world model

From Angus Jenkinson, 2016-06-14.12.16.GMT

AJ: I have received some 1000 emails since this exchange, many most interesting, thank you, but I may have missed exactly where the matter was settled and how, but if so I have not found it, at least not in a way that gives me much satisfaction. Here is my characterisation of the question: Philip claims that there is a way of understanding the world that is different from that of physics, and proposes biology, and uses contemporary models or representations of biology as information codes as the means of doing so, as do other biologists. Rick is interested in control and in the reliable certainty provided by mathematically precise physics and the the Newtonian approach to the (macro-level) body in the world. He claims that biology can be reduced to physics, which is the standard claim of the physicist and of reductionism. But he is rightly concerned to point out that what we are dealing with is the models of physics and the models of physics are not identical with but only correlative with the world. Notwithstanding his clarity, science in general has proceeded over the last few centuries by reifying the models as fact, and this includes post-classical physics (and several of the quotations that Philip offered from famous physicists), and indeed this tendency has not escaped these conversations.

The whole conversation is placed in the context of an ongoing conversation about a new paradigm for understanding control behaviour, which would seek to substitute one set of collective representations (how the world actually appears to people on an everyday basis in general) with another set of collective representations as a result of a changed model in theory, the perceptual control theory system. (Some will detect the connection I am making here to Barfield, Saving the Appearances.) I do not need to make this point in order to affirm that the way the world will appear to us will change over time, over the centuries, as it has in the past, nor that some people are quite active in trying to bring that about.

One thing that it may be safe to say that we have learned (or had affirmed) from physics is that the world that is and the world as represented by human beings to their consciousness at any particular point in history may be correlative but they are not the same. And the relationship keeps changing. This relationship is also of course related to the subject of this discourse, control of perception.

The Newtonian control model is part of a system of modern science cultivated some four centuries ago that has sought an objective description of the world with a correlative modification of consciousness towards the scholarly aloof mathematical objective stance. With many benefits. But it is a staging post. It did not for example include PCT nor circular logic, nor many other things, and it relegated much of what was most important such as personal experience into a secondary and second class status. As such it could not be the last word. No one wants to throw out the rigour but nor do we want to throw out the life. That of course is just a rhetorical line, but it is a rhetorical line that in some way science must respond to because the science that does not deal with all of the appearances including consciousness and experience in terms that correlate with consciousness and experience will never be very satisfactory once you get outside dead substance, or the energy forms of inert matter. I think if we look at the science of Maturana and Varela or the more populist accounts of Andreas Weber, and think there is evidence of movement in these directions. And I think, as I said before, ternary cybernetics has something to offer us.

I therefore not only agree with Philip that there are ways of understanding the world different from both the classical and post-classical physics, but go further: there are ways of understanding the world different to those of contemporary biology (e.g. PCT) and there will be ways of understanding the world different to both of these.

And I propose that scientists need to be cautious about a pick and choose method of which paradigms they will update and which ones they will not. If on the one hand one asserts the ongoing validity of Newtonian physics as a representation of the world and an explanation for its behaviour and at the same time you wish to propose a different paradigm operating (at the first level of observation) in a quite different range of phenomena (consciousness, the mind) without needing to change the Newtonian physics, then this is I think a recipe for disconnect, which becomes apparent at the point where you try to connect the control phenomena, as they appear to the mind, with the phenomena in the idealised mathematical models of science in the fleshly process and the changing appearances in “the world”. My very first posts questioned the corpus of causality and my claim was that PCT was a final functional dismantling of this aberration that has dogged the last four centuries.

More generally, I think that Barfield’s account of models, representations, appearances, the evolution of consciousness and science, has much to recommend it.

Best

…………………………………………………….

Angus Jenkinson

[From Rick Marken (2015.09.19.0940)]

RM: I think where we might be having a disconnect is in what we mean by “exists in the environment”. When I say that a control system controls an “aspect of the environment” I am not saying that it is controlling something that necessarily exists in the environment. It is controlling a function of variables that, per the models of physics and chemistry, exist in the environment.

PY: This one always gets me. Why is there always a disclaimer which says, “The perception you are controlling may not exist in the environment.”?

RM: It’s true that, according to PCT, what is controlled is a perceptual variable. But this perceptual variable corresponds to some aspect of the environment (which is called the controlled quantity, q.o) that is also controlled. My “disclaimer” simply acknowledged that q.o does not necessarily correspond anything that actually exists in the environment according to our existing physical models of that environment. I mentioned humidity and, in B:CP Bill mentions the taste of lemonade as examples of perceptions that don’t correspond to anything that exist in the environment. But they do correspond aspects of the environment (functions of physical variables that do exist in the environment according to our physical models) and these aspects of the environment are controlled when the perceptions that correspond to them are controlled.

[From Rick Marken (2015.09.16.1900)]

[9.16.2015]

PY: I’ve been doing some studying so I have something to talk about.

RM: I haven’t been replying to your posts because I haven’t seen their relevance to what I am interested in: the study of purposive behavior. And I also have to admit that I haven’t really understood them all that well. But the last paragraph in this post did catch my attention:

PY: Finally, a word of caution to those who put faith in the models of physics and chemistry to provide us with what we know about what is “out there”.

RM: It looks like that is addressed to me, since I’m the one who most recently said that PCT takes the current models of physics and chemistry as the model of what is “out there” in the environment component of the PCT model. You go on to say:

PY: That’s quite simply not going to cut it for biology.

RM: My impression is that biology uses the current models of physics and chemistry. Isn’t DNA based on the molecular model of matter, for example? Don’t the forces exerted by muscles on the skeleton behave according to Newton’s laws?

PY: If my two cents is worth anything in your economy: I believe it’s more reliable to compare biology to computer systems adhering to codes, rather than physical systems adhering to laws. There are such things as the microprocessor and the memory hierarchy.

RM: That may be (though my bet would be on a control rather than a computer organization as the model of biological systems, since what biological systems do, at the behavioral as well as molecular level, is control). But this doesn’t negate the fact that biologists (like all scientists, including control theorists) use the models of physics and chemistry to describe what is really “out there”. Whether biological systems should be modeled as computers or control systems, the implementation of these systems will be in terms of entities (like molecules, electromagnetic energy) that are components of our current models of physics and chemistry. Computer and control system models are different ideas about how the reality “out there” – the reality described by the models of physics and chemistry – are *organized. *

Best

Rick

···

On 17/09/2015, 03:08, “Richard Marken” rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Sep 16, 2015 at 12:28 AM, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu wrote:

Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[From Rick Marken (2016.06.15.1910)]

···

From Angus Jenkinson, 2016-06-14.12.16.GMT

Â

AJ: I have received some 1000 emails since this exchange, many most interesting, thank you, but I may have missed exactly where the matter was settled and how, but if so I have not found it, at least not in a way that gives me much satisfaction. Here is my characterisation of the question: Philip claims that there is a way of understanding the world that is different from that of physics, and proposes biology, and uses contemporary models or representations of biology as information codes as the means of doing so, as do other biologists. Rick is interested in control and in the reliable certainty provided by mathematically precise physics and the the Newtonian approach to the (macro-level) body in the world. He claims that biology can be reduced to physics, which is the standard claim of the physicist and of reductionism.Â

RM: OK up to that last sentence. I don’t know where you get the idea that I think (or claim) that biology can be reduced to physics. But I don’t. Indeed, I’m sure that it can’t.Â

BestÂ

Rick

Â

But he is rightly concerned to point out that what we are dealing with is the models of physics and the models of physics are not identical with but only correlative with the world.   Notwithstanding his clarity, science in general has proceeded over the last few centuries by reifying the models as fact, and this includes post-classical physics (and several of the quotations that Philip offered from famous physicists), and indeed this tendency has not escaped these conversations.

Â

The whole conversation is placed in the context of an ongoing conversation about a new paradigm for understanding control behaviour, which would seek to substitute one set of collective representations (how the world actually appears to people on an everyday basis in general) with another set of collective representations as a result of a changed model in theory, the perceptual control theory system. (Some will detect the connection I am making here to Barfield, Saving the Appearances.) I do not need to make this point in order to affirm that the way the world will appear to us will change over time, over the centuries, as it has in the past, nor that some people are quite active in trying to bring that about.Â

Â

One thing that it may be safe to say that we have learned (or had affirmed) from physics is that the world that is and the world as represented by human beings to their consciousness at any particular point in history may be correlative but they are not the same. And the relationship keeps changing. This relationship is also of course related to the subject of this discourse, control of perception.

Â

The Newtonian control model is part of a system of modern science cultivated some four centuries ago that has sought an objective description of the world with a correlative modification of consciousness towards the scholarly aloof mathematical objective stance. With many benefits. But it is a staging post. It did not for example include PCT nor circular logic, nor many other things, and it relegated much of what was most important such as personal experience into a secondary and second class status. As such it could not be the last word. No one wants to throw out the rigour but nor do we want to throw out the life. That of course is just a rhetorical line, but it is a rhetorical line that in some way science must respond to because the science that does not deal with all of the appearances including consciousness and experience in terms that correlate with consciousness and experience will never be very satisfactory once you get outside dead substance, or the energy forms of inert matter.   I think if we look at the science of Maturana and Varela or the more populist accounts of Andreas Weber, and think there is evidence of movement in these directions. And I think, as I said before, ternary cybernetics has something to offer us.

Â

I therefore not only agree with Philip that there are ways of understanding the world different from both the classical and post-classical physics, but go further: there are ways of understanding the world different to those of contemporary biology (e.g. PCT) and there will be ways of understanding the world different to both of these.

Â

And I propose that scientists need to be cautious about a pick and choose method of which paradigms they will update and which ones they will not. If on the one hand one asserts the ongoing validity of Newtonian physics as a representation of the world and an explanation for its behaviour and at the same time you wish to propose a different paradigm operating (at the first level of observation) in a quite different range of phenomena (consciousness, the mind) without needing to change the Newtonian physics, then this is I think a recipe for disconnect, which becomes apparent at the point where you try to connect the control phenomena, as they appear to the mind, with the phenomena in the idealised mathematical models of science in the fleshly process and the changing appearances in “the worldâ€?. My very first posts questioned the corpus of causality and my claim was that PCT was a final functional dismantling of this aberration that has dogged the last four centuries.Â

Â

More generally, I think that Barfield’s account of models, representations, appearances, the evolution of consciousness and science, has much to recommend it.

Â

Best

…………â………………………… ¦â€¦â€¦â€¦â€¦………………….

Angus Jenkinson

Â

[From Rick Marken (2015.09.19.0940)]

RM: I think where we might be having a disconnect is in what we mean by “exists in the environment”. When I say that a control system controls an “aspect of the environment” I am not saying that it is controlling something that necessarily exists in the environment. It is controlling a function of variables that, per the models of physics and chemistry, exist in the environment.

Â

PY: This one always gets me. Why is there always a disclaimer which says, “The perception you are controlling may not exist in the environment.”?

Â

RM: It’s true that, according to PCT, what is controlled is a perceptual variable. But this perceptual variable corresponds to some aspect of the environment (which is called the controlled quantity, q.o) that is also controlled. My “disclaimer” simply acknowledged that q.o does not necessarily correspond anything that actually exists in the environment according to our existing physical models of that environment. I mentioned humidity and, in B:CP Bill mentions the taste of lemonade as examples of perceptions that don’t correspond to anything that exist in the environment. But they do correspond aspects of the environment (functions of physical variables that do exist in the environment according to our physical models) and these aspects of the environment are controlled when the perceptions that correspond to them are controlled.

Â

On 17/09/2015, 03:08, “Richard Marken” rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

Â

[From Rick Marken (2015.09.16.1900)]

Â

On Wed, Sep 16, 2015 at 12:28 AM, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu wrote:

[9.16.2015]

  PY:  I’ve been doing some studying so I have something to talk about.

Â

RM: I haven’t been replying to your posts because I haven’t seen their relevance to what I am interested in: the study of purposive behavior. And I also have to admit that I haven’t really understood them all that well. But the last paragraph in this post did catch my attention:

Â

PY: Finally, a word of caution to those who put faith in the models of physics and chemistry to provide us with what we know about what is “out there”.Â

Â

RM: It looks like that is addressed to me, since I’m the one who most recently said that PCT takes the current models of physics and chemistry as the model of what is “out there” in the environment component of the PCT model. You go on to say:

Â

PY: That’s quite simply not going to cut it for biology.Â

Â

RM: My impression is that biology uses the current models of physics and chemistry. Isn’t DNA based on the molecular model of matter, for example? Don’t the forces exerted by muscles on the skeleton behave according to Newton’s laws?Â

Â

PY: If my two cents is worth anything in your economy: I believe it’s more reliable to compare biology to computer systems adhering to codes, rather than physical systems adhering to laws. There are such things as the microprocessor and the memory hierarchy.

Â

RM: That may be (though my bet would be on a control rather than a computer organization as the model of biological systems, since what biological systems do, at the behavioral as well as molecular level, is control). But this doesn’t negate the fact that biologists (like all scientists, including control theorists) use the models of physics and chemistry to describe what is really “out there”. Whether biological systems should be modeled as computers or control systems, the implementation of these systems will be in terms of entities (like molecules, electromagnetic energy) that are components of our current models of physics and chemistry. Computer and control system models are different ideas about how the reality “out there” – the reality described by the models of physics and chemistry – are *organized. *

Â

BestÂ

Â

Rick

Richard S. MarkenÂ

www.mindreadings.com
Author of  Doing Research on Purpose

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

Richard S. MarkenÂ

Author, with Timothy A. Carey, of  Controlling People: The Paradoxical Nature of Being Human

From Angus Jenkinson, 2016-06-14.12.16.GMT

Â

···

…If on the one
hand one asserts the ongoing validity of Newtonian physics as
a representation of the world and an explanation for its
behaviour and at the same time you wish to propose a different
paradigm operating (at the first level of observation) in a
quite different range of phenomena (consciousness, the mind)
without needing to change the Newtonian physics, then this is
I think a recipe for disconnect, which becomes apparent at the
point where you try to connect the control phenomena,
as they appear to the mind, with the phenomena in the
idealised mathematical models of science in the
fleshly process and the changing appearances in “the
world�. My very first posts questioned the corpus of
causality and my claim was that PCT was a final functional
dismantling of this aberration that has dogged the last four
centuries.Â

[Angus Jenkinson, 2016-06-17.18.43 UK]

Ah, interesting. Thank you for your point of view. And thank you very much for responding.

On almost every fundamental point, however and sadly, I am at least orthogonal to you in. Indeed for me what is most exciting about PCT is its absolute negation of causality as classically understood. Nor am I simply substituting a quantum alternative. I am saying that the genuine implication of PCT is an entirely new epistemology as well as paradigm. It represents (in relevant fields) the cancelling of causality to the extent that causality exists in the first place (and its disavowal goes back to Hume). Some wonderfully practical and powerful consequences follow. (Subject for another time.)

Now I am not making this is a simple rhetorical statement: I am suggesting it is a compelling conclusion of a close open observation of the actual phenomenon. Is it not the case that the action that is taken in the process of controlling for a specific outcome is ‘intended to’ cancel (and routinely does) the effect of perturbation from any causal agent or factor outside the actor? It is the negative of causality.

There are various other aspects of your description that are also most interesting, such as emergent phenomenon and causal loop.

By describing something as an emergent phenomenon, it states that there are various phenomena that when observed individually (and so described) do not appear to have the appearance that they do when they appear to be a single phenomenon and that what happens between the one observed (and so described) appearance and the other is a mystery dressed up as a scientific concept. This represents for me an abdication of explanation, and indeed a presumed unpredictability is commonly built into such descriptions.

Moreover, when discussing a causal loop, the operant paradigm is cybernetics: PCT was developed out of cybernetics. Cybernetics in its classical (first or second order) form only deals with information, it is media neutral, indeed there is no such thing as medium, nor energy, from the point of view of cybernetics (it is not saying that there is no such thing as energy, it saying that the transformation that takes place between energy and order is a function of information and since media are nothing but order there is no need to describe the system in any other terms other than information). At its next level, really understood, level of incarnation, cybernetics adds the third function or operant factor, imparity, and this does have some significance from the point of view of PCT, since it is precisely the case that in controlling for a particular outcome alternative information has imparity, but notwithstanding this imparity does not affect the basic point I want to make. What is being described as a causal loop is in this case an information loop and information is not causal in terms of Newtonian force dynamics. It works through agent/patient dynamics and the agent/patient dynamics as described by PCT are such, as previously described, as to cancel out the informational effect of any perturbation from the controlled-for condition, which is information itself.

No doubt this could be described more precisely or elegantly, perhaps even more accurately, but I only intend to try and give an impression of why, although I appreciate that it is quite obvious that you know a great deal of physics in various areas that would appear to exceed my own, the issue of our difference is at least in part fundamentally epistemological in our interpretation and understanding of perceptual control theory and its underlying paradigm of cybernetics. My extraordinary excitement in discovering PCT is precisely that it gives an exact scientific explanation with a momentous effect at least exceeding that of Newton or Einstein or the quantum physicists and once rightly understood will transform centuries of future science.

Have a good weekend

…………………………………………………….

Angus Jenkinson

[Martin Taylor 2016.06.18.11.14]

From Angus Jenkinson, 2016-06-14.12.16.GMT

…If on the one hand one asserts the ongoing validity of Newtonian physics as a representation of the world and an explanation for its behaviour and at the same time you wish to propose a different paradigm operating (at the first level of observation) in a quite different range of phenomena (consciousness, the mind) without needing to change the Newtonian physics, then this is I think a recipe for disconnect, which becomes apparent at the point where you try to connect the control phenomena, as they appear to the mind, with the phenomena in the idealised mathematical models of science in the fleshly process and the changing appearances in “the world”. My very first posts questioned the corpus of causality and my claim was that PCT was a final functional dismantling of this aberration that has dogged the last four centuries.

I see no disconnect, and I see no way in which PCT is inconsistent with causality or Newtonian physics. It might possibly be inconsistent with quantum-level physics, but that’s very unlikely provided we restrict consideration to macroscopic phenomena. The same applies to the consistency of PCT with general relativity. It may or may not be consistent, but that doesn’t matter so long as we restrict consideration to things less massive than a planet and slower than a few thousand km/hr. Within those restrictions on size and speed, Newtonian physics works pretty well.

As for causality, every component of a control loop is a simple causal structure. What appears at the input, passing through whatever structures constitute the component, determines what appears at the output, whether that be the “neural current” approximation, the firing or otherwise of a single neuron, a chemical concentration, or whatever. Everything is causal.

What you are talking about is an emergent phenomenon that happens in a fully causal feedback loop. The loop is completely analyzable using Newtonian physics and orthodox chemistry, but emergent properties such as control, homeostasis, oscillation, explosive growth and chaos depend on the particular loop structure and parameters. None of these “question the corpus of causality”. They are consequences of causality.

In the realms of quantum effects and relativistic effects there may be reason to question causality; indeed, two observers may disagree on which of two events happened first. But in the world of events within a few orders of magnitude of human-scale mass and speed, quantum and relativistic effects can ordinarily be ignored (and I’m not forgetting the need for relativistic corrections of GPS data).

Control is causal. That’s the bottom line.

Martin

···

On 17/06/2016, 16:35, “Martin Taylor” mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Angus Jenkinson, 2016-06-17.18.43 UK]

        Ah, interesting.  Thank you for your point of

view. And thank you very much for responding.

Angus, just one quick comment… PCT was not ’ PCT was developed out of
cybernetics. 'Â Essentially Bill Powers, developed PCT from Herman
Black’s 'control theory.'Â A field in which Bill was indeed an
expert. The real truth as I understand it is that Bill was
working with such luminaries as Norbert Weiner to get that
community to understand what they should really be dealing with.Â
That community was heavily ‘into’ complex mathematical
computations to try to produce output, that is behavior. Bill
created a computer model demonstrating that what the cybernetics
people were doing with their mini-computers could be performed
quite simply using just a micro-processor (at that time just an
Intel 8086 without math co-processor). It has taken years and
significant improvements in sensory inputs and sensory processing
to reach the point where we are today.

  Best,

  Bill
···

On 06/17/2016 12:01 PM, Angus Jenkinson
wrote:

[Angus Jenkinson, 2016-06-17.18.43 UK]

Â

        Ah, interesting.  Thank you for your point of

view. And thank you very much for responding.

Â

        On almost every fundamental point, however and

sadly, I am at least orthogonal to you in. Indeed for me
what is most exciting about PCT is its absolute negation of
causality as classically understood. Nor am I simply
substituting a quantum alternative. I am saying that the
genuine implication of PCT is an entirely new epistemology
as well as paradigm. It represents (in relevant fields) the
cancelling of causality to the extent that causality exists
in the first place (and its disavowal goes back to Hume).Â
Some wonderfully practical and powerful consequences follow.
(Subject for another time.)

Â

        Now I am not making this is a simple rhetorical

statement: I am suggesting it is a compelling conclusion of
a close open observation of the actual phenomenon. Is it
not the case that the action that is taken in the process of
controlling for a specific outcome is ‘intended to’ cancel
(and routinely does) the effect of perturbation from any
causal agent or factor outside the actor? It is the negative
of causality.

Â

        There are various other aspects of your

description that are also most interesting, such as emergent
phenomenon and causal loop.

Â

        By describing something as an emergent

phenomenon, it states that there are various phenomena that
when observed individually (and so described) do not appear
to have the appearance that they do when they appear to be a
single phenomenon and that what happens between the one
observed (and so described) appearance and the other is a
mystery dressed up as a scientific concept. This represents
for me an abdication of explanation, and indeed a presumed
unpredictability is commonly built into such descriptions.

Â

        Moreover, when discussing a causal loop, the

operant paradigm is cybernetics: PCT was developed out of
cybernetics. Cybernetics in its classical (first or second
order) form only deals with information, it is media
neutral, indeed there is no such thing as medium, nor
energy, from the point of view of cybernetics (it is not
saying that there is no such thing as energy, it saying that
the transformation that takes place between energy and order
is a function of information and since media are nothing but
order there is no need to describe the system in any other
terms other than information). At its next level, really
understood, level of incarnation, cybernetics adds the third
function or operant factor, imparity, and this does have
some significance from the point of view of PCT, since it is
precisely the case that in controlling for a particular
outcome alternative information has imparity, but
notwithstanding this imparity does not affect the basic
point I want to make. What is being described as a causal
loop is in this case an information loop and information is
not causal in terms of Newtonian force dynamics. It works
through agent/patient dynamics and the agent/patient
dynamics as described by PCT are such, as previously
described, as to cancel out the informational effect of any
perturbation from the controlled-for condition, which is
information itself.

Â

        No doubt this could be described more precisely

or elegantly, perhaps even more accurately, but I only
intend to try and give an impression of why, although I
appreciate that it is quite obvious that you know a great
deal of physics in various areas that would appear to exceed
my own, the issue of our difference is at least in part
fundamentally epistemological in our interpretation and
understanding of perceptual control theory and its
underlying paradigm of cybernetics. My extraordinary
excitement in discovering PCT is precisely that it gives an
exact scientific explanation with a momentous effect at
least exceeding that of Newton or Einstein or the quantum
physicists and once rightly understood will transform
centuries of future science.

Â

Have a good weekend

Â

…………………………………………………….

            Angus

Jenkinson

Â

Â

          On 17/06/2016, 16:35, "Martin Taylor"

<mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net >
wrote:

Â

[Martin Taylor 2016.06.18.11.14]

              From Angus Jenkinson,

2016-06-14.12.16.GMT

Â

              ...If on the one hand one asserts the

ongoing validity of Newtonian physics as a
representation of the world and an explanation for its
behaviour and at the same time you wish to propose a
different paradigm operating (at the first level of
observation) in a quite different range of phenomena
(consciousness, the mind) without needing to change
the Newtonian physics, then this is I think a recipe
for disconnect, which becomes apparent at the point where
you try to connect the control phenomena, as they
appear to the mind, with the phenomena in the
idealised mathematical models of science in
the fleshly process and the changing
appearances in “the world�. My very first posts
questioned the corpus of causality and my claim was
that PCT was a final functional dismantling of this
aberration that has dogged the last four centuries.Â

          I see no disconnect, and I see no way in which PCT is

inconsistent with causality or Newtonian physics. It might
possibly be inconsistent with quantum-level physics, but
that’s very unlikely provided we restrict consideration to
macroscopic phenomena. The same applies to the consistency
of PCT with general relativity. It may or may not be
consistent, but that doesn’t matter so long as we restrict
consideration to things less massive than a planet and
slower than a few thousand km/hr. Within those
restrictions on size and speed, Newtonian physics works
pretty well.

          As for causality, every component of a control loop is a

simple causal structure. What appears at the input,
passing through whatever structures constitute the
component, determines what appears at the output, whether
that be the “neural current” approximation, the firing or
otherwise of a single neuron, a chemical concentration, or
whatever. Everything is causal.

          What you are talking about is an emergent phenomenon that

happens in a fully causal feedback loop. The loop is
completely analyzable using Newtonian physics and orthodox
chemistry, but emergent properties such as control,
homeostasis, oscillation, explosive growth and chaos
depend on the particular loop structure and parameters.
None of these “question the corpus of causality”. They are
consequences of causality.

          In the realms of quantum effects and relativistic effects

there may be reason to question causality; indeed, two
observers may disagree on which of two events happened
first. But in the world of events within a few orders of
magnitude of human-scale mass and speed, quantum and
relativistic effects can ordinarily be ignored (and I’m
not forgetting the need for relativistic corrections of
GPS data).

          Control is causal. That's the bottom line.

          Martin

philip 6/11 17:26

I find it interesting that PCT describes a system that functions without a model of the environment programmed into its memory. However, the job of scientists is to build a model of the environment. We innately desire a model of the environment which describes it in the form of equations. We can imagine a scientist controlling a perceptual
representation of some aspect of the environment. It’s understood that the fundamental mode of action is to apply physical forces to objects to move them. But when the perception is an equation, what is the fundamental mode of action? What is does it mean to apply “force” to an equation? In other words, how can we imagine an abstract level 1 system which applies “force” to an equation? Perhaps you would think that we control a relationship among variables. For example, instead of energy = T^4, we imagine energy = h*frequency (as Planck described blackbody radiation). Planck is described as having altered one of the axioms or first principles of the model. Thus, we can imagine that an imagination connection simply injected this signal into the equation. So the axiom was created by virtue of the imagination. This axiom is somehow is brought into a particular state. What is the mechanism that brings an abstraction into a state when physical forces are not the means? In other words, what is an abstract “force”?    Â

···

On Sun, Oct 15, 2017 at 1:02 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.10.15.1300)]

Martin Taylor (2017.10.15.00.31)–

Â

MT: I have no idea what the other Editor has submitted for review [regarding the “Power Law of Movement Paper”], but I sent you my letter in which the central issue is explained. You passed it on to your co-author on August 13.Â

RM: OK, there is no evidence that anyone has submitted a rebuttal to our paper. I still hold out hope that someone will --preferably you -- so I won’t reply to the arguments in your letter now. So I encourage you or others of like mind to please submit a rebuttal to our “power law of movement” paper. I think it’s important to make this debate public; I believe it would be a great way to get scientific psychologists to pay attention to PCT.Â

BestÂ

Rick


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-12_09:53:13 ET]

philip 6/11 17:26 –

PCT describes a system that functions without a model of the environment programmed into its memory.Â

The perceptual control hierarchy that PCT proposes embodies a model of the environment in two forms of memory. One is the memory that is stored at every synapse, and the other is the ‘memory’ that is immanent in the structures of the perceptual input functions, output functions, reference input functions, and their interconnections constituting the perceptual control hierarchy.

···

On Sun, Oct 15, 2017 at 1:02 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.10.15.1300)]

Martin Taylor (2017.10.15.00.31)–

Â

MT: I have no idea what the other Editor has submitted for review [regarding the “Power Law of Movement Paper”], but I sent you my letter in which the central issue is explained. You passed it on to your co-author on August 13.Â

RM: OK, there is no evidence that anyone has submitted a rebuttal to our paper. I still hold out hope that someone will --preferably you -- so I won’t reply to the arguments in your letter now. So I encourage you or others of like mind to please submit a rebuttal to our “power law of movement” paper. I think it’s important to make this debate public; I believe it would be a great way to get scientific psychologists to pay attention to PCT.Â

BestÂ

Rick


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Interesting…

···

From: Bruce Nevin (bnhpct@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Tuesday, June 12, 2018 3:53 PM
To: Philip Yeranosian pyeranos@ucla.edu
Cc: CSG csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: world model

[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-12_09:53:13 ET]

philip 6/11 17:26 –

PCT describes a system that functions without a model of the environment programmed into its memory.

The perceptual control hierarchy that PCT proposes embodies a model of the environment in two forms of memory. One is the memory that is stored at every synapse, and the other is the ‘memory’ that is immanent in the structures of the perceptual input functions, output functions, reference input functions, and their interconnections constituting the perceptual control hierarchy.

HB : Maybe I didn’t understand well something. Can you describe :

  1. How memory is stored at every synapse

  2. How is immanent in the structures of the perceptual input functions (for example eye, year, skin…)

  3. How is immanent in the structures of the perceptual ouptut functions (I suppose you meant muscle)

  4. What is reference input function and memory that is immanent to these structures

Boris

/Bruce

On Mon, Jun 11, 2018 at 9:06 PM PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

philip 6/11 17:26

I find it interesting that PCT describes a system that functions without a model of the environment programmed into its memory. However, the job of scientists is to build a model of the environment. We innately desire a model of the environment which describes it in the form of equations. We can imagine a scientist controlling a perceptual representation of some aspect of the environment. It’s understood that the fundamental mode of action is to apply physical forces to objects to move them. But when the perception is an equation, what is the fundamental mode of action? What is does it mean to apply “force” to an equation? In other words, how can we imagine an abstract level 1 system which applies “force” to an equation? Perhaps you would think that we control a relationship among variables. For example, instead of energy = T^4, we imagine energy = h*frequency (as Planck described blackbody radiation). Planck is described as having altered one of the axioms or first principles of the model. Thus, we can imagine that an imagination connection simply injected this signal into the equation. So the axiom was created by virtue of the imagination. This axiom is somehow is brought into a particular state. What is the mechanism that brings an abstraction into a state when physical forces are not the means? In other words, what is an abstract “force”?

On Sun, Oct 15, 2017 at 1:02 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.10.15.1300)]

Martin Taylor (2017.10.15.00.31)–

MT: I have no idea what the other Editor has submitted for review [regarding the “Power Law of Movement Paper”], but I sent you my letter in which the central issue is explained. You passed it on to your co-author on August 13.

RM: OK, there is no evidence that anyone has submitted a rebuttal to our paper. I still hold out hope that someone will --preferably you – so I won’t reply to the arguments in your letter now. So I encourage you or others of like mind to please submit a rebuttal to our “power law of movement” paper. I think it’s important to make this debate public; I believe it would be a great way to get scientific psychologists to pay attention to PCT.

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

philip 6/13 10:00

The model of the environment programmed into the memory I was
referring to was specifically a law of dynamics that is used for
simulation. Unlike a simulator, we don't have F=ma programmed into our
brain.

···

On 6/13/18, "Boris Hartman" <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu> wrote:

Interesting�

From: Bruce Nevin (bnhpct@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List)
<csgnet@lists.illinois.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, June 12, 2018 3:53 PM
To: Philip Yeranosian <pyeranos@ucla.edu>
Cc: CSG <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu>
Subject: Re: world model

[Bruce Nevin 2018-06-12_09:53:13 ET]

philip 6/11 17:26 --

> PCT describes a system that functions without a model of the environment
programmed into its memory.

The perceptual control hierarchy that PCT proposes embodies a model of the
environment in two forms of memory. One is the memory that is stored at
every synapse, and the other is the 'memory' that is immanent in the
structures of the perceptual input functions, output functions, reference
input functions, and their interconnections constituting the perceptual
control hierarchy.

HB : Maybe I didn't understand well something. Can you describe :

1. How memory is stored at every synapse
2. How is immanent in the structures of the perceptual input functions (for
example eye, year, skin�)

3. How is immanent in the structures of the perceptual ouptut functions (I
suppose you meant muscle)
4. What is reference input function and memory that is immanent to these
structures

Boris

/Bruce

On Mon, Jun 11, 2018 at 9:06 PM PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN > <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu <mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu> > wrote:

philip 6/11 17:26

I find it interesting that PCT describes a system that functions without a
model of the environment programmed into its memory. However, the job of
scientists is to build a model of the environment. We innately desire a
model of the environment which describes it in the form of equations. We can
imagine a scientist controlling a perceptual representation of some aspect
of the environment. It's understood that the fundamental mode of action is
to apply physical forces to objects to move them. But when the perception is
an equation, what is the fundamental mode of action? What is does it mean to
apply "force" to an equation? In other words, how can we imagine an abstract
level 1 system which applies "force" to an equation? Perhaps you would think
that we control a relationship among variables. For example, instead of
energy = T^4, we imagine energy = h*frequency (as Planck described blackbody
radiation). Planck is described as having altered one of the axioms or first
principles of the model. Thus, we can imagine that an imagination connection
simply injected this signal into the equation. So the axiom was created by
virtue of the imagination. This axiom is somehow is brought into a
particular state. What is the mechanism that brings an abstraction into a
state when physical forces are not the means? In other words, what is an
abstract "force"?

On Sun, Oct 15, 2017 at 1:02 PM, Richard Marken <rsmarken@gmail.com > <mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com> > wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2017.10.15.1300)]

Martin Taylor (2017.10.15.00.31)--

MT: I have no idea what the other Editor has submitted for review [regarding
the "Power Law of Movement Paper"], but I sent you my letter in which the
central issue is explained. You passed it on to your co-author on August 13.

RM: OK, there is no evidence that anyone has submitted a rebuttal to our
paper. I still hold out hope that someone will --preferably you -- so I
won't reply to the arguments in your letter now. So I encourage you or
others of like mind to please submit a rebuttal to our "power law of
movement" paper. I think it's important to make this debate public; I
believe it would be a great way to get scientific psychologists to pay
attention to PCT.

Best

Rick

--

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�?
                                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

We begin with a premise. For example, the Earth orbits the Sun
or vice versa. From the perspective of Earth, we cannot discern between these
two premises. Thus, two incompatible premises can lead to the same observation.
So we add another premise. For example, the other planets orbit either the
Earth or the Sun. This gives us 4 possibilities:

  1. The Earth orbits the Sun and the other planets orbit the Earth.
  2. The Earth orbits the Sun and the other planets orbit the Sun. (Copernicus)
  3. The Sun orbits the Earth and the other planets orbit the Earth. (Ptolemy)
  4. The Sun orbits the Earth and the other planets orbit the Sun. (Tycho Brahe)
    from the perspective of Earth, we can rule out premises (1) and (3). However,
    premises (2) and (4) again lead to the same observation. So we add another
    premise. For example, the orbits are either circular or elliptical. This again
    gives us 4 possibilities:
  5. The Earth orbits the Sun and the other planets orbit the Sun circularly.
  6. The Earth orbits the Sun and the other planets orbit the Sun elliptically.
  7. The Sun orbits the Earth and the other planets orbit the Sun circularly.
  8. The Sun orbits the Earth and the other planets orbit the Sun elliptically.
    Again from the perspective of Earth, we can rule out premises (1) and (3) as
    Kepler did. But premises (2) and (4) ostensibly lead to the same observation.
    So we add yet another premise. For example, an equation of motion describes the
    orbits of the heavenly bodies. At this point, Newton introduced his equation of
    motion and the Copernicus-Kepler model was adopted ad hoc. Given the principle
    that observation is the only authority for all descriptions, it is philosophically
    incorrect to scientifically rule out the Tychonic system as a possibility
    unless it conflicts with observation.

[Martin Taylor 2018.07.07.17.29]

It is always scientifically incorrect to "rule out" anything that is

not impossible. What is not scientifically incorrect is to choose
the most probable of the available hypotheses, keeping in mind that
further observation might change the probabilities. It is
scientifically correct use the available evidence from other
situations to produce simplified explanations that cover wide ranges
of observation equally well or better (
Premise 2 uses nothing extra beyond what has been used to explain a
wide range of phenomena, whereas 4 makes a special case of the
Earth-Sun relationship, therefore requiring a lot more background
explanation than 2. But there is a Premise 5 that is even simpler
and fits the observations equally well: (5) The Earth and Sun orbit
each other in paths that are nearly elliptical. It is simpler
because it makes neither the Sun nor the Earth a special case. Both
are treated simply as bodies in space that influence each other
equally, causing different accelerations according to f=ma, which
is pretty simple in itself. Premise 5 is therefore preferred over
both 2 and 4, though all three anticipate the same observations for
this specific situation.
That’s the scientific-philosophical background to the interpretation
of observations and the production of models of how the world works,
either by direct reorganization of the hierarchy or by effective
control in imagination, controlling through an imagined
(world-model) environment – if the world works way, will be the observation.
Martin
Martin

···

On 2018/07/5 4:04 PM, PHILIP JERAIR
YERANOSIAN ( via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

pyeranos@ucla.edu

        We begin with a premise. For example,

the Earth orbits the Sun
or vice versa. From the perspective of Earth, we cannot
discern between these
two premises. Thus, two incompatible premises can lead to
the same observation.
So we add another premise. For example, the other planets
orbit either the
Earth or the Sun. This gives us 4 possibilities:

      1. The Earth orbits the Sun and the other planets orbit the

Earth.
2. The Earth orbits the Sun and the other planets orbit the
Sun. (Copernicus)
3. The Sun orbits the Earth and the other planets orbit the
Earth. (Ptolemy)
4. The Sun orbits the Earth and the other planets orbit the
Sun. (Tycho Brahe)
>From the perspective of Earth, we can rule out premises
(1) and (3). However,
premises (2) and (4) again lead to the same observation. So we
add another
premise. For example, the orbits are either circular or
elliptical. This again
gives us 4 possibilities:
1. The Earth orbits the Sun and the other planets orbit the
Sun circularly.
2. The Earth orbits the Sun and the other planets orbit the
Sun elliptically.
3. The Sun orbits the Earth and the other planets orbit the
Sun circularly.
4. The Sun orbits the Earth and the other planets orbit the
Sun elliptically.
Again from the perspective of Earth, we can rule out premises
(1) and (3) as
Kepler did. But premises (2) and (4) ostensibly lead to the
same observation.
So we add yet another premise. For example, an equation of
motion describes the
orbits of the heavenly bodies. At this point, Newton
introduced his equation of
motion and the Copernicus-Kepler model was adopted ad hoc.
Given the principle
that observation is the only authority for all descriptions,
it is philosophically
incorrect to scientifically rule out the Tychonic system as a
possibility
unless it conflicts with observation.

  the modern

version of making explanations as simple as possible but not more
so, otherwise known as Ockham’s Razor. See
for the
mathematical argument about the relative probability of
hypotheses).
this**that

http://www.mmtaylor.net/Academic/ockham.html

It is scientifically incorrect to rule out Tycho Brahe’s model in the same way that Ptolemy’s model can be ruled out. The simplicity of a theory does not mean that another theory can be ruled out ad hoc.

···

On Sat, Jul 7, 2018 at 2:52 PM, Martin Taylor csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2018.07.07.17.29]

  On 2018/07/5 4:04 PM, PHILIP JERAIR

YERANOSIAN (pyeranos@ucla.edu via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

        We begin with a premise. For example,

the Earth orbits the Sun
or vice versa. From the perspective of Earth, we cannot
discern between these
two premises. Thus, two incompatible premises can lead to
the same observation.
So we add another premise. For example, the other planets
orbit either the
Earth or the Sun. This gives us 4 possibilities:

      1. The Earth orbits the Sun and the other planets orbit the

Earth.
2. The Earth orbits the Sun and the other planets orbit the
Sun. (Copernicus)
3. The Sun orbits the Earth and the other planets orbit the
Earth. (Ptolemy)
4. The Sun orbits the Earth and the other planets orbit the
Sun. (Tycho Brahe)
>From the perspective of Earth, we can rule out premises
(1) and (3). However,
premises (2) and (4) again lead to the same observation. So we
add another
premise. For example, the orbits are either circular or
elliptical. This again
gives us 4 possibilities:
1. The Earth orbits the Sun and the other planets orbit the
Sun circularly.
2. The Earth orbits the Sun and the other planets orbit the
Sun elliptically.
3. The Sun orbits the Earth and the other planets orbit the
Sun circularly.
4. The Sun orbits the Earth and the other planets orbit the
Sun elliptically.
Again from the perspective of Earth, we can rule out premises
(1) and (3) as
Kepler did. But premises (2) and (4) ostensibly lead to the
same observation.
So we add yet another premise. For example, an equation of
motion describes the
orbits of the heavenly bodies. At this point, Newton
introduced his equation of
motion and the Copernicus-Kepler model was adopted ad hoc.
Given the principle
that observation is the only authority for all descriptions,
it is philosophically
incorrect to scientifically rule out the Tychonic system as a
possibility
unless it conflicts with observation.

It is always scientifically incorrect to "rule out" anything that is

not impossible. What is not scientifically incorrect is to choose
the most probable of the available hypotheses, keeping in mind that
further observation might change the probabilities. It is
scientifically correct use the available evidence from other
situations to produce simplified explanations that cover wide ranges
of observation equally well or better ( the modern
version of making explanations as simple as possible but not more
so, otherwise known as Ockham’s Razor. See
http://www.mmtaylor.net/Academic/ockham.html for the
mathematical argument about the relative probability of
hypotheses).

Premise 2 uses nothing extra beyond what has been used to explain a

wide range of phenomena, whereas 4 makes a special case of the
Earth-Sun relationship, therefore requiring a lot more background
explanation than 2. But there is a Premise 5 that is even simpler
and fits the observations equally well: (5) The Earth and Sun orbit
each other in paths that are nearly elliptical. It is simpler
because it makes neither the Sun nor the Earth a special case. Both
are treated simply as bodies in space that influence each other
equally, causing different accelerations according to f=ma, which
is pretty simple in itself. Premise 5 is therefore preferred over
both 2 and 4, though all three anticipate the same observations for
this specific situation.

That's the scientific-philosophical background to the interpretation

of observations and the production of models of how the world works,
either by direct reorganization of the hierarchy or by effective
control in imagination, controlling through an imagined
(world-model) environment – if the world works this way, that
will be the observation.

Martin





Martin

[philip 8.10.2015]

I propose a definition of control which has been eluding me for years. Control is the process of causing an outcome to have a probability of occurrence different than random or pure chance. A disturbance is something which causes the probability of an occurence to be completely random.

The process of control seems analogous to the reduction of entropy caused by atoms bonding (either covalently or non-covalently) and moving together. The high-affinity interaction between a B cell receptor and an antigen is an example of control. If a B cell and T cell bind to the same antigen, the communication between them initiates the production of antibody.

image44.png

In this case, we have two cells controlling (binding) the same aspect of the environment - literrally the same physical object.

Here’s an overview of how the adaptive immune system functions:

  1. B cell receptor binds to free floating antigen.

image45.png

  1. B cell internalizes receptor and bound antigen
    image46.png

  2. B cell transfers antigen to MHC (major histocompatability complex) protein.
    image47.png

  3. B cell transports MHC and bound antigen to cell surface.

image48.png

  1. T cell binds to antigen and MHC protein combination (but not to free floating antigen).
    image47.png

  2. T cell activates B cell.

This process of B and T cell mediated immunity provides a natural model to discuss the following diagram.

image50.png

We see two arrows pointing at the perceptual input. The arrow coming from the world represents antigen. The antigen is first bound by a BCR, and the antigen and BCR will now travel together (reduction in entropy). This is analogous to a perception matching a reference.
The world model represents an MHC protein, which serves as the connection between the output of the B cell and the input of the T cell. Remember: when the BCR binds antigen, the antigen is transferred to the MHC protein and represented to the surface of the B cell for the T cells to bind. So the output of the B cell (the input of the T cell) always goes through the world model.

···

Hi Philip, what about if the control system wants a certain exact, non-chance value as its reference, and the disturbance is supplying a different, but exact and predictable, non-chance value?
Warren

···

On 11 Aug 2015, at 00:17, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN (pyeranos@ucla.edu via csgnet Mailing List) <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu> wrote:

[philip 8.10.2015]

     I propose a definition of control which has been eluding me for years. Control is the process of causing an outcome to have a probability of occurrence different than random or pure chance. A disturbance is something which causes the probability of an occurence to be completely random.
     The process of control seems analogous to the reduction of entropy caused by atoms bonding (either covalently or non-covalently) and moving together. The high-affinity interaction between a B cell receptor and an antigen is an example of control. If a B cell and T cell bind to the same antigen, the communication between them initiates the production of antibody.

<image.png>

In this case, we have two cells controlling (binding) the same aspect of the environment - literrally the same physical object.

Here's an overview of how the adaptive immune system functions:
1. B cell receptor binds to free floating antigen.

<image.png>

2. B cell internalizes receptor and bound antigen
<image.png>
3. B cell transfers antigen to MHC (major histocompatability complex) protein.
<image.png>
4. B cell transports MHC and bound antigen to cell surface.
<image.png>
5. T cell binds to antigen and MHC protein combination (but not to free floating antigen).
<image.png>
6. T cell activates B cell.

This process of B and T cell mediated immunity provides a natural model to discuss the following diagram.

<image.png>

We see two arrows pointing at the perceptual input. The arrow coming from the world represents antigen. The antigen is first bound by a BCR, and the antigen and BCR will now travel together (reduction in entropy). This is analogous to a perception matching a reference.
The world model represents an MHC protein, which serves as the connection between the output of the B cell and the input of the T cell. Remember: when the BCR binds antigen, the antigen is transferred to the MHC protein and represented to the surface of the B cell for the T cells to bind. So the output of the B cell (the input of the T cell) always goes through the world model.

And what is chance anyway? When I throw a die I might say it turned up a six 'by chance' but the die w just following simple physical laws in complex and dynamic but nonetheless deterministic interactions with its environment...

···

On 11 Aug 2015, at 00:17, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN (pyeranos@ucla.edu via csgnet Mailing List) <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu> wrote:

[philip 8.10.2015]

     I propose a definition of control which has been eluding me for years. Control is the process of causing an outcome to have a probability of occurrence different than random or pure chance. A disturbance is something which causes the probability of an occurence to be completely random.
     The process of control seems analogous to the reduction of entropy caused by atoms bonding (either covalently or non-covalently) and moving together. The high-affinity interaction between a B cell receptor and an antigen is an example of control. If a B cell and T cell bind to the same antigen, the communication between them initiates the production of antibody.

<image.png>

In this case, we have two cells controlling (binding) the same aspect of the environment - literrally the same physical object.

Here's an overview of how the adaptive immune system functions:
1. B cell receptor binds to free floating antigen.

<image.png>

2. B cell internalizes receptor and bound antigen
<image.png>
3. B cell transfers antigen to MHC (major histocompatability complex) protein.
<image.png>
4. B cell transports MHC and bound antigen to cell surface.
<image.png>
5. T cell binds to antigen and MHC protein combination (but not to free floating antigen).
<image.png>
6. T cell activates B cell.

This process of B and T cell mediated immunity provides a natural model to discuss the following diagram.

<image.png>

We see two arrows pointing at the perceptual input. The arrow coming from the world represents antigen. The antigen is first bound by a BCR, and the antigen and BCR will now travel together (reduction in entropy). This is analogous to a perception matching a reference.
The world model represents an MHC protein, which serves as the connection between the output of the B cell and the input of the T cell. Remember: when the BCR binds antigen, the antigen is transferred to the MHC protein and represented to the surface of the B cell for the T cells to bind. So the output of the B cell (the input of the T cell) always goes through the world model.

[philip 8.14.2015]

The point I am trying to make is that concept of purpose is very much analogous to the concept of atomic bonding - bonding represents a minimization of enthalpy (internal energy), whereas purpose represents a minimization of error (internal signal).

To get straight to the point, please consider the following diagram:
image52.png

The dotted lines represent the surface of a B cell. The antigen represents the input quantity, and the B cell receptor (BCR) represents the input sensor. After binding to the BCR, the antigen is transferred to an MHC protein inside the B cell and the antigen-MHC complex is transported (represented) to the surface for the T cell receptor to match. The output of the B cell can be in one of two states: either the B cell will only express BCR on its surface, or the B cell releases BCR into the systemic environment (in which case, the BCR is referred to as an antibody, Ab).

When antibody binds to antigen, the process causes the antigen to accumulate wherever the antibodies stick. And one of the places antibodies stick to is the follicular dendritic cells in the lymphoid follicles. Lymphoid follicles are islands of follicular dendritic cells within a sea of B cells. So as it turns out, the antibodies (the output of B cells) are selectively transporting antigen (the input of B cells) to the very environment of the B cells. Thus the production of antibody organizes the environment of the B cells, and the result is to increase the chances of a B cell encountering its cognate antigen.

image53.png

image54.png

Of course, the magnitude of the bond between a BCR or an antibody and an antigen determines the controllability or physical retention of antigen. Hence the result tended to over time should be to optimize the associativity of antibody and antigen.

···

On Mon, Aug 10, 2015 at 9:57 PM, Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

And what is chance anyway? When I throw a die I might say it turned up a six ‘by chance’ but the die w just following simple physical laws in complex and dynamic but nonetheless deterministic interactions with its environment…

On 11 Aug 2015, at 00:17, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN (pyeranos@ucla.edu via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[philip 8.10.2015]

 I propose a definition of control which has been eluding me for years.  Control is the process of causing an outcome to have a probability of occurrence different than random or pure chance.  A disturbance is something which causes the probability of an occurence to be completely random.
 The process of control seems analogous to the reduction of entropy caused by atoms bonding (either covalently or non-covalently) and moving together.  The high-affinity interaction between a B cell receptor and an antigen is an example of control.  If a B cell and T cell bind to the same antigen, the communication between them initiates the production of antibody.

<image.png>

In this case, we have two cells controlling (binding) the same aspect of the environment - literrally the same physical object.

Here’s an overview of how the adaptive immune system functions:

  1. B cell receptor binds to free floating antigen.

<image.png>

  1. B cell internalizes receptor and bound antigen

<image.png>

  1. B cell transfers antigen to MHC (major histocompatability complex) protein.

<image.png>

  1. B cell transports MHC and bound antigen to cell surface.

<image.png>

  1. T cell binds to antigen and MHC protein combination (but not to free floating antigen).

<image.png>

  1. T cell activates B cell.

This process of B and T cell mediated immunity provides a natural model to discuss the following diagram.

<image.png>

We see two arrows pointing at the perceptual input. The arrow coming from the world represents antigen. The antigen is first bound by a BCR, and the antigen and BCR will now travel together (reduction in entropy). This is analogous to a perception matching a reference.

The world model represents an MHC protein, which serves as the connection between the output of the B cell and the input of the T cell. Remember: when the BCR binds antigen, the antigen is transferred to the MHC protein and represented to the surface of the B cell for the T cells to bind. So the output of the B cell (the input of the T cell) always goes through the world model.

image53.png

The world is a virus!

image56.png

image54.png

image52.png

···

On Fri, Aug 14, 2015 at 3:58 PM, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu wrote:

[philip 8.14.2015]

The point I am trying to make is that concept of purpose is very much analogous to the concept of atomic bonding - bonding represents a minimization of enthalpy (internal energy), whereas purpose represents a minimization of error (internal signal).

To get straight to the point, please consider the following diagram:

The dotted lines represent the surface of a B cell. The antigen represents the input quantity, and the B cell receptor (BCR) represents the input sensor. After binding to the BCR, the antigen is transferred to an MHC protein inside the B cell and the antigen-MHC complex is transported (represented) to the surface for the T cell receptor to match. The output of the B cell can be in one of two states: either the B cell will only express BCR on its surface, or the B cell releases BCR into the systemic environment (in which case, the BCR is referred to as an antibody, Ab).

When antibody binds to antigen, the process causes the antigen to accumulate wherever the antibodies stick. And one of the places antibodies stick to is the follicular dendritic cells in the lymphoid follicles. Lymphoid follicles are islands of follicular dendritic cells within a sea of B cells. So as it turns out, the antibodies (the output of B cells) are selectively transporting antigen (the input of B cells) to the very environment of the B cells. Thus the production of antibody organizes the environment of the B cells, and the result is to increase the chances of a B cell encountering its cognate antigen.

Of course, the magnitude of the bond between a BCR or an antibody and an antigen determines the controllability or physical retention of antigen. Hence the result tended to over time should be to optimize the associativity of antibody and antigen.

On Mon, Aug 10, 2015 at 9:57 PM, Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

And what is chance anyway? When I throw a die I might say it turned up a six ‘by chance’ but the die w just following simple physical laws in complex and dynamic but nonetheless deterministic interactions with its environment…

On 11 Aug 2015, at 00:17, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN (pyeranos@ucla.edu via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[philip 8.10.2015]

 I propose a definition of control which has been eluding me for years.  Control is the process of causing an outcome to have a probability of occurrence different than random or pure chance.  A disturbance is something which causes the probability of an occurence to be completely random.
 The process of control seems analogous to the reduction of entropy caused by atoms bonding (either covalently or non-covalently) and moving together.  The high-affinity interaction between a B cell receptor and an antigen is an example of control.  If a B cell and T cell bind to the same antigen, the communication between them initiates the production of antibody.

<image.png>

In this case, we have two cells controlling (binding) the same aspect of the environment - literrally the same physical object.

Here’s an overview of how the adaptive immune system functions:

  1. B cell receptor binds to free floating antigen.

<image.png>

  1. B cell internalizes receptor and bound antigen

<image.png>

  1. B cell transfers antigen to MHC (major histocompatability complex) protein.

<image.png>

  1. B cell transports MHC and bound antigen to cell surface.

<image.png>

  1. T cell binds to antigen and MHC protein combination (but not to free floating antigen).

<image.png>

  1. T cell activates B cell.

This process of B and T cell mediated immunity provides a natural model to discuss the following diagram.

<image.png>

We see two arrows pointing at the perceptual input. The arrow coming from the world represents antigen. The antigen is first bound by a BCR, and the antigen and BCR will now travel together (reduction in entropy). This is analogous to a perception matching a reference.

The world model represents an MHC protein, which serves as the connection between the output of the B cell and the input of the T cell. Remember: when the BCR binds antigen, the antigen is transferred to the MHC protein and represented to the surface of the B cell for the T cells to bind. So the output of the B cell (the input of the T cell) always goes through the world model.

Ah, yes that’s more like it. Have you read Gary Cziko’s book on universal selection theory that includes both PCT and the immune system? (‘Without Miracles’). What you are working on could be a more detailed proposition?

Warren

···

On Mon, Aug 10, 2015 at 9:57 PM, Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

And what is chance anyway? W
hen I throw a die I might say it turned up a six ‘by chance’ but the die w just following simple physical laws in complex and dynamic but nonetheless deterministic interactions with its environment…

On 11 Aug 2015, at 00:17, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN (pyeranos@ucla.edu via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[philip 8.10.2015]

 I propose a definition of control which has been eluding me for years.  Control is the process of causing an outcome to have a probability of occurrence different than random or pure chance.  A disturbance is something which causes the probability of an occurence to be completely random.
 The process of control seems analogous to the reduction of entropy caused by atoms bonding (either covalently or non-covalently) and moving together.  The high-affinity interaction between a B cell receptor and an antigen is an example of control.  If a B cell and T cell bind to the same antigen, the communication between them initiates the production of antibody.

<image.png>

In this case, we have two cells controlling (binding) the same aspect of the environment - literrally the same physical object.

Here’s an overview of how the adaptive immune system functions:

  1. B cell receptor binds to free floating antigen.

<image.png>

  1. B cell internalizes receptor and bound antigen

<image.png>

  1. B cell transfers antigen to MHC (major histocompatability complex) protein.

<image.png>

  1. B cell transports MHC and bound antigen to cell surface.

<image.png>

  1. T cell binds to antigen and MHC protein combination (but not to free floating antigen).

<image.png>

  1. T cell activates B cell.

This process of B and T cell mediated immunity provides a natural model to discuss the following diagram.

<image.png>

We see two arrows pointing at the perceptual input. The arrow coming from the world represents antigen. The antigen is first bound by a BCR, and the antigen and BCR will now travel together (reduction in entropy). This is analogous to a perception matching a reference.

The world model represents an MHC protein, which serves as the connection between the output of the B cell and the input of the T cell. Remember: when the BCR binds antigen, the antigen is transferred to the MHC protein and represented to the surface of the B cell for the T cells to bind. So the output of the B cell (the input of the T cell) always goes through the world model.

[From Rick Marken (2015.08.15.1250)]

image52.png

image53.png

image54.png

···

[philip 8.14.2015]

PY: The point I am trying to make is that concept of purpose is very much analogous to the concept of atomic bonding - bonding represents a minimization of enthalpy (internal energy), whereas purpose represents a minimization of error (internal signal).

To get straight to the point, please consider the following diagram:

RM: Great job Phillip. This is a step toward a model of a biochemical control system. There are just a couple of things that I have questions about. First, the reference signal (TCR) seems to be external to the control system (the B cell). This is a bit unusual but interesting; it suggests that T cells control antigen levels by providing a reference to the B cell. This would make the T cell possibly a higher level control system that would presumably be varying the TCR reference for antigen level for a reason-- to control a higher level variable. Is there any data to suggest what the T cells might be controlling for by varying antigen levels?

RM: The diagram suggests that antigen level is a controlled variable, controlled by varying antibody (Ab) level. And it shows mutation as a disturbance to antibody level. But I don’t see how mutation could be a disturbance. What’s being mutated? The mutation is shown outside the B cell so it’s apparently not in the B cell. What does the mutation, wherever it is, do that affects antigen level?

RM: Finally, why the inner loop (with switch) to BCR, the perception of antigen level? What does it accomplish? And what throws the switch? And on what basis?

RM: So this looks like a really great start to a model of an antigen control system. Some data on this would be really nice. For example, is there data showing antigen levels following TCR levels? And does this following occur in the presence of the mutation-based disturbances?

RM: Again, a very nice start at modeling a biochemical control system.

Best

Rick

The dotted lines represent the surface of a B cell. The antigen represents the input quantity, and the B cell receptor (BCR) represents the input sensor. After binding to the BCR, the antigen is transferred to an MHC protein inside the B cell and the antigen-MHC complex is transported (represented) to the surface for the T cell receptor to match. The output of the B cell can be in one of two states: either the B cell will only express BCR on its surface, or the B cell releases BCR into the systemic environment (in which case, the BCR is referred to as an antibody, Ab).

When antibody binds to antigen, the process causes the antigen to accumulate wherever the antibodies stick. And one of the places antibodies stick to is the follicular dendritic cells in the lymphoid follicles. Lymphoid follicles are islands of follicular dendritic cells within a sea of B cells. So as it turns out, the antibodies (the output of B cells) are selectively transporting antigen (the input of B cells) to the very environment of the B cells. Thus the production of antibody organizes the environment of the B cells, and the result is to increase the chances of a B cell encountering its cognate antigen.

Of course, the magnitude of the bond between a BCR or an antibody and an antigen determines the controllability or physical retention of antigen. Hence the result tended to over time should be to optimize the associativity of antibody and antigen.

On Mon, Aug 10, 2015 at 9:57 PM, Warren Mansell wmansell@gmail.com wrote:

And what is chance anyway? When I throw a die I might say it turned up a six ‘by chance’ but the die w just following simple physical laws in complex and dynamic but nonetheless deterministic interactions with its environment…

On 11 Aug 2015, at 00:17, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN (pyeranos@ucla.edu via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[philip 8.10.2015]

 I propose a definition of control which has been eluding me for years.  Control is the process of causing an outcome to have a probability of occurrence different than random or pure chance.  A disturbance is something which causes the probability of an occurence to be completely random.
 The process of control seems analogous to the reduction of entropy caused by atoms bonding (either covalently or non-covalently) and moving together.  The high-affinity interaction between a B cell receptor and an antigen is an example of control.  If a B cell and T cell bind to the same antigen, the communication between them initiates the production of antibody.

<image.png>

In this case, we have two cells controlling (binding) the same aspect of the environment - literrally the same physical object.

Here’s an overview of how the adaptive immune system functions:

  1. B cell receptor binds to free floating antigen.

<image.png>

  1. B cell internalizes receptor and bound antigen

<image.png>

  1. B cell transfers antigen to MHC (major histocompatability complex) protein.

<image.png>

  1. B cell transports MHC and bound antigen to cell surface.

<image.png>

  1. T cell binds to antigen and MHC protein combination (but not to free floating antigen).

<image.png>

  1. T cell activates B cell.

This process of B and T cell mediated immunity provides a natural model to discuss the following diagram.

<image.png>

We see two arrows pointing at the perceptual input. The arrow coming from the world represents antigen. The antigen is first bound by a BCR, and the antigen and BCR will now travel together (reduction in entropy). This is analogous to a perception matching a reference.

The world model represents an MHC protein, which serves as the connection between the output of the B cell and the input of the T cell. Remember: when the BCR binds antigen, the antigen is transferred to the MHC protein and represented to the surface of the B cell for the T cells to bind. So the output of the B cell (the input of the T cell) always goes through the world model.

Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble