provide a ready-made account of how those systems are integrated into PCT. This would be consistent with the mistaken pov that PCT is a finished product, a point of view that fails to recognize that it’s up to each of us to develop it further in our respective areas of interest and competence, and to draw in colleagues who can help to expand PCT research in your area of interest. That would be a welcome change from trolling. But I digress.

The perceptions under immediate control from one point of view are not the same as those under immediate control from another. Seems to me there’s a whole lot of presumption going on, and not enough respectful Test and verification.

···

On Wed, Dec 20, 2017 at 9:31 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.12.20.1830)]

Martin Taylor (2017.12.20.17.10)

MT: What is “it” here?

 RM: “It” is PCT.Â

MT: Boris, and I venture to guess, everyone else that has been long on

CSGnet, probably agrees with that.

RM: Well that would be great. But it seems unlikely since Boris (and and just about everyone else on CSGNet) seems to think that it’s only perception that is controlled and that variable aspects of the environment are only controlled as a side effect of controlling perception. This gets things exactly backwards in the sense that it puts theory before observation (phenomena). What I’m saying above is what Bill said in his letter to Phil Runkel that was just quoted by Bruce Nevin:  “First we must establish control as a phenomenon. This is not a theoretical matter. We have to show that organisms actually do stabilize external variables of all degrees of complexity against disturbances, maintaining them recognizably near reference conditions that we can identify experimentally.” Do you agree with this?Â

MT: So how can the dispute be

anything to do with what you say here. Until Boris says otherwise, I
continue to believe he has a more restricted view of the meaning of
the word “control” than you do, or that his meaning of “control” is
not encapsulated within yours (since he believes that reducing the
difference between a perception and its reference value while you
now say you don’t), and that difference of definition is the reason
for this very boring clutter on CSGnet.

RM: Well, one person’s clutter is another’s essential reading. This discussion of the relationship between the fact of control – the fact that organisms actually do stabilize external variables (q.i’s) of all degrees of complexity against disturbances, maintaining them recognizably near reference conditions that we can identify experimentally – and the theory that explains this fact (control theory), which says that the observed control of q.i is accomplished by controlling an internal “model” of q.i in the form of an afferent neural signal, is fundamental to an understanding of how to do the science of PCT – how to study and understand the behavior (controlling) done by living organisms. That science has to be anchored in fact – the fact of control (per the subtitle of LCS III). I have seen no evidence that you have an interest in anything other than theory. Indeed, you have suggested that observation – the experimental identification of the external variables that organisms control to which Bill alluded – is not even feasible. This could certainly account for why you consider these discussions to be clutter. From my point of view, the only clutter on CSGNet comes from attempts to suggest changes or “improvements” to the theory for no reason other than because they seem nice and you don’t have to leave your armchair to do it.Â

BestÂ

Rick


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

          RM: I say it's about understanding an objective phenomenon

called controlÂ

          RM: -- a phenomenon that, according to PCT, is a

fundamental characteristic of the behavior of living
systems – that has been ignored or rejected in
psychology and the rest of the life sciences. Others say
it’s not. There’s the problem!

Hi Bruce, a very astute overview, thank you!

···

On Wed, Dec 20, 2017 at 9:31 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.12.20.1830)]

Martin Taylor (2017.12.20.17.10)

MT: What is “it” here?

RM: “It” is PCT.

MT: Boris, and I venture to guess, everyone else that has been long on

CSGnet, probably agrees with that.

RM: Well that would be great. But it seems unlikely since Boris (and and just about everyone else on CSGNet) seems to think that it’s only perception that is controlled and that variable aspects of the environment are only controlled as a side effect of controlling perception. This gets things exactly backwards in the sense that it puts theory before observation (phenomena). What I’m saying above is what Bill said in his letter to Phil Runkel that was just quoted by Bruce Nevin: “First we must establish control as a phenomenon. This is not a theoretical matter. We have to show that organisms actually do stabilize external variables of all degrees of complexity against disturbances, maintaining them recognizably near reference conditions that we can identify experimentally.” Do you agree with this?

MT: So how can the dispute be

anything to do with what you say here. Until Boris says otherwise, I
continue to believe he has a more restricted view of the meaning of
the word “control” than you do, or that his meaning of “control” is
not encapsulated within yours (since he believes that reducing the
difference between a perception and its reference value while you
now say you don’t), and that difference of definition is the reason
for this very boring clutter on CSGnet.

RM: Well, one person’s clutter is another’s essential reading. This discussion of the relationship between the fact of control – the fact that organisms actually do stabilize external variables (q.i’s) of all degrees of complexity against disturbances, maintaining them recognizably near reference conditions that we can identify experimentally – and the theory that explains this fact (control theory), which says that the observed control of q.i is accomplished by controlling an internal “model” of q.i in the form of an afferent neural signal, is fundamental to an understanding of how to do the science of PCT – how to study and understand the behavior (controlling) done by living organisms. That science has to be anchored in fact – the fact of control (per the subtitle of LCS III). I have seen no evidence that you have an interest in anything other than theory. Indeed, you have suggested that observation – the experimental identification of the external variables that organisms control to which Bill alluded – is not even feasible. This could certainly account for why you consider these discussions to be clutter. From my point of view, the only clutter on CSGNet comes from attempts to suggest changes or “improvements” to the theory for no reason other than because they seem nice and you don’t have to leave your armchair to do it.

Best

Rick


Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

          RM: I say it's about understanding an objective phenomenon

called control

          RM: -- a phenomenon that, according to PCT, is a

fundamental characteristic of the behavior of living
systems – that has been ignored or rejected in
psychology and the rest of the life sciences. Others say
it’s not. There’s the problem!

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.21 19.10)]

(Rick Marken (2017.12.20.1830)]

I think the confusion (for me anyway) concerns what you mean by

“aspects of the environment”. Perhaps, you could explain this term
and others in the context of your baseball interception scenario.
What are the aspects of the environment that are controlled? Are
they external to the fielder? What external variables are
stabilised? What perceptions are controlled? Where are the
perceptions? Are any environmental variables controlled? Are
external variables the same as environmental variables and the same
as “aspects” of the environment?

Regards,

Rupert
···

RM: … just about everyone else on CSGNet) seems to
think that it’s only perception that is controlled and
that variable aspects of the environment are only
controlled as a side effect of controlling perception.

RM: This discussion of the relationship between thefact of control – the fact that organisms actually
do stabilize external variables (q.i’s) of all degrees of
complexity against disturbances, maintaining them
recognizably near reference conditions that we can
identify experimentally – and the theory that explains
this fact (control theory), which says that the observed
control of q.i is accomplished by controlling an internal
“model” of q.i in the form of an afferent neural signal,
is fundamental to an understanding of how to do the
science of PCT – how to study and understand the behavior
(controlling) done by living organisms.

[From Rick Marken (2017.12.21.1110)]

[From Bruce Nevin (2017.12.21.08:46 ET)]

BN: Martin Taylor (2017.12.20.17.10) –

Rick Marken (2017.12.20.1830) –

Maybe a clue to the fruitless root of this bickering isÂ

RM: What would be a fruitful root?Â

RM: When I say that p = q.i I am speaking from the point of view of one who builds PCT models to account for observed phenomena.

BN: It appears to me that there are different points of view involved. People shift from one point of view (pov) to another, but tend to have a preferred or most familiar pov.

BN: My guess (hypothesis, if you will) is that Rick’s present pov is as stated above, that of a modeler, Martin’s pov is of one steeped in the dynamics of perceptual input and motor output in living things, Bill’s pov in the cited passage is of communicating and gaining acceptance of PCT, and Boris’s pov is of one who assumes the theory as a fact and projects from there what must necessarily be the correct way of talking about it.

RM: Well I have a different pov on that. My pov is that my pov in these “bickeringsâ€? is precisely the same as the one taken by Bill in the letter to Phil that you quoted (heck Bill even said in that passage that Phil should adopt my phenomena first pov).Â

BN: The perceptions under immediate control from one point of view are not the same as those under immediate control from another. Seems to me there’s a whole lot of presumption going on, and not enough respectful Test and verification.

RM: If this were true then there would be no bickering (conflict). In fact the different povs are creating conflict because they reflect different references for the state of the same perceptual variable, which we call PCT. Â

Best

Rick

···

On Wed, Dec 20, 2017 at 9:31 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.12.20.1830)]

Martin Taylor (2017.12.20.17.10)

MT: What is “it” here?

 RM: “It” is PCT.Â

MT: Boris, and I venture to guess, everyone else that has been long on

CSGnet, probably agrees with that.

RM: Well that would be great. But it seems unlikely since Boris (and and just about everyone else on CSGNet) seems to think that it’s only perception that is controlled and that variable aspects of the environment are only controlled as a side effect of controlling perception. This gets things exactly backwards in the sense that it puts theory before observation (phenomena). What I’m saying above is what Bill said in his letter to Phil Runkel that was just quoted by Bruce Nevin:  “First we must establish control as a phenomenon. This is not a theoretical matter. We have to show that organisms actually do stabilize external variables of all degrees of complexity against disturbances, maintaining them recognizably near reference conditions that we can identify experimentally.” Do you agree with this?Â

MT: So how can the dispute be

anything to do with what you say here. Until Boris says otherwise, I
continue to believe he has a more restricted view of the meaning of
the word “control” than you do, or that his meaning of “control” is
not encapsulated within yours (since he believes that reducing the
difference between a perception and its reference value while you
now say you don’t), and that difference of definition is the reason
for this very boring clutter on CSGnet.

RM: Well, one person’s clutter is another’s essential reading. This discussion of the relationship between the fact of control – the fact that organisms actually do stabilize external variables (q.i’s) of all degrees of complexity against disturbances, maintaining them recognizably near reference conditions that we can identify experimentally – and the theory that explains this fact (control theory), which says that the observed control of q.i is accomplished by controlling an internal “model” of q.i in the form of an afferent neural signal, is fundamental to an understanding of how to do the science of PCT – how to study and understand the behavior (controlling) done by living organisms. That science has to be anchored in fact – the fact of control (per the subtitle of LCS III). I have seen no evidence that you have an interest in anything other than theory. Indeed, you have suggested that observation – the experimental identification of the external variables that organisms control to which Bill alluded – is not even feasible. This could certainly account for why you consider these discussions to be clutter. From my point of view, the only clutter on CSGNet comes from attempts to suggest changes or “improvements” to the theory for no reason other than because they seem nice and you don’t have to leave your armchair to do it.Â

BestÂ

Rick


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

          RM: I say it's about understanding an objective phenomenon

called controlÂ

          RM: -- a phenomenon that, according to PCT, is a

fundamental characteristic of the behavior of living
systems – that has been ignored or rejected in
psychology and the rest of the life sciences. Others say
it’s not. There’s the problem!

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[From Fred Nickols (2017.12.21.1442 ET)]

Replying to the RM snippet below:

I do not think it is only perception that is controlled, although I do think it is every bit as much controlled as are any variables out there in the environment. It would be hard to believe otherwise in light of the definition of “controlled quantity� that appears in the glossary:

“CONTROLLED QUANTITY: An environmental variable corresponding to the perceptual signal in a control system; a physical quantity (or a function of several physical quantities� that is affected and controlled by the outputs from a control system’s output function.� P.296 of B:CP 2nd Edition.

Fred Nickols

[From Rick Marken (2017.12.20.1830)]

RM: Well that would be great. But it seems unlikely since Boris (and and just about everyone else on CSGNet) seems to think that it’s only perception that is controlled and that variable aspects of the environment are only controlled as a side effect of controlling perception.

[Martin Taylor 2017.12.21.16.54]

[From Rick Marken (2017.12.21.1110)]

[From Bruce Nevin (2017.12.21.08:46 ET)]

BN: Martin Taylor (2017.12.20.17.10) –

Rick Marken (2017.12.20.1830) –

            Maybe a clue to the fruitless root of this bickering

isÂ

RM: What would be a fruitful root?Â

                RM: When I say that

p = q.i I am speaking from the point of view of one
who builds PCT models to account for observed
phenomena.

              BN: It appears to me

that there are different points of view involved.
People shift from one point of view (pov) to another,
but tend to have a preferred or most familiar pov.

              BN: My guess

(hypothesis, if you will) is that Rick’s present pov
is as stated above, that of a modeler, Martin’s pov is
of one steeped in the dynamics of perceptual input and
motor output in living things, Bill’s pov in the cited
passage is of communicating and gaining acceptance of
PCT, and Boris’s pov is of one who
assumes the theory as a fact and projects from there
what must necessarily be the correct way of talking
about it.

        RM: Well I have a different pov on that. My

pov is that my pov in these “bickerings� is precisely the
same as the one taken by Bill in the letter to Phil that you
quoted (heck Bill even said in that passage that Phil should
adopt my phenomena first pov).Â

              BN: The perceptions

under immediate control from one point of view are not
the same as those under immediate control from
another. Seems to me there’s a whole lot of
presumption going on, and not enough respectful Test
and verification.

        RM: If this were true then there would be no

bickering (conflict). In fact the different povs are
creating conflict because they reflect different references
for the state of the same perceptual variable, which we call
PCT. Â

Martin

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.21 19.10)]

(Rick Marken (2017.12.20.1830)]

RM: … just about everyone else on CSGNet) seems to think that it’s only perception that is controlled and that variable aspects of the environment are only controlled as a side effect of controlling perception.

RM: This discussion of the relationship between the fact of control – the fact that organisms actually do stabilize external variables (q.i’s) of all degrees of complexity against disturbances, maintaining them recognizably near reference conditions that we can identify experimentally – and the theory that explains this fact (control theory), which says that the observed control of q.i is accomplished by controlling an internal “model” of q.i in the form of an afferent neural signal, is fundamental to an understanding of how to do the science of PCT – how to study and understand the behavior (controlling) done by living organisms.

I think the confusion (for me anyway) concerns what you mean by “aspects of the environment”. Perhaps, you could explain this term and others in the context of your baseball interception scenario. What are the aspects of the environment that are controlled? Are they external to the fielder? What external variables are stabilised? What perceptions are controlled? Where are the perceptions? Are any environmental variables controlled? Are external variables the same as environmental variables and the same as “aspects” of the environment?

HB : Good questions Rupert. I’ll add some more behaviors.

Which »aspect of environment« is controled when we are sleeping, sitting and thinking, observing, sunshining…. We are talking about general theory of human behavior…do we ? So diagram and definitions have to explain any behavior.

Boris

Regards,
Rupert

···

From: Rupert Young [mailto:rupert@perceptualrobots.com]
Sent: Thursday, December 21, 2017 8:10 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Watching your p’s and q.i’s (was Re: Kenneth J. W. Craik on levels of perception and control)

[From Rick Marken (2017.12.21.1620)]

···

 Rupert Young (2017.12.21 19.10)–

RY: I think the confusion (for me anyway) concerns what you mean by

“aspects of the environment”.

RM: I mean the same thing as “functions of physical variables external to the nervous system”. Indeed, the term “aspects of the environment” is synonymous with “perceptual variable”.Â

RY: Perhaps, you could explain this term

and others in the context of your baseball interception scenario.

RM: Great idea!Â

RY: What are the aspects of the environment that are controlled?

RM: The time varying 3-D (x,y,z) coordinates of the baseball are the environmental variables. The aspects of these variables that are controlled are functions of these variables. To be precise, one aspect of the environment that is controlled is the rate of change in the vertical optical projection of the ball on the eye: d(arctan(z/(x-fx))/dt; the other is the horizontal optical deviation of the ball from the line of sight: arctan (y-fy)/(x-fx)), where fx and fy are the fielder’s position in the x and y dimension, respectively. The formulas d(arctan(z/(x-fx)/dt and arctan (y-fy)/(x-fx) represent guesses about the nature of the perceptual functions that are involved in catching baseballs. The values of these functions over time are the values of the perceptual variables that the model controls and that are thought to be the perceptual variables that fielders control.Â

RY: Are

they external to the fielder?

 RM: No. Perceptual variables – the functions of environmental variables – exist in the fielder. But since the basis of these perceptions are external to the fielder, they can also exist in any observer (such as myself) with perceptual functions – natural or artificial - that are capable of producing them.Â

RY: What external variables are

stabilised?

 RM: Depends on what you mean by “external variables”. See below. Since I take “external variables” to be synonymous with “aspects of the environment” then vertical optical velicity, d(arctan(z/(x-fx)/dt and horizontal displacement, arctan (y-fy)/(x-fx) are external variables that are not only stabilized, they are controlled.

RY: What perceptions are controlled?

RM: Same as the eternal variables: vertical optical velocity, d(arctan(z/(x-fx)/dt and horizontal displacement, arctan (y-fy)/(x-fx)Â

Â

RY: Where are the

perceptions?

RM: In the nervous system of the fielder and in any observer with the same perceptual functions as the fielder.

Â

RY: Are any environmental variables controlled?

RM: Not in this case, no. Â

Â

RY: Are

external variables the same as environmental variables and the same
as “aspects” of the environment

RM:Â I think the term “environmental variables” is almost always used to refer to physical variables in the environment; that is, electromagnetic and acoustic energy, forces, etc, the variables of physics and chemistry. The term “aspects of the environment” is used when we want to be clear that it’s functions of environmental variables that are controlled and not the environmental variables themselves.Â

RM: As I said. “aspects of the environment” is synonymous with “perceptual variables” but this phrase is used when we what to avoid giving the impression that we are referring to a perceptual signal in a particular individual; “aspects of the environment” are perceptions that can be had by anyone with the appropriate perceptual functions. Indeed, “aspects of the environment” are things like the colors, shapes, movements, events, relationships, principles – that is, the things we see as “external variables” in the world.Â

RM: So the term “external variables” is used to describe what we see as being out there in the environment. This is how the term is used in the letter that Bruce Nevin just posted where Bill says: “We have to show that organisms actually do stabilize external variables of all degrees of complexity against disturbances, maintaining them recognizably near reference conditions that we can identify experimentally”. Clearly, Bill is referring to his own (and our own) perceptions that we experience as being “out there”; simple things like the location of a cursor on a computer screen or more complex things like the level of respect we get for our ideas.Â

RM: I’ll illustrate these points by using these terms to describe what is going on in the situation where a person controls either the area or perimeter of a rectangle. Area and perimeter are aspects of the environment inasmuch as they are functions of environmental variables, which are the light intensities emitted from the computer screen. We see these aspects of the environment as external variables inasmuch as we can see the rectangular image “out there” on the computer screen varying in area and perimeter. When we watch a person control the area or perimeter of the rectangle we see a variable that is external to the person – an external variable - being controlled. We account for this observed controlling by assuming that the person is controlling a perceptual variable that corresponds to the same aspect of the environment – the same external variable – that we see being controlled.Â

RM: In terms of notation, the variable q.i refers to the aspect of the environment that is being controlled. It does not refer to the environmental variable(s) of which q.i is a function. Because q.i is an aspect of the environment, it is also a perceptual variable – but it is a perceptual variable in the observer of the control system. But because q.i appears to be external to the control system, q.i is also sometimes called an external variable

RM: In the baseball fielder model, there are two q.i’s that seem to be controlled – vertical optical velocity (d(arctan(z/(x-fx)/dt) and horizontal displacement from the line of sight (arctan (y-fy)/(x-fx). So we used these two q.i’s as our perceptual variables and that worked better than other q.i’s that also seemed to be controlled – vertical optical acceleration (d2(arctan(z/(x-fx)/dt) and horizontal displacement arctan (y-fy)/(x-fx)). So we used modeling to test for the variable controlled by fielders when catching balls.Â

RM: Hope that’s all perfectly clear!

BestÂ

Rick


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

RM: This discussion of the relationship between thefact of control – the fact that organisms actually
do stabilize external variables (q.i’s) of all degrees of
complexity against disturbances, maintaining them
recognizably near reference conditions that we can
identify experimentally – and the theory that explains
this fact (control theory), which says that the observed
control of q.i is accomplished by controlling an internal
“model” of q.i in the form of an afferent neural signal,
is fundamental to an understanding of how to do the
science of PCT – how to study and understand the behavior
(controlling) done by living organisms.

[From Rick Marken (2017.12.21.1800)]

···

Martin Taylor (2017.12.21.16.54)–

        RM: If this were true then there would be no

bickering (conflict). In fact the different povs are
creating conflict because they reflect different references
for the state of the same perceptual variable, which we call
PCT. Â

MT:Â Â

RM: My experience has been that the people who most ardently demand that their thoughts and opinions be respected are the same people who are most disrespectful of the thoughts and opinions of others. I think a disinterested referee would agree that you have disrespected my thoughts and opinions at least as much as I have disrespected yours. Indeed, I think such a referee would find that I have disrespected you only in the sense of disagreeing with your ideas and opinions where your disagreements with me have often been ad hominum. But I don’t demand respect from you (or from others who have been even worse) because I find that the quality of respect, like that of mercy, is not strained but droppeth as the gentle rain from Heaven upon the place beneath. I find that it’s most blessed when it droppeth upon me from people I respect. And I have been fortunate to have gotten such respect (without straining for it). But I also find that the inverse is also true; disrespect is of no consequence when it droppeth upon me from people for whom I have little respect. Maybe seeing things that way can help ease your concerns about the disrespect that you feel coming from me.Â

BestÂ

Rick


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[From Rick Marken (2017.12.21.1850)]

Bruce Nevin (2017.12.21.08:46 ET)
BN: My guess (hypothesis, if you will) is that Rick's present pov is as stated above, that of a modeler...Bill's pov in the cited passage is of communicating and gaining acceptance of PCT

 RM: Are you implying that I am not interested in gaining acceptance of PCT? It seems to me that the only place in the passage you cited that could be taken as indicating an interest on Bill's part in gaining acceptance for PCT is this:Â

Bill Powers: In any case we control theorists have to establish the reality of the observations first. Then we can raise the question of finding a theory that makes sense of them [psychologists]. Fortunately, this theory exists in mature form ....

RM: So Bill is saying that the path to gaining acceptance for PCT is by convincing psychologists of the "reality of the observations" first. The observations he is talking about are the ones he described at the beginning of the cited passage:Â

Bill Powers: First we must establish control as a phenomenon. This is not a theoretical matter. We have to show that organisms actually do stabilize external variables of all degrees of complexity against disturbances, maintaining them recognizably near reference conditions that we can identify experimentally.Â

RM: That is, he is saying that the first step in gaining acceptance of PCT is convincing psychologists of the reality of the phenomenon of control. This is the same point I have been hammering on during this and many other discussions. So if Bill was working to gain acceptance of PCT in this way I am too, right? And the people who have opposed my harping on the importance of establishing the reality of the phenomenon of control must be considered to be uninterested in gaining acceptance of PCT, right? Actually, I think people who have been opposed to my harping on this are, indeed, interested in gaining acceptance of PCT; they just want to gain acceptance of a version of PCT that is not the one that Bill developed.
BestÂ
Rick

···

--
Richard S. MarkenÂ
"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Fred we’ve already discussed this. Do we have to do it again ? It’s harmony of deifnitions and all literature. This is a case where Bill didn’t specifically mentioned which environment is controlled and which is not. But as I said before. There are two environments : one is controlled and that is internal, and one is not controlled : outer environment. It is affected by muscle tension and stabilized so that enable internal control. Affection of outer environment is plausible with other definitions of control loop. See it. And control of internal environemnt is plausible with defitniton of control.

CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

Best regards

Boris

···

From: Fred Nickols [mailto:fred@nickols.us]
Sent: Thursday, December 21, 2017 8:46 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: RE: Watching your p’s and q.i’s (was Re: Kenneth J. W. Craik on levels of perception and control)

[From Fred Nickols (2017.12.21.1442 ET)]

Replying to the RM snippet below:

I do not think it is only perception that is controlled, although I do think it is every bit as much controlled as are any variables out there in the environment. It would be hard to believe otherwise in light of the definition of “controlled quantity� that appears in the glossary:

“CONTROLLED QUANTITY: An environmental variable corresponding to the perceptual signal in a control system; a physical quantity (or a function of several physical quantities� that is affected and controlled by the outputs from a control system’s output function.� P.296 of B:CP 2nd Edition.

Fred Nickols

[From Rick Marken (2017.12.20.1830)]

RM: Well that would be great. But it seems unlikely since Boris (and and just about everyone else on CSGNet) seems to think that it’s only perception that is controlled and that variable aspects of the environment are only controlled as a side effect of controlling perception.

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.23 17.55)]

(Rick Marken (2017.12.21.1620)]
RM: Hope that’s all perfectly clear!

    Broadly, yes. Though I think there is

still some terminology that needs some clarification. For the
moment can we forget about the observer, to simplify things by
removing some variables from the discussion, such as q.i.

    In case there is any formatting confusion, comments prefixed

with RY were my previous queries; new comments in blue.

    RY: Are they [aspects of the environment]

external to the fielder?

  RM: No. Perceptual variables -- the functions of environmental

variables – exist in the fielder. But since the basis of these
perceptions are external to the fielder, they can also exist in
any observer (such as myself) with perceptual functions – natural
or artificial - that are capable of producing them.

      RY: What external variables are

stabilised?

    RM: Depends on what you mean by "external variables". See

below. Since I take “external variables” to be synonymous with
“aspects of the environment” then vertical optical velicity,
d(arctan(z/(x-fx)/dt and horizontal displacement, arctan
(y-fy)/(x-fx) are external variables that are not only
stabilized, they are controlled.

      So, here is a bit of confusion for me as you

appear to be using “external” in two different ways (perceptual
variables are not external to the fielder, yet are “external
variables”). Would you clarify?

  Is it correct that vertical optical velocity and horizontal

displacement are perceptual variables (i.e. perceptual signals) on
the internal side of the perceptual function, of the controller?

      RM: As I said. "aspects of

the environment" is synonymous with “perceptual variables” but
this phrase is used when we what to avoid giving the impression
that we are referring to a perceptual signal in a particular
individual; “aspects of the environment” are perceptions that can
be had by anyone with the appropriate perceptual functions.
Indeed, “aspects of the environment” are things like the colors,
shapes, movements, events, relationships, principles – that is,
the things we see as “external variables” in the world.

Perhaps, then, the terminology of         "aspects of the environment"

is only relevant if we are including the “observer” in
the discussion?

      Are environmental variables the same as

external variables (if we are omitting the observer from the
discussion)? If so, would it be correct to say that, in this case,
no external variables are controlled?

  It would be useful if we could clear up these points before

getting back to including the observer’s perspective.

  Regards,

  Rupert
···
            RY: I think the confusion (for me

anyway) concerns what you mean by “aspects of the
environment”.

          RM: I mean the same thing as "functions of physical

variables external to the nervous system". Indeed, the
term “aspects of the environment” is synonymous with
“perceptual variable”.

            RY: Perhaps, you could explain this

term and others in the context of your baseball
interception scenario.

RM: Great idea!

RY: Where are the perceptions?

RM: In the nervous system of the fielder …

            RY: Are any environmental variables

controlled?

RM: Not in this case, no.

[From Bruce Nevin (2017.12.23.15:12 ET)]

Rupert Young (2017.12.23 17.55) –

Rupert, you’re pressing Rick about the status of q.i, external variables, and environmental variables.

Assuming that these exist, all we have of them is perceptions “of” them.

As I said in (Bruce Nevin 2017.12.22.20:20 ET), there are only two ways to know that a variable is external.

  • The first is by presumption, the quotidian projection of our perceptions as actual that is the stuff of everyday life as well as of science. (NB that to say that a perception is “of” a thing is to presume the existence of that thing.)
  • The second is by corroboration, e.g. by the Test (in which an observer confirms that a variable is controlled by the subject), by replication of an experiment, or by any other form of collective control including cooperation and conflict.

Do you know any other way that we can know that a variable is external? Or do you deny that even these are ways of knowing that a variable is external?

When you eliminate “the observer” from consideration you limit yourself to the first of these, our native presumption that our perceptions are “real”. (I agree with what I think is your view that q.i depends most obviously on an observer, because it is a numerical value resulting from measurement.)

···

On Sat, Dec 23, 2017 at 12:53 PM, Rupert Young rupert@perceptualrobots.com wrote:

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.23 17.55)]

(Rick Marken (2017.12.21.1620)]
RM: Hope that’s all perfectly clear!

    Broadly, yes. Though I think there is

still some terminology that needs some clarification. For the
moment can we forget about the observer, to simplify things by
removing some variables from the discussion, such as q.i.

    In case there is any formatting confusion, comments prefixed

with RY were my previous queries; new comments in blue.

    RY: Are they [aspects of the environment]

external to the fielder?

  RM: No. Perceptual variables -- the functions of environmental

variables – exist in the fielder. But since the basis of these
perceptions are external to the fielder, they can also exist in
any observer (such as myself) with perceptual functions – natural
or artificial - that are capable of producing them.

      RY: What external variables are

stabilised?

    RM: Depends on what you mean by "external variables". See

below. Since I take “external variables” to be synonymous with
“aspects of the environment” then vertical optical velicity,
d(arctan(z/(x-fx)/dt and horizontal displacement, arctan
(y-fy)/(x-fx) are external variables that are not only
stabilized, they are controlled.

      So, here is a bit of confusion for me as you

appear to be using “external” in two different ways (perceptual
variables are not external to the fielder, yet are “external
variables”). Would you clarify?

  Is it correct that vertical optical velocity and horizontal

displacement are perceptual variables (i.e. perceptual signals) on
the internal side of the perceptual function, of the controller?

      RM: As I said. "aspects of

the environment" is synonymous with “perceptual variables” but
this phrase is used when we what to avoid giving the impression
that we are referring to a perceptual signal in a particular
individual; “aspects of the environment” are perceptions that can
be had by anyone with the appropriate perceptual functions.
Indeed, “aspects of the environment” are things like the colors,
shapes, movements, events, relationships, principles – that is,
the things we see as “external variables” in the world.

Perhaps, then, the terminology of         "aspects of the environment"

is only relevant if we are including the “observer” in
the discussion?

      Are environmental variables the same as

external variables (if we are omitting the observer from the
discussion)? If so, would it be correct to say that, in this case,
no external variables are controlled?

  It would be useful if we could clear up these points before

getting back to including the observer’s perspective.

  Regards,

  Rupert
            RY: I think the confusion (for me

anyway) concerns what you mean by “aspects of the
environment”.

          RM: I mean the same thing as "functions of physical

variables external to the nervous system". Indeed, the
term “aspects of the environment” is synonymous with
“perceptual variable”.

            RY: Perhaps, you could explain this

term and others in the context of your baseball
interception scenario.

RM: Great idea!

RY: Where are the perceptions?

RM: In the nervous system of the fielder …

            RY: Are any environmental variables

controlled?

RM: Not in this case, no.

[Martin Taylor 2017.12.23.15.42]

[From Bruce Nevin (2017.12.23.15:12 ET)]

Rupert Young (2017.12.23 17.55) –

        Rupert, you're pressing Rick

about the status of q.i, external variables, and
environmental variables.

        Assuming that these exist,

all we have of them is perceptions “of” them.

        As I said in (Bruce Nevin

2017.12.22.20:20 ET), there are only two ways to know that a
variable is external.

  •           The first is by presumption, the quotidian projection of
    
    our perceptions as actual that is the stuff of everyday
    life as well as of science. (NB that to say that a
    perception is “of” a thing is to presume the existence
    of that thing.)
  •           The second is by corroboration, e.g. by the Test (in
    
    which an observer confirms that a variable is controlled
    by the subject), by replication of an experiment, or by
    any other form of collective control including cooperation
    and conflict.
        Do you know any other way

that we can know that a variable is external? Or do you deny
that even these are ways of knowing that a variable is
external?

I think that either there is no way at all, or there is a third way.

Your second way, I think, does not work because the observer you
perceive might well be a hallucination constructed by yourself.
(Disagreeing with myself from a while back, here.) So my “third way”
would actually be a second way.

The basic presumption is that there are other external variables

that you have been able to influence through actions that you will
now use to see if you can influence either the one now in question
or another to which this one is a necessary contributor. For
example, you may have once perceived yourself to lift something
using your hands. The presumption for the new test is that the
previous thing was in the external world that your hands seem to
influence. If now your hands can influence the property of interest,
such as its height, then you have evidence that it is really there
in the external world.

I don't think you can ever know for sure that anything is in the

external world. All you can do is to gather evidence for and against
such a perception – for it is only a perception that the property
is external rather than imagined. The greater the value of that
perception, the more strongly you perceive that the property is
external to your body. Evidence includes, but is not limited to,
ability to influence it, and correlations of changes in that
property with changes in other perceptions. But however much
evidence for the externality of a property you gather, you can never
exclude the possibility that the evidence you gathered was
hallucinatory. The best one can do is to go on perceiving that what
seems real and external is indeed real and external, until other
evidence produces a perception that it is not.

If we perceive something, some brain state exists that created that

perception. If the brain state depends exclusively on what has
influenced our sensory organs, then there is an external state or
history of states that corresponds to the perception. That state is
q.i. Otherwise, what we perceive may be only partially determined by
the external world, or possibly it may be completely independent of
what is really out there. In either case, q.i does not correspond
directly to anything in the environment, though it may well be
highly correlated with some property of the environment.

Our ancestors (if they every existed) did pretty well not thinking

about this problem, and so, usually, will we. It matters only to the
theoretician and the psychiatrist (who is necessarily a
theoretician) until real world actions for control of variables that
don’t exist in the real world affect perceptions in other organisms.

Martin
···

On Sat, Dec 23, 2017 at 12:53 PM,
Rupert Young rupert@perceptualrobots.com
wrote:

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.23 17.55)]

(Rick Marken (2017.12.21.1620)]
RM: Hope that’s all perfectly clear!

              Broadly, yes. Though I think

there is still some terminology that needs some
clarification. For the moment can we forget about the
observer, to simplify things by removing some
variables from the discussion, such as q.i.

              In case there is any formatting confusion, comments

prefixed with RY were my previous queries; new
comments in blue.

              RY: Are they [aspects of the

environment] external to the fielder?

              RM: No. Perceptual variables -- the functions of

environmental variables – exist in the fielder. But
since the basis of these perceptions are external to
the fielder, they can also exist in any observer (such
as myself) with perceptual functions – natural or
artificial - that are capable of producing them.

                  RY: What external variables

are stabilised?

                RM: Depends on what you mean by "external

variables". See below. Since I take “external
variables” to be synonymous with “aspects of the
environment” then vertical optical velicity,
d(arctan(z/(x-fx)/dt and horizontal displacement,
arctan (y-fy)/(x-fx) are external variables that are
not only stabilized, they are controlled.

                          So, here is a bit of

confusion for me as you appear to be using “external” in
two different ways (perceptual variables are not
external to the fielder, yet are “external variables”).
Would you clarify?

            Is it correct that vertical optical velocity and

horizontal displacement are perceptual variables (i.e.
perceptual signals) on the internal side of the
perceptual function, of the controller?

                              RM: As I said.

“aspects of the environment” is synonymous with
“perceptual variables” but this phrase is used when we
what to avoid giving the impression that we are
referring to a perceptual signal in a particular
individual; “aspects of the environment” are
perceptions that can be had by anyone with the
appropriate perceptual functions. Indeed, “aspects of
the environment” are things like the colors, shapes,
movements, events, relationships, principles – that
is, the things we see as “external variables” in the
world.

                          Perhaps, then, the

terminology of “aspects of the environment” is only
relevant if we are including the “observer” in
the discussion?

                          Are environmental variables the same

as external variables (if we are omitting the observer
from the discussion)? If so, would it be correct to say
that, in this case, no external variables are
controlled?

            It would be useful if we could clear up these points

before getting back to including the observer’s
perspective.

            Regards,

            Rupert
                        RY: I think the

confusion (for me anyway) concerns what you
mean by “aspects of the environment”.

                      RM: I mean the same thing as "functions of

physical variables external to the nervous
system". Indeed, the term “aspects of the
environment” is synonymous with “perceptual
variable”.

                        RY: Perhaps, you could

explain this term and others in the context
of your baseball interception scenario.

RM: Great idea!

                      RY: Where are the

perceptions?

RM: In the nervous system of the fielder …

                        RY: Are any

environmental variables controlled?

RM: Not in this case, no.

[From Rupert Young (2017.12.23 22.15) ]

(Bruce Nevin (2017.12.23.15:12 ET)]

      When you eliminate

“the observer” from consideration you limit yourself …

Not when you are speaking, as I was, as the objective all-seeing eye

:slight_smile:

Rupert

[From Rick Marken (2017.12.25.1930)]

···

Rupert Young (2017.12.23 17.55)–

RM: Hope that’s all perfectly clear!

    RY: Broadly, yes. Though I think there is

still some terminology that needs some clarification. For the
moment can we forget about the observer, to simplify things by
removing some variables from the discussion, such as q.i.

RM: OK, I’ll give it a try. Â

      RY: What external variables are

stabilised?

    RM: Depends on what you mean by "external variables". See

below. Since I take “external variables” to be synonymous with
“aspects of the environment” then vertical optical velocity,
d(arctan(z/(x-fx)/dt and horizontal displacement, arctan
(y-fy)/(x-fx) are external variables that are not only
stabilized, they are controlled.

      RY: So, here is a bit of confusion for me as you

appear to be using “external” in two different ways (perceptual
variables are not external to the fielder, yet are “external
variables”). Would you clarify?

RM:Â Bill used the term “external variable” or “variables external to the controller” to describe perceptual variables that are experienced as being “out there”. When a fly ball is hit towards you, you can see its vertical and horizontal movement as being “out there” where the ball is. Higher level perceptions, like the perception of the degree to which someone is carrying out the principle of being honest in his dealings with the electorate, for example, seem more “internal”, like cognitions. But both “external” and “internal” perceptions are perceptual aspects of the physical environment – environmental variables.Â

Â

  RY: Is it correct that vertical optical velocity and horizontal

displacement are perceptual variables (i.e. perceptual signals) on
the internal side of the perceptual function, of the controller?

RM: Yes, a perceptual variable is assumed to be the output of a perceptual function.Â

Â

  RM: As I said. "aspects of

the environment" is synonymous with “perceptual variables” but
this phrase is used when we want to avoid giving the impression
that we are referring to a perceptual signal in a particular
individual; “aspects of the environment” are perceptions that can
be had by anyone with the appropriate perceptual functions.
Indeed, “aspects of the environment” are things like the colors,
shapes, movements, events, relationships, principles – that is,
the things we see as “external variables” in the world.

RY: Perhaps, then, the terminology of         "aspects of the environment"

is only relevant if we are including the “observer” in
the discussion?

RM: I don’t think so. “Aspects of the environment” describe possible functions of environment variables – the later being the variables of physics and chemistry that we believe to be what is actually out there. These functions exist whether anyone is actually computing them or not. Area is an example; it is a function of environmental variables that it is possible to compute, whether anyone – observer or controller – is computing it or not.Â

  RY: Are environmental variables the same as

external variables (if we are omitting the observer from the
discussion)? If so, would it be correct to say that, in this case,
no external variables are controlled?

RM: I try to limit the term “environmental variable” or “environment” to the physical variables that are thought to be what s actually “out there” while I try to use “external variable” to refer only to functions of environmental variables that seem, when experienced, to be external to the perceiver. What Bill (and I) call an “external variable” could correspond to an environmental variable. For example, I think the “intensity” perception of weight is pretty directly proportional to a force vector created by gravitational acceleration. But once you get above intensity perceptions, I think we are dealing with external variables in the sense of functions of physical variables that, when computer by our perceptual functions, are experienced as being external to us.

  RY: It would be useful if we could clear up these points before

getting back to including the observer’s perspective.

RM: I think “external variable” is a rarely used term. I think the clearest way to think of this is that, in PCT, “environment” or “environmental variable” always refer to physical variables external to our sensory systems; “perceptual variable” always refers to a function of environmental variables, whether this function is actually being computed by a perceptual function in an observer, controller, machine, etc or not. And “external variable”, when it is used, refers to a perceptual variable that is experienced as being out there, in the environment.

RM: Here’s another way to think of it. Think of “environmental variables” as a time varying spatial array of random intensity pixels, like the noisy picture on a TV when there is no signal. Perceptual variables are all the possible different functions of this times varying array. Obviously, there are a gazillion possibilities. It turns out that, unlike the TV noise, the environmental variables that are the array of pixels that surround us do not vary randomly (they are not a booming, buzzing confusion; this is what Gibson realized); they are apparently structured so that some functions of this array are better to control than others. The functions that are better to control – that, when controlled, result in behavior that is more “adaptive” – are the perceptual variables that we are familiar with as “the real world”. They are the perceptual variables that you are trying to give to your robots so that they control int he same way people do. We know what a lot of those perceptual variables probably are – perceptions of distance, of shapes (objects), of rates of change, etc. In PCT we just want to map out those perceptual variables more precisely and find out how control of one kind of variables is used as the means of controlling others. At least, that would seem to me to be the first step.

RM Merry Xmas to all. What’s not to like about a holiday where you celebrate the birth of a nice Jewish boy! Mazeltov!

BestÂ

Rick

Â

  Regards,

  Rupert


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery