TCV and Collective Control ...

[Martin Taylor 2016.12.03.17.14]

[From Rupert Young (2016.12.03 11.15)]

Well, it could be that I am basing things on religious conviction, or, another possibility, is that you have mis-understood my point.

Quite probably true. To get a common understanding has been the objective throughout, Obviously, it hasn't yet been achieved. I have tried, in my "long-winded" responses, to allow you to see my position in a way that would allow you to argue against it. This you have not done.

That you assumed the former indicates a certain disdain for those who think differently to you, and a dogmatic adherence to your own point of view, that does not bode well for the progression of the discussion.

Maybe it's not a "religious conviction", but more than once you have said that you KNOW that there are "no dots below the line",
which has the kind of dogmatic assertiveness I associate with religion. What I have done is ask where you get that knowledge, if not through perception.

I'll go with the latter as you have repeatedly mis-represented my position,

Not deliberately, I assure you. But I have tried to understand your position, and to get you to understand my position, in light of my belief that our only access to the outer world is through our perceptions, and I find that very hard to do.

and provided long-winded responses that have little to do with the point I am making.

I apologize for being long winded, but since I have tried to be as precise as possible in explaining my viewpoint, I find it difficult to be succinct.

To which, it is irrelevant whether or not you know what is in the real world.

I agree with these words, though from the preceding discussion, I don't imagine we mean the same by them. What I mean is that over evolutionary and personal time, control has worked when we treat most of our perceptions as corresponding to something in the real world outside the unit that perceives them. When control has not worked, the perceptions in question have not proved very stable. So we might as well go on working with the assumption that the real world is more or less as we perceive it to be. We have no better.

So I'll just highlight this, as you, unwittingly I guess, get to the crux of the point in your own words here,

(Martin Taylor 2016.11.26.10.06]

Is "a malevolent force" really the only possibility for providing input to a perceptual function whose output is the magnitude of a "fear" perception?

The point being that the perception (fear or otherwise) is on the right-hand side of the function and not on the left-hand (input) side. The variable "exists" only here (and not in the external world), as an internal variable, not because of any knowledge of the external world, but because here is where the variable is created, from a set of inputs of other variables; and not as a re-creation of some other variable supposedly in the real world.

You are the one who brought a malevolent force into the discussion.

I don't think we have been (or I have not, at any rate) talking about the qualia of perceptions. The quality labelled "fear", not the "variable" that is designated as the quantity of fear, is what I would include among the qualia of perception. I have instead been talking about the magnitude of perceptions based on the functional relationships of variables external to the perceptual function, some of which may be sourced inside the organism, some derived from sensory experiences. All I say is that there are combinations of hormonal and other chemical internal states, that together with particular sensory combinations, lead us to experience different quantities of a variable we label "fear".

Personally, I neither know nor care (right now) where the qualia of perception arise. I do care about the ability of person A to manipulate things in the environment observed both by person A and also by Person B, changing some perceptions in both.

Martin

···

Rupert

[Martin Taylor 2016.12.04.10.43]

[Martin Taylor 2016.12.03.17.14]

[From Rupert Young (2016.12.03 11.15)]

Well, it could be that I am basing things on religious conviction, or, another possibility, is that you have mis-understood my point.

Quite probably true. To get a common understanding has been the objective throughout, Obviously, it hasn't yet been achieved.

I had a further thought that might help, based around your example of "fear", which you say does not have a corresponding "dot below the line". In my previous response, yesterday, I pointed out that "fear" was a qualitative name for a particular perceptual variable, sometimes called "qualia". How does "red", or "chair" or "lemon" or "freedom" feel? Those feelings are qualia, and are conscious. PCT doesn't treat consciousness, except very tangentially.

My thought is that all these feelings are not variables such as are the objects of control in PCT. I have been talking about variables that have values that might be influenced by actions, not the qualities that consciousness gives different magnitudes of those variables, such as the one for which a moderately high magnitude give "fear", a very high value "terror", a moderate value "insecurity", and a very low value "serenity" or something like that. One possible interpretation of what you have been saying that I had not previously considered is that you are asserting there is no conscious entity in the external environment experiencing my personal feeling of "fear" when a particular function of internal and external variables produces the numerical value that I consciously experience as "fear".

If that is your position, I would say that I have no knowledge of whether such an entity exists in the external environment. I would also say that whether one does or not, it is totally irrelevant to what I have been talking about, whereas it may possibly be the central point of what you have been talking about. Control works the same way whether such an entity does or does not exist.

Could this be the main reason we have been talking past one another?

Martin

[From Rick Marken (2016.12.04.1340)]

···

Martin Taylor (2016.12.04.10.43)–

MT: Could this be the main reason we have been talking past one another?

RM: I think the simplest way to get us all on the same page is for you to provide a description of the CEV in the “What is size”? demo (http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Size.html).

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We
have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for
others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for
themselves.” – William T. Powers

RM: I mention this, not to show how brilliant I am (I know it’s a tough job but someone’s got to do it;-) but just to show that I am not unaware of the importance of the fact that much of the controlling done by people is done collectively (interactively). And I would love to see more PCT-based work done on “collective control”. But, as I said above, I would just like to see it done scientifically, which to me means seeing how well a PCT model accounts for observed (and quantified) examples of collective control.

HB : You mentioned your demos and books because you are narcisoid and egoistic person Rick. Anyway your work has nothing to do with brliliancy. It’s PCT mostly worthless. But Kents’ work about »Collective Control« is worth of reading. But you don’t read him and so you are ignorant about scientifical ground of »Collective Control«. So start reading Rick, not just Kents’, also Bills’ books and articles about »collective control« and you’ll understand it scientifically. I’m sure that if you’ll find some places that you’ll not understand Kent will gladly expalin it to you.

Best,

Boris

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, December 02, 2016 9:53 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: TCV and Collective Control …

[From Rick Marken (2016.12.02.1250)]

Erling Jorgensen (2016.12.01 1430 EST)–

EJ: I view Kent M. & Bob H. & other sociologists as trying to expand & even construct the broader awareness of the social construction of much of working reality for humans.

RM: And I think that’s great that they are doing it. I would just prefer to see it done a bit more scientifically – by comparing the performance of models to data. Tom Bourbon showed how I think this should be done in several papers describing his research on social interaction (what is now called “collective control”). Though Tom came to hate my guts for reasons I still don’t understand, Tom and I had been pretty good friends and I was actually the one who got him started on the social research that he did so well. Back in the mid 1980s I published a paper on a PCT model of coordinated action:

Marken, R. S. (1986) Perceptual Organization of Behavior: A Hierarchical Control Model of Coordinated Action. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 12, 67 - 76.

RM: It’s reprinted in MIND READINGS, a book that Tom suggested that I put together! If you don’t have a copy you can avoid several days in purgatory by purchasing an indulgence … er, copy at :https://www.amazon.com/Mind-Readings-Experimental-Studies-Purpose/dp/096241543X. The more copies, the more days of purgatory you avoid. (Those of you who are wondering how a nice Jewish boy like me knows about indulgences, it’s because my wife is a lapsed Catholic;-)

RM: Anyway, the JEP: HPP paper above describes several studies where participants controlled two perceptual variables using two game paddles (remember those?). The perceptual variables could be controlled only by properly coordinated movement of the two game paddles, one in the right hand and and the other in the left hand of the participant. At around this time Tom was searching for ideas for research on PCT and I suggested that he replicate my experiments but having two different participants holding each each game paddle rather than having one participant hold both. And thus was born Tom’s social research program.

RM: It turns out that a model with two control systems can account for the data from my single participant experiment and from Tom’s two participant experiment equally well. So one of the main take aways from this research is that multiple control systems interact with each other in the same way (in theory and in fact) whether the systems are housed in the same person or in two different people.

RM: I should also note that in “Controlling People” we briefly discuss the “stabilizing” consequences of the presence of controlling people in the world. In a brief segment on p. 21 we refer to a wonderful book, “The World Without Us” (https://www.amazon.com/World-Without-Us-Alan-Weisman/dp/0312427905) that describes what the physical world would be like if people weren’t there to keep things as they want them to be. That book is filled with data describing how environmental variables, like the water level in the subways, would be varying (increasing in teh case of the subway water) if they were not being controlled (regularly pumped dry). Weisman describes what is basically conceptual test for the social variables that are being kept under control by groups of controllers.

RM: I have also dealt with “collective control” in terms of some attempts at producing models of economic behavior. One of my papers on the subject, H. Economicus, is reprinted in MORE MIND READINGS (https://www.amazon.com/More-Mind-Readings-Methods-Purpose/dp/0970470177/). THat paper shows an example of using a control model of social behavior (economic behavior in this case) to account for actual economic data.

RM: I mention this, not to show how brilliant I am (I know it’s a tough job but someone’s got to do it;-) but just to show that I am not unaware of the importance of the fact that much of the controlling done by people is done collectively (interactively). And I would love to see more PCT-based work done on “collective control”. But, as I said above, I would just like to see it done scientifically, which to me means seeing how well a PCT model accounts for observed (and quantified) examples of collective control.

Best regards

Rick

Language categories & the utility of everyday objects are themselves social constructions. For instance, the implicit understanding “sit on chairs, as a rule� only makes sense because every one of those words points to a perceptual entity. Even the physics model itself, which we infer forms the energy substrates that Rick enumerates for the lowest Intensity level of the PCT hierarchy, is itself a set of socially constructed perceptions. We wouldn’t know to refer to it as our best guess about what was once called Boss Reality on CSGnet, if it had not been constructed as a perceptual domain.

KM: The presence of other living control systems in our environments has given them a solidity, a stability, a reliability much different from the random fluctuations of the nonliving physical world, …

EJ: It seems what is being argued here is that the stability of much of human life derives from a wide range of collectively controlled perceptions. I don’t believe conflict among control systems leading to virtual reference levels is the only model being proposed for interactive control. I haven’t read Kent’s most recent writings, but I believe he is pointing to issues of collaborative or coordinated control, & the resulting artifacts that create stabilities for other living control systems to build upon. Those later control actions often just take those stabilities as a given, just as I drive upon roads I had no part in constructing, other than via now abiding by socially constructed rules for safe operation on roads.

KM: [continuing the previous citation] …because collective control, as I’ve often emphasized in my publications on PCT, has a far more powerful stabilizing effect on our shared environment than any individual can accomplish on his or her own.

EJ: For perceptions that are already under decent control, to speak of a “more powerful stabilizing effect” raises in my mind the concept of Gain. To increase the gain in a control loop, provided it is not oscillating or moving into a positive feedback region, allows for tighter control. If that formulation is correct, it seems that we’re talking about gain applied via the Environmental Feedback Function (EFF) section of a classical PCT control loop.

EJ: Conflicting control systems seem to interact by becoming Disturbances for one another. The “virtual reference level” that emerges seems to depend on the differential weighting of gain that each respective control system brings to its own efforts at control.

EJ: If there is collaborative control, however, I wonder if we should locate that, not in the concept of mutual Disturbances, but in the Environmental Feedback Function. I can improve your control if I can add to the leverage that your EFF brings to your own efforts at control. This is why I prefer the language of “stabilizing effects” rather than “control effects,” because my effect on your controlled variable is only indirect.

EJ: To speak of the EFF in this way brings to mind the notion of a Niche for more effective control. If your control actions can flow through an already stabilized niche, it seems there is potential for their having a more powerful effect than you could otherwise obtain on your own.

EJ: The conceptual difference here in my mind is similar to that between Control actions changing the perceptual value in a loop, versus Reorganization actions changing the properties of the loop. A stabilized niche may make for more potent properties in a control loop, whether or not it is actively being utilized at a given point in time. The road improves my control for getting to work. But its stability is not created anew each time I drive upon it. Moreover, the builders were not actively controlling my variable of getting to work. They were only adding to the EFF’s available for me to use. Stabilized properties, for more effective control.

All the best,

Erling

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Richard S. Marken

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers

Dear Eetu,

Rick is of course manipulating again as he did in the »Coin game«, so that he could »defend« his faulty statement and he of course again pull also Bill into bullshit. He didn’t want to ask me to show Bills’ original post where it’s clear that term »model« is used not in »physical« sense as Rick wants to represent but as a »model« that is bulit up by perceptions. So this is what Bill wrote :

Bill P : Something is coming together that is making sense of some ideas I have resisted for a long time. It has to do with the brain’s models of the external world. From the way I have seen those models proposed by others such as Ashby and Modern Control Theory adherents, I have thought they were simply impractical, calling for far too much knowledge, computing power, and precision of action – as indeed they are and they do, as they have been presented.

But those ideas may nevertheless be right. Some of those other blind men standing around the elephant are perhaps only a little nearsighted, and are seeing something going on that looks fuzzily like modeling, but there’s something funny about it so it isn’t quite how it seems from this angle or that. This particular blind or nearsighted man writing these sentences has not seen models; he has seen a hierarchy of perceptions that somehow represents an external world, and a large collection of Complex Environmental Variables (as Martin Taylor calls them) that is mirrored inside the brain in the form of perceptions.

Briefly, then: what I call the hierarchy of perceptions is the model. When you open your eyes and look around, what you see – and feel,

smell, hear, and taste – is the model. In fact we never experience anything but the model. The model is composed of perceptions of all

kinds from intensities on up.

That is all we need to do to build up a model of the external world. It’s not even that; it’s just a model of the world. The idea that there’s also an external world that we don’t experience takes a while to develop. At first it’s just the only world there is.

So that is the model that Ashby and the Modern Control Theorists are talking about. It’s the world we experience. When we examine that external plant in order to model it, we’re already looking at the brain’s model.

It seems very risky to be operating entirely on an internal model without any ability to know what is really going on that we can’t see, but really, it’s not. Before you step into the bathtub you feel the water, so if you’ve made a mistake you’re not going to scald your whole body. We detect errors very quickly and make adjustments almost as quickly to limit the errors, and eventually to keep them from ever getting very large. We’re always interacting with whatever is Out There, and we learn fast. Most of us, most of the time, don’t even think about the invisible universe Out There. The visible one is sufficient to keep us busy and interested. The idea that there’s another bigger one that actually determines what the rules are doesn’t usually arise.

HB : So I think that Eetu was right that »Powers didn’t say the same thing somewhere» as Rick has writen, but he talked just about model and hierarchy of perceptions not about physical model. So we can clearly see how manipulative game Rick is playing. Like in the example with »Coin game«. Rick is literaly trassforming Bills’ text (PCT) into his text (RCT) for his purposes which only he knows. He is a real LCS. He uses very little of possible »social constructions«. It seems that he is mostly constructing his own theory.

Best,

Boris

image339.png

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, December 01, 2016 2:11 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: TCV and Collective Control …

[From Rick Marken (2016.11.30.1710)]

On Mon, Nov 28, 2016 at 8:55 PM, Eetu Pikkarainen eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi wrote:

EP: That is a quite hard claim: �PCT (and I) take the truth of what is out there to be the current physical model of what is out there.� Could you point where does PCT say so?

RM: I’m sure Powers said the same thing somewhere. I have a lousy memory (and it ain’t getting any better) so I can’t quote chapter and verse. But the “environment” side of the PCT diagram is the physical environment, which is known to us only via the models of science.

Best

Rick

I think this claim could be called eliminative reductionism. According to it only the research objects of physics do exist. The research objects of all other sciences are non-existing. So in addition to tables etc. also chemicals and physiology, living organisms, all kind of control systems, PCT and finally the science of physics itself with its models are non-extant.

I have learned from John Heil (e.g. From an Ontological Point of View), who is one of the most science appreciating current ontologists, that it is really the duty of the “fundamental physics� to tell the “deep story� of reality i.e. account for the basic constituents of this reality. BUT this does NOT mean, that all the complex compilations build from these basic constituents would then be non-extant. Not even if in some far future the physics could fulfill that duty. The eliminativist claim is like someone would believe in the existence of sand grains but in sand heaps.

Secondly I would believe that the model of current physics somewhat allows the principle “everything affect everything�. If so, we do not have much bases to make assumptions that some variables as constituents of a perception would really be fully independent.

All this leaves much room in reality to the CEVs – even though they were restricted out from some theory. And this is not a claim that perceptions were one to one copies or representations of the CEVs of the reality. Not even the most simple and elementary perceptions of those “physical variables� are, even they are constructions made by input functions.

BTW What are those “physical variables�? I would say that they are effects. And effects are effects of something to something. They exist only in interaction between some entities, in this case between something in the environment and the perceiving organism. That “thing� (e.g. table) in the environment can cause many kind of effects depending the on the relationship between it and the organism. These effects again can cause many kind of perceptions depending on the nature of the input functions of the organism.

Best

Eetu Pikkarainen


Lähettäjä: Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com
Lähetetty: 28. marraskuuta 2016 7:51
Vastaanottaja: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Aihe: Re: TCV and Collective Control …

[From Rick Marken (2016.11.27.2150)]

Martin Taylor (2016.11.26.10.06

MT: Nobody, not even Rick with his privileged access to the truth, can know whether tables and chairs actually exist as we seem to perceive them, but until control fails because we have perceived something to exist that does not, we can’t know it does not exist.

RM: It is true that no one, not even I, has privileged access to what is actually out there in reality. As I have said before, however, PCT (and I) take the truth of what is out there to be the current physical model of what is out there. There are no tables and chairs in that model. Tables and chairs exist only as perceptions that are assumed, in PCT, to be functions of the variables in the physical model. Also, it’s important to remember that, according to PCT, our perceptual experience is made up of many levels of perceptual functions of the same hypothetical physical variables; and these perceptions are variables. So a “table” is the state of a perceptual variable (the perception of a type of furniture, perhaps) that is itself made up of the states of perceptual variables like color, shape, relationship, etc. So there are no tables and chairs out there to be perceived; there are just physical variables out there that can be perceived as tables and chairs.

MT: As RM says, even the physical variables are presumed to make up that real world, but we have to remember that this presumption is entirely based on the presumption that the objects themselves are real.

RM: Actually, PCT presumes that physical variables make up the real world based on the remarkable success of the physical models of which these physical variables are a component. The success of the physical models is demonstrated by their ability to precisely predict what we will perceive when we manipulate other perceptions, like the inclination of a plane down which you roll a ball; that is, it’s based on science. It’s not based on the presumption that “the objects themselves are real” because “objects” are perceptions themselves which are functions of the presumed physical variables that make up the reality described by the physical model. So in PCT we presume that perceptions, like the perceptions of tables and chairs, are functions of physical variables, they don’t correspond to physical variables themselves*.* In PCT we don’t think of tables and chairs as really being out there (although we certainly assume it in our everyday lives); what is out there (we presume, when we are wearing our PCT hats) are physical variables that are perceived as tables and chairs.

MT: It’s a circular argument to say that tables and chairs don’t exist because they are configurations of physical variables whose presumed existence depends on the presumed existence of table and chairs.

RM: Yes, that would be a circular argument, indeed. The PCT “argument” is that tables and chairs exist only as perceptions in systems (like people) that are capable of constructing those perceptions; those perceptions are functions of physical variables that are presumed to exist in an environment external to the perceiving system. I know this is a difficult concept to get but maybe the “What is size” demo can help. In that demo the relevant physical variables are the intensities of the light waves emitted from different locations on the display. There is no “area” or “perimeter” or “diagonal angle” or “squareness” or any of the other variable aspects of the display that we can perceive; all there is “out there” are, presumably, light waves varying in intensity over space. But these physical variables can be the basis for perceptions of “area” or “perimeter” or “diagonal angle” or “squareness”, etc by a system that can compute these functions of the physical variables. The physical variables that are the basis of these perceptions are presumed to be really out there; but the perceptions that are a function of these variables are not out there.

MT: Control works if when you perceive yourself putting a chair under a table there really is a chair, a table, and a relation “under” in the real world.

RM: PCT would say that control will only work if, when you perceive yourself putting a chair under a table, there really are physical variables in the real world that are the basis for perceiving a chair and table and the chair perception being moved under the table. This can’t be done, for example, if the basis of the perception of a table and chair are light waves reflected off a van Gogh canvas; in that case you can perceive the table and chair but you can’t put the latter under the former, without destroying the painting, that is.

MT: There is an infinite number of other possibilities, but Occam’s razor offers a single most probable possibility, which is that the reality by which we live or die actually contains those objects and relationships.

RM: Again, it would be more correct (from a PCT perspective) to say that the most probable possibility is that the reality in which we live contains the physical variables that are the basis for perceiving and controlling object and relationship perceptual variables. I know this is a hard thing to understand; our natural inclination is to think of perception as corresponding to a reality that “looks like” those very same perceptions. Most people seem to think of perception as it is depicted in this cartoon:

Inline image 2

RM: The idea is that there are things – objects – like kitties, out there in the real world that correspond to our perception of those things. I call this the “through a glass darkly” view of perception because the main question, for people who adopt this view – and it is the easiest view to adopt, as one can tell from its biblical origins – is how well perception represents what is “really” (or thought to be “really”) out there. The problem with this point of view is that it conflicts with the physical model of reality that is based on science. That model contains no kitties; just light waves, masses, forces and such. So a better way to draw this cartoon would be to have an array of numbers instead of a kitty out in the real world; these numbers represent the intensity of the light rays entering the persons visual field. Based on the effect of those light rays on the sensory receptors the person’s perceptual functions construct the perception of a kitty. There is no such perception in the real world outside the perceiving system. There may be a kitty out there but there is nothing in that real world that can perceive it as such. That’s why the cartoon above is misleading. It’s putting out in the environment a perception of the kitty, not what is actually in the environment, which is the physical basis for that perception.

MT: I ask once again, as I would also ask Rick: How, without using your perceptual apparatus, do you KNOW what is or is not in the real world?

RM: What we know of the real world is based on science and that knowledge exists in the form of a model – a tentatively correct theory of what is actually out there.

MT: The CEV is a component of a theory that proposes that there exists one real world. In that theory, the CEV IS in the environment.

RY: But above you said it is “defined by the perceptual function”, so how can it be in the environment?

MT: I don’t know how else to say it than the various different ways I have used. Maybe I still don’t understand what your difficulty is.

RM: Here’s the difficulty. If the CEV is defined by the perceptual functiont, then it cannot be in the environment. Here’s why. Let the environment consist of 2 independent variables, x.1 and x.2. Define a perceptual function, f(x.1,x.2), as the product of x.1 and x.2. So f(x.1,x.2) = x.1x.2. So x.1x.2 is a perceptual variable that and assume it can be controlled. So the function x.1x.2 defines a controlled perceptual variable. The CEV is supposed to be the environmental correlate of the controlled perceptual variable. So the CEV is the environmental correlate of the perception defined by x.1x.2. But the only variables in the environment are x.1 and x.2 and they are independent – they have no effect on one another. That is, the environment itself cannot compute x.1x.2. So the variable x.1x.2 exists only as a perception. There is no environmental correlate of x.1*x.2; that is, there is no CEV.

MT: No. I mean No. Your influence is on something in the environment that I call the CEV and Rick wrongly calls the “controlled quantity”.

RM: No, your influence in the TCV is on the controlled quantity – the controlled perceptual variable as perceived by you. There is no such thing as a CEV in PCT, as I demonstrated above.

Best regards

Rick

Richard S. Marken

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers

Richard S. Marken

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers

I’m sorry Earling to jump in but as I see it, you tryed to explain Rick in very gentle way that he should start using »Control of perception« not »Control of behavior«.

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, November 23, 2016 8:21 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: TCV and Collective Control …

[From Rick Marken (2016.11.23.1120)]

Erling Jorgensen (2016.11.23 1030 EST)–

[EJ] In following this exchange, I am reminded of a passage from Powers’ B:CP that was very formative for me in turning from a realist to a constructivist epistemology. I don’t have my copy of B:CP with me right now, so I’ll have to reconstruct this from memory.

I think it was in the section where he talked about Relationships, giving examples of perceived relationships that are controlled. Then Powers said something like, “We could ask which relationships are really there in the environment, but that is a trivial question. All relationships are really there, even ones that are meaningless.” This is definitely my paraphrase of his point!

RM: This is a great point, Erling, and one I’ve tried to make in a couple of my demos. The point is that the same environmental variables can be perceived in many different ways. It’s the perceptual functions that determine how we experience the environment, not the environment itself. There is nothing in the environment that necessarily corresponds to what we perceive; but what is out in the environment is the basis for what we perceive.

HB : This was really a good start but the end is awfull……

RM: For example, in my “Control of Perception” demo (http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/ControlOfPerception.html) the same environmental variables – the display on the screen – can be perceived in at least three different ways – shape, size (area) and angle. And each of these perceptual variables can be controlled. But none of them are in the environment! Only the possibility of these perceptions is out there. And each possibility is made a “reality” when you perceive things that way using your perceptual functions.

RM: When I say that only the possibility of a shape, size or angle perception is out there I mean that all that’s out there (presumably) is electromagnetic energy of different frequencies, phases and intensities distributed over the space of the display. Call these spatially distributed environmental variables x.i. The perceptions of shape, size and angle are then functions of the sensory effects of these variables: so shape = f1(s(x.1), s(x.2)…s(x.n)), size = f2(s(x.1), s(x.2)…s(x.n)), and angle = f3(s(x.1), s(x.2)…s(x.n)), where the s()'s are the sensory effects of the environmental variables and the f()'s are perceptual functions of those sensory effects – the functions that produce what we experience as the shape, size or angle of the displayed variables.

RM: Hopefully, this shows what I think is the problem with the concept of a CEV. The idea of a CEV implies that there is some variable in the environment that corresponds to the perception that is controlled. But there is no variable in the environment that corresponds to, say, shape, size or angle. Size (area) is a function of environmental variables: say size = x.1*x.2. The variables x.1 and x.2 are, indeed, variables in the environment but size – the product of x.1 and x.2 – is not. The perception of size exists only because there is a perceptual function that can compute it.

RM: The fact that size is not in the environment – but the environmental variables that are the basis of size, are – can, perhaps, be seen more clearly in the fact that the same environmental variables are also the basis of shape and angle. Shape, for example, might be defined as x.1/x.2 so you are perceiving a square when x.1/x.2 = 1. But the square is not an environmental variable any more than size was. The concept of a CEV suggests that x.1 and x.2 can’t be both a size and a shape in the environment at the same time. But actually all that x.1 and x.2 can be is x.1 and x.2; size and shape exist only as perceptions, not as environmental variables.

RM; So I prefer to stick with the term “controlled quantity”, q.o, to refer to the perception of the controlled perceptual variable, p, from the point of view of an observer.

HB : What you prefer is irrelevant. There is no such thing in PCT as »Controlled perceptual variable« p. It’s simply »perceptual signal« that will be »controled variable« in comparator. See Bills’ diagram LCS III. There is also no »Controlled quantity« in diagram, because there is no »controlled aspect of environment« iether and of course there can’t be any »Controlled Perceptual variable«.

RM : It makes it clear that the controlled perceptual variable and the controlled quantity are both perceptions,

HB : It makes clear in your imgination and nowhere else. What a construct »Perception of the Controlled Perceptual Variable«. What it is for you »Controlled quantity« as perception which is not in the LCS III diagram and what it is »controlled perceptual variable« as perception ?

Bill P (B:CP) :

  1.  ….it is even more apparent that a first-order perceptual signal reeflects only what happens at the sensory ending : the source of stimulation is completely undefined and unsensed….The perceptual signal from a touch receptor does not reflect whether the cause is an electrical current, a touch, or a chemical poisoning, or whether  a touch occurs to the left or right of the exact receptor location.
    
  2.   There is no information in any one first order visual signal to indicate the origin of the light the input function absorbs : the source can be fluorescence inside the eyeball or an exploding star hundred million years removed in space and time, with no change in the character of the perceptual signal.
    

HB : Rick. How can something that has no identified source of stimulation be »Controlled Perceptual Variable« ??? Your ignorancy in PCT is so high that you are making serious damage to Bill and his daughters. And of course to PCT.

RM : ….but one (thhe controlled perception or controlled variable) is the perception in the head of the person doing the controlling and the other (controlled quantity) is the same perception in the head of the person observing, studying or trying to understand the controller.

HB : So I was right. Everything is your imagination. And you could stop bugging CSGnet forum with your fantasy and start promoting PCT with Bills’ diagram, his defintion and his terms. There is no »Controlled perception« there is just perception – controlled variable, that will be controlled in comparator. Fullstop.

Bill P :Â If system is to stabilize some quantity it must sense that quantity and it must have an internal standard against which to compare the outcome of that sensing process – a reeference with respect to which the sensed quantity can be judged as too little, just right, or too much. The action of the system is based on that judgement, not on the sensed quantity itself nor on the reference itself nor on the disturbances.

Bill P :

Using the internal point of view, we can understand many aspects of behavior by seeing control as control of perception rather than of an objective world. We can make sense not only of other people’s behavior, but of our own, using the same concept of perceptual control.

HB : What you prefer is really your problem but it would be good if you also inform members of CSGnet, that Bill is using »Input quantiy, sensed quantity« what is much better term to understand that nothing in environment is controlled and that there is no »Controlled Quantity« that is controlled in environment, just the »sensed quantity« that is controlled in comparator. And there is no »Controlled behavior« and no »Controlled Perceptual Variable« which is already containing »control«. These wrong terms are your contruct (RCT). PCT diagram looks like (down) and it has specific terms which where by the words of Barb carefully chosen by Bill :

cid:image003.jpg@01D23694.7341FD90

What you are perceiving Rick is just the »sum« of effects which are entering »input function«. Your »phylosophy« above is really a masterpeace. But you can see from Bills’ work how this control loop really work. It’s »Control of perception«. Why don’t you give us your explanation of Bills’ diagram LCS III. I think that best explanation how diagrma works is Bills’ example with a »glass«.

Bill P :

What you are experiencing is not the obejct outside you but a set of neural signals representing something outside you….You are directly experiencing the signals in youur brain that represnt the world outside you. There is no second way to know about the skin, the wrinkles, the fingernails, the palm, and so on. There is only one way, through neural signals, and you are looking art them.

HB : By the way ,which is that another way of perceiving »reality« that Bill mentioned ?

Bill P.

Our only view of the real world is our view of the neural signals that represent it, inside our own brains. When we act to make a perception change to our more desireble state – when wee make perception of the glass change from “on the table” to " near the mouth" – we have no direct knowledge of what we aree doing to the reality that is the origin of our neural signal; we know only the final result, how the result looks, feels, smells, sounds, tastes, and so forth.

HB : Rick, wouldn’t you just stick to Bills’ latest terminology and diagram in LCS III, so that you could avoid conflicts with PCT. Why you PREFER YOUR TERMINOLOGY instead of Bills’ ? Why do you prefer »Behavior is Control«, »Controlled Perceptual variable« and so on. Why don’t you use Bills’ terminology like »Control of perception«, »perceptual signal«, »affected envrionment« and so on, what’s the real core of PCT ?

If you are doing this because you published all those nonsense books and articles and now you want to change PCT to RCT so that it would »conform« to your nonsense articles, books, demos and so on, than you are making even greater damage to PCT than you did.

Best,

Boris

RM: Another way I thought of to keep this straight is to think of environmental variables as the argument of a function that results in what we experience as perception. The flaw in the concept of the CEV is that it mistakes the argument for the function.

Best regards

Rick

The “ah ha” part for me was to realize that the environment holds innumerable possibilities for perceptual regularities, but the key is always which (small) subset of them will matter enough to me to control. In other words, the PCT mantra that “It’s all perception.”

Yes, there seems to be an environmental substrate for perception, but the only interface we have is through the perceptions we construct, so the environment remains unknowable in itself. The best we can hope for is that it may be infer-able. And that occurs through the “reality test” (can I call it that?) built into every act of control. If the perceptions we’ve constructed are too far unhinged from the reality that is supposedly out there in that environment, then our efforts at control will not be very good. We’ll keep getting frustrated because the environment doesn’t seem to be cooperating. In such circumstances, it is likely our constructed perceptions that are not cooperating. They are too much at odds from the (unknowable) substrate out there.

So in terms of Martin’s diagram (I think it was in [Martin Taylor 2016.10.16.10.32]), I think I would pretty much cover the environmental portion below the line with even dimmer dots and lines, and then allow certain dots and connections to be slightly bolder (ala Martin’s scheme), corresponding with what is above the line in the organism’s particular set of constructed perceptions. That would suggest that for this organism, certain environmental regularities are more “useful” than others, while still conveying that there remains a universe of untapped possibilities left to others to construct and perceive.

I basically agree with Rupert’s query about the concept of a Complex Environmental Variable, to whit:

[RY] What does it (CEV) add to the theory, that is not already captured by the current
understanding of perceptual control loop and processes?

All the best,

Erling

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Richard S. Marken

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers

RM: A controlled perception is a function of something in the environment.

HB : There is no such term »controlled perception« in PCT. It’s perception – the controlled variablee that will be controlled in comparator. If by your RCT there is »controlled perception« a function of something in environment, then there have to be also »something« that is »controlled« in environment. With what ? With controlled behavior ? Telekinesis ? Environment by itself controlling something ? Imagination ?

RM : And by “data” I don’t mean verbal anecdotes but quantitative data, the kind that Powers used to demonstrate the importance and usefulness of the concept of a controlled perceptual variable (see Adam Matic’s excellent javascript versions of Powers’ demos at http://www.pct-labs.com/tutorial1/index.html;

HB : Where exactly did Powers use the term »Controlled Perceptual Variable« or PCV ??? Show me the exact place. I can’t find it in the text you offered. I also couldn’t find any »protection from disturbances«. I could read only »cancel effects«…

But I could notice some »contradictions«, that could mislead you. If I understood right it’s quite a lot time ago when Bill wrote that… But I think that some contradictions in mentioned Bills’ text can be mostly corrected if you add »perception« to some terms. But I think that the main point of Bills’ shown exeperiment is this ;

Bill P : There is much more to the idea of control than tracking, the control of relative position. Anything that can vary, that can be sensed, and that can be affected by action can be controlled.

HB : It’s »Control of perception«, and not in the same time control of »some aspect of environment«. Aspect of environemnt is affected by actions. The environment that can be affected by actions and disturbances can be controlled in nervous system (comparator).

Bill did change his mind some times. So maybe it’s irrelevant to find something what Bill said when he was born and was changed later.

O.K. Seriously. I think that LCS III book is good navigator through PCT as it will be upgraded to LCS IV. And it’s 20 years later in relation to the text Adam presented. In this time many »refined« explanations appeared :

Bill P :

  1.  Using the internal point of view, we can understand many aspects of behavior by seeing control as control of perception rather than of an objective world.
    
  2.  A control system controls what it senses, and what it senses is the result of applying a continuous transformaton process to the elementary sensory inputs to the nervous system.
    
  3.  The organism acts to bring under control, in relation to some reference state, the sensed perceptions.
    
  4.  Bill P (LCS III) : In this book I have only one goal : to establish in the mind of the reader the literal reality of negative feed-back control as the basic organizing principle of human behavior. Human beings do not plan actions and then carry them out; they do not respond to stimuli according to the way they have been reinforced. They control. They never produce any behavior except for the purpose of making  what they are experiencing become more like they intend or want to experience, and then keeping it that way even in a changing world. If they plan, they plan perceptions, not actions. If they respond to stimuli, they do so in order to prevent those stimuli from affecting variables they have under control. The root, the core, of the behavior of living systems is negative feedback control, at every level of organization from RNA and DNA to a spinal reflex to a mental concept of physics. Negative feedback control is the basic principle of life.
    
  5.  (2011) Perceptual Control Theory (PCT) provides a general theory of functioning for organisms. At the core concept of the theory is the observation that living things control perceived environment by means of their behavior. Consequently, the phenomen of control takes center stage in PCT, with observable behavior playing an important but supporting role.
    

HB : I think Rick that you are living in the past. PCT is a theory about how organisms function and how they »Control perception« and affect environment so to change perception not to »Control some aspect of environment« with »Controlling behavior« as you are pointing out. Although it probably makes a littile difference whether you say that you are controlling perception or that you are controlling »the state of the real world« when you choose simple example like »tracking experiment«, you’ll lose your way if you’ll want to explain all behaviors that human can produce. The TCV in »tracking experiment« is simple to be done. But you also noticed how complex can be a problem with TCV when complex behaviors occur :Â

RM (2013) : But the intentional behavior that occurs in real life often involves the coontrol of variables that are impossible to represent as simple function of physical variables, e.g., the honesty of a communication or the intimacy of a realtionship. A quantitative approcah to the TCV will not work when trying to study such abstract variables….

<

HB : The tracking experiment is far too »pure« to explain all complex behaviors which are produced by human nervous system while it’s controlling inside organism. You gave a very complex example : »honesty«, and I gave you some simple examples : sleeping, sunshining… and we can add observing, and so on… You can’t expalin these behaviors with RCT which has thhe main point in »controlling« organisms homeostases.

Generally speaking Bills’ diagram is trying to comprehend all behaviors that can be produced by »Control of perception« not just some simple one, which do not show all the complexity of human nervous system. If you want to see hierarchy that is behind the experiment you can see it in B:CP. It’s showing problems with »rubber-band« Test :

Bill P (B:CP) : The Test, as outlined so far, will not work if the reference level shifts erratically, as it might well do as higher-order systems act to correct higher-order errors. In order to use Test succesfully as described so far, one must either pick quantities likely to involve fixed reference levels (avoiding shock) or arrange to have subject hold his higher-order reference levels constant for a while. The usefulness of The Test would be greatly increased if a way could be found to make it independent of reference levels.

HB : The problems with rubber band Test as I see it, are mostly connected to setting references of »experimental person« or his »willingness« to cooperate in Test. She can leave or abandon the Test whenever she wants.

RM : So the controlled perceptual variable, x.1x.2, doesn’t exist in the environment; there is nothing in the environment that corresponds to x.1x.2. All that is in the environment in this case are the the variables x.1 and x.2; the product of those variables – what you call the CEV – is not. There is no such thing as a CEV, at least not in PCT.

HB : At least in PCT I’ve never heard of »Controlled Perceptual Variable«. So I must assume that «Controlled Perceptual Variable« or PCV is not PCT concept.

Best,

Boris

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, November 30, 2016 12:29 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: TCV and Collective Control …

[From Rick Marken (2016.11.29.1530)]

Martin Taylor (2016.11.28.11.26)–

MT: Let’s see whether Rick’s argument can be justified as scientific (spoiler alert: It can’t).

RM: That’s OK, I would like to see it anyway;-)

MT: Rick starts by postulating that the environment (truly and really) contains two independent variables, x.1 and x.2. So we start with an environment that does indeed contain real and known things, not things that correspond to perceptual functions. Those things are NOT CEVs of perceptual functions, despite the fact that they are defined to be in the environment and their values are perceived. This is because in the second sentence, x.1 and x.2 are moved out of the environment into the perceptual system without being perceived. If they were instead the perceived values of x.1 and x.2, Rick’s proof would have already disproved itself, so x.1 and x.2 must have a property akin to quantum entanglement. They are at the same time both perceptions and things in the external environment. But let that pass, and move on to the rest of the argument.

RM: You have a truly dizzying intellect!

MT: Now x.1 and x.2, in their guise as lower-level perceptions, are the sole inputs to a perceptual function that produces an output x.1y.1 This is clearly a perception and NOT in the environment. However, by assumption, it can be controlled, which is done by influencing something in the environment. Perfect control means that if its reference value is V, then V = x.1y.1.

RM: Truly dizzying indeed!

MT: Rick’s argument concludes with a self-contradiction:

RM: But the only variables in the environment are x.1 and x.2 and they are independent – they have no effect on one another. That is, the environment itself cannot compute x.1x.2. So the variable x.1x.2 exists only as a perception. There is no environmental correlate of x.1*x.2; that is, there is no CEV.

MT: The self-contradiction is this: x.1x.2 can be controlled to take the value x.1x.2 = V, while at the same time x.1 and x.2 have values that can vary independently of each other, despite that x.1 = V/x.2 and V is fixed.

RM: I don’t see the contradiction. Think of x.1 and x.2 as the height and width of a rectangle, as in my “What is size” demo. In that demo, x.1 and x.2 are physical variables that vary independently. The area of the rectangle can be controlled by keeping x.1x.2 at some reference value, V. The controller can vary the value of x.1. The variable x.2 varies completely independently of x.1. So in order to keep x.1x.2 = V the controller must vary x.1 so that x.1x.2 =V. This can only be done by varying x.1 so that x.1 = V/x.2. So the apparent dependence of x.1 on x.2 when the perception x.1x.2 is controlled is simply the disturbance opposing property of a control system; control system’s output, x.1, varies so as to oppose variations in a disturbance, x.2, to the controlled perception, x.1*x.2, keeping it at V.

MT: The logical conclusion from the observed dependence of the formally independent variables x.1 on x.2 and x.2 on x.1 when their product is controlled is that because (and only because) x.1*x.2 has a value that can be controlled, something in the environment that has that value is being perceived.

RM: A controlled perception is a function of something in the environment. That “something” is the variables x.1 and x.2; the function of those variables that is controlled is the multiplicative relationship between them – x.1x.2. That multiplicative function is presumed (by PCT) to be carried out by the neural network that constitutes the perceptual function of the controller. This perceptual function constructs the perceptual variable x.1x.2; the multiplicative perceptual function that operates on x.1 and x.2 – x.1x.2 – does not exist in the environment. So the controlled perceptual variable, x.1x.2, doesn’t exist in the environment; there is nothing in the environment that corresponds to x.1*x.2. All that is in the environment in this case are the the variables x.1 and x.2; the product of those variables – what you call the CEV – is not. There is no such thing as a CEV, at least not in PCT.

RM: But since I’m sure you will continue to believe that the CEV is an important and useful new concept in PCT, it would be helpful if you could demonstrate its usefulness by showing what observation(s) it actually accounts for. That is, it would be nice if you could show what data the concept of a CEV accounts for. And by “data” I don’t mean verbal anecdotes but quantitative data, the kind that Powers used to demonstrate the importance and usefulness of the concept of a controlled perceptual variable (see Adam Matic’s excellent javascript versions of Powers’ demos at http://www.pct-labs.com/tutorial1/index.html; particularly relevant here is “STEP H: BEYOND TRACKING”).

RM: And I suggest that in the future you beware of drinking from the goblet with the Iocane powder;-)

Best regards

Rick

Hence, Rick’s argument actually demonstrates that the environment contains a CEV corresponding to the perception x.1*x.2, even if we let go the confusing point that Rick’s original assertion that x.1 and x.2 individually exist simultaneously in the environment and as perceptions seems to assert that they are their own CEVs.

We don’t need an abstract argument like that. As I pointed out a couple of months ago, way back in the threads from which this all sprang (the taste of lemonade) the TCV does the same job. If I can influence in the environment something of which you control your perception, that “something” must exist in the environment, unless reality is a construct in an immense simulation in which we are all incorporated, or a set of influences by super-intelligences on our senses, or something along those lines. Apart from such fantastical possibilities, the ability of different people to affect each other’s perceptions of some part of the environment is evidence for (not proof of) the reality of that part of the perceived environment.

RM: There is no such thing as a CEV in PCT, as I demonstrated above.

Since I conceded that you have absolute authority on what is or is not “in” or “according to” PCT, I concede what you say before the comma. However, there is such a thing as a CEV in most, if not all, non-private versions of Perceptual Control Theory, considered as science, as your own demonstration showed.

Martin

Richard S. Marken

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers

[From Rick Marken (2016.11.24.2140)]

Martin Taylor (2016.11.24.13.35)–

RM: I now believe, as Bill did, that it is entirely possible that there are other ways to perceive the physical world in which we live and that those ways of perceiving might be just as adaptive as the way we now perceive it. But apparently evolution settled on the way we currently perceive the world – probably starting early in phylogenetic history-- and there was no reason to change. So I think the way we now perceive the world is a way that is adaptive, in the sense that it does a reasonably good job of allowing us to survive in the real world. But I believe the PCT epistemology forces us to conclude that this is not the only adaptive way of perceiving what is “really” out there.

HB : No kidding ? Are you Rick trying to make clown out of Bill. He was a serious scientist not charlatan like you are. You beleive that PCT epistemology forces us to conlcude…. ???

Where exactly Bill »beleived« that there are other ways of perceiving the outer world ? So if I understand right Bill beleived in some »exstrasensory perception« which hasn’t been proved yet, but exist somewhere in human bodies and it wasn’t developed through evolution ? It’s realy incredible that history of people didn’t notice in 14 milion years that they posses some extra sensors. I’d say this is another imagination as you Rick also now beleive that some other ways of perceiving »real« Univesre are possible ? I think Rick that you fullled bonus. Your paranormal abilities grow like a mushrooms after the rain. You have telekinetic abilities, you are »protected from bullets«, and now you have some »extrasensory« perception and for the bonus »everything is happening in the same time in Control loop«. You need only »laser vision« and »super hearing« and you are superman. Why don’t you find internet pages where people will beleive you, because it seems that you think that here on CSGnet we are all idiots ?

Or maybe Powers ladies are opening paranormal forum ? But I’m asking myself if they could also add Astrological forum (just in case that Rick change his mind as he did it so many times) for Rick could »compute« from planets and stars the characteristics of perosnality and human destiny. For some moments we could see the most stupid statement in history of PCT. That environment »computes« or Univesre is »thinking«. Vauu and master Rick could in that moment just with his »extrasensory abilites« understand how Universe »thinks« and he could explain exact possions of Planets, Sun and Moon for every human Destiny. Considering his »wide« Paranormal knowledge that was possible. So I’m wondering if Powers ladies could maybe add also UFO rubric and maybe »how to stire from death« and maybe »Journey of Souls « and so on.

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, November 25, 2016 6:36 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: TCV and Collective Control …

It is what is really there, whether it is perceptible or not, whether it is knowable or not, that determines whether your perceptual control is effective or not. We work under the assumption that there is only one real reality, independent of what we perceive, and that real reality determines what influences affect our external sense organs (and internal ones, too). If our control actions influence our perceptions, they do so only by acting on real reality, whatever that may be.

Richard S. Marken

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers

[Martin Taylor 2016.12.05.10.41]

From Kent McClelland (2016.11.28.1400)

      Apart from the fact that I thought I had

done the opposite of “dismissing” Bob Hintz’z question. I tried to
explain why the control of perception by means of action on the
environment was the same whether or not the environment contained
other control systems, and then went on to discuss how the process
of acting on the sentient environment had to be different, because
your perceptions are influenced by the actions of the other, which
are the outputs of control systems that your actions disturbed.

    Kent's point is very important, but unless I misunderstood

Bob, it wasn’t an answer to the question he asked. It was an
extension of an answer to the world in which every living thing
controls its perceptions. The world is full of collectively
controlled stabilities I call “artifacts”. Here is part of a
paragraph from a current draft of the book on which I am working:

···

… I’ve had the feeling that
this whole discussion about reality might benefit from a
little reality check. Another sociologist, Bob Hintz, in his post a few days ago ( 11-25-16)
raised a crucial point that has this thread has so far
neglected:Â

            BH: How does a conception

of that world out there change if it is composed of
 mothers, children, pets, and mosquitoes. A model of
that world is not supplied by physical sciences. The
interaction between independent control systems is
different from the interaction between a biological
control system and the physical objects that might be
outside the boundaries of one’s skin.Â

Martin
Taylor
(2016.11.25.16.53) dismissed Bob’s question by arguing
that control of perceptions works the same way
whether a person is interacting  with other independent
control systems or only with inanimate objects. While
Martin’s argument is probably correct, his answer
still misses the essential point: that the presence of
other control systems acting upon the environment
encountered by an individual has an enormous impact on
the stability of certain aspects of that environment,
and thus upon the “reality� of the environment as
perceived and experienced. The reality of our everyday
living environments is a socially constructed reality,
not the reality described by physics.

            This

reality in which we conduct our lives is a common-sense
world, and I mean that quite literally. It’s a world
that humans share in common because of their  shared sensory apparatus, their
typical modes of perception. This social reality is a
world of "tables, chairs, lamps, computers, walls,
windows, etc.,� (Rick Marken 2016.11.24.2140) all manufactured and
maintained by human control efforts, as well as a world
of familiar patterns of social
behavior, as the humans around us act in (mostly)
expected ways. It’s also world of shifting visual
patterns on the electronic screens that most of us stare
at for hours every day.Â

The physical
environments in which find ourselves have come
to us at birth already  highly structured by the
control actions of other people. Of course,
in our daily efforts to control our perceptions we ourselves constantly
engage in manipulation of aspects of the physical
environment that correspond to the perceptions we’re
trying to control, but the forms
predominantly taken by those environments are not our
own doing. To a very large extent our environments
have been structured by others, including the people
around us, animals, plants, and other people across
the globe, some still alive and some dead.Â

              The

presence of other living control systems in our
environments has given them a solidity, a stability, a
reliability much different from the random
fluctuations of the nonliving physical world,
because collective control, as I’ve often emphasized
in my publications on PCT, has a far more powerful
stabilizing effect on our shared environment than any
individual can accomplish on his or her own.Â

              Tables and chairs became common features of

our common-sense environments because of the
collective control efforts of generations of our
predecessors, who first recognized the need for tables
and chairs, then built the first examples, named
them, Â refined
and standardized the designs, and organized
manufacturing and distribution systems for these
artifacts, which are now almost universally used.
There isn’t a person in the developed or developing
world (probably 99 of humanity) who doesn’t know about
tables and chairs, and there are precious few
populated places you could go where you wouldn’t find
tables and chairs.Â

              People

growing up in this kind of a world furnished with
plentiful examples of tables and chairs will develop
perceptual control systems through
reorganization  for recognizing and using
tables and chairs and all the other culturally
stereotyped objects and patterns of action around
them. Thus, the socially stabilized perceptual world
comes to be built into our perceptions, as the reality
of our redundantly standardized living environments is
internalized within us.

              Of

course, our perception of this standardized,
manufactured world has a lot of limitations.  It’s
obvious that the human sensory apparatus is severely
limited in a great variety of ways, including scale,
scope, and quality. We can’t perceive things that are
too big or too small, that occur too quickly or too
slowly, that are too far away from our physical
bodies, or anything getting news of
which might depend on signals from parts of the
electro-magnetic or sound spectrums that are outside the ranges
that we monitor. The edited version of reality
available through our senses provides only a small
percentage of what we might perceive if our
evolutionary heritage were different.Â

              But our

edited version of reality is based on the bedrock of a
socially imposed stability in our living environments,
and t his
everyday reality is emphatically not "the real world
of the physical sciences,� as Rick would have it.
Physics, after all, is just an abstract  model, a collection of
high-level perceptions, a collection to which most
people have extremely limited access. Even scientists
must usually rely on instruments and computers that
spit out abstract images, graphs, or numbers, in order
for them to control the even more abstract perceptions
that constitute scientific theory.

              In his

most recent post (copied below), Rick presents a
diagram of a person perceiving a kitty to illustrate
the conventional, non-PCT view of perception and then
explains what’s wrong with that view: Â

            What Rick has missed is that there actually

are lots of things in that real world capable of
perceiving kitties—all the other people that populaate
the environment that he shares with the kitty. Those
people’s perceptions and ways of thinking and talking
about kitties have had an enormous, perhaps even
determining influence on how Rick perceives the kitty.
His perceptions, even though he imagines himself to be
as isolated individual suspended in an inchoate world of
numerical variables, are in no way independent of
theirs.Â

              Until PCT

theorists can expand their theories sufficiently come
to grips with the everyday realities of the social
environments in which we live, we’ll be stuck in
fruitless discussions of the how-many-angels-can-dance
variety, discussions that have about zero interest for
anyone outside the PCT fraternity. Just resorting to
the slogan that “it’s all perception� means dismissing
as unreal everything outside the skin of the isolated
individual, even though the socially constructed
stabilities of our living environments have in fact
been built into our perceptions.Â

              We need

to move beyond referring to everything in the physical
and social environment—our everyday reality ”simply as
 undifferentiated “feedback functions.� The coining of
the terms “CEV� and “atenfel� have represented in my
view a couple of useful steps in the direction of
understanding this environment more clearly, and
Martin’s work on “language and culture as malleable
artifacts� for LCS IV contains many more examples of
exciting new ways to think how PCT can apply to the
social reality around us.Â

              PCT has

provided us with an excellent framework for building a
science of human behavior and interaction, but the
edifice left by Bill Powers was unfinished. A complex
scientific theory can never be the work of one person
alone. To be more broadly useful, the theory will
require the collective control of lots of individuals
working together, adding to it, revising it, filling
in the details. It seems to me that we should get to
work on understanding the reality around us through
the lens of PCT, rather than wasting time on esoteric
ontological debates.Â

              Best to

all,

Kent

                      RM: The problem with this point of

view is that it conflicts with the physical
model of reality that is based on science.
That model contains no kitties; just light
waves, masses, forces and such. So a better
way to draw this cartoon would be to have an
array of numbers instead of a kitty out in the
real world; these numbers represent the
intensity of the light rays entering the
persons visual field. Based on the effect of
those light rays on the sensory receptors the
person’s perceptual functions construct the
perception of a kitty. There is no such
perception in the real world outside the
perceiving system. There may be a kitty out
there but there is nothing in that real world
that can perceive it as such.

bob hintz 12-5-16

I have finished reading LPT and GPG papers. My first coherent response involves Oliver’s desire to send a message to Rachel. You suggest, “To originate a message’’ is to control a perception that the dialogue is bringing the other
partner (the recipient) to some desired condition–a goal.”  I would like to suggest that to originate a message is to control a perception that the dialogue is bringing oneself to some desired condition – a personal goal. Oliver appears to have decided that he wants to have a party and that he has some list of others whom he would like to have come to that party. Rachel is on that list. If he meets with Rachel and remembers that he is planning a party and she is on the list, then he will try to introduce this topic into the conversation at some point in the conversation in a manner that he hopes will be interpreted as an “invitation”. Most face-to-face invitations require an acceptance or refusal in order to close or end that topic and move on to a different topic. I do not simply want to perceive you as understanding that I have invited you, I want to understand whether or not you are making a commitment to come to my party. If this invitation is a routine event in their relationship, then either answer might be OK with each of them and it is simply a matter of understanding communication. If it is Oliver’s first ever party, then he might really, really want a “yes” and will not easily take “no” for an answer. If it is the first time Oliver has asked Rachel to a party, she might initially wonder if she is a “date” or just a “guest” and try to subtly find out with being explicit. It is in each person’s perception of the their relationship with the other and their respective hopes regarding the future of that relationship that the complexity of human communication evolves. I am always trying to control my conception of our relationship and my output is always an expression of that conception. Your output is an expression of your conception of that same relationship, but its content might be quite different. It is in these interactions or dialogues that we create, maintain or dissolve our conceptions of our relationships, but it is not in the concrete observable behaviors as physical phenomena. Each of us uses the observations to support or disconfirm our immediate conceptions. If each of us in not free to express ourselves honestly, then we cannot develop shared conceptions of who each of us is and how we fit together.Â

If Rachel says “yes” or “no”, Oliver will know more about the probability of Rachel showing up for the party. If they end this topic with a “maybe”, he will keep her on the list and maybe ask again before the party occurs. If she says “no”, he might never ask her again and that might be fine with her. Did she control his future behavior anymore than the fact that he invited her in the first place.Â

Â

···

On Mon, Dec 5, 2016 at 10:47 AM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2016.12.05.10.41]

From Kent McClelland (2016.11.28.1400)

      Apart from the fact that I thought I had

done the opposite of “dismissing” Bob Hintz’z question. I tried to
explain why the control of perception by means of action on the
environment was the same whether or not the environment contained
other control systems, and then went on to discuss how the process
of acting on the sentient environment had to be different, because
your perceptions are influenced by the actions of the other, which
are the outputs of control systems that your actions disturbed.

    Kent's point is very important, but unless I misunderstood

Bob, it wasn’t an answer to the question he asked. It was an
extension of an answer to the world in which every living thing
controls its perceptions. The world is full of collectively
controlled stabilities I call “artifacts”. Here is part of a
paragraph from a current draft of the book on which I am working:
----------------
"…dictionary definitions do not seem to help very much when we
talk about culture and language as artifacts, so let us try another:* An artifact is perceptible by humans, is susceptible to influence
from humans, and exists in its current form only as the result of
human perceptual control* . This definition is agnostic as to
whether the artifact is tangible, but it does cover the essence of
the OED definition and all of the Random House definitions, if we
ignore the connotation of “thing� as necessarily being a tangible
object. The definition also suggests why an artifact, perceptible to
and influenced by humans, is often “malleable� (literally
“deformable by hammering1�). What humans can create, humans may be
able to change.

----

1 Latin “malleus� a hammer.

----------------
    bob hintz 11-28-16

(To Kent, I think)

  This is a wonderful response.  I have spent part of the weekend

studying Martin’s Layered Protocol Theory papers that he recently
made available. I was curious about his response to my question
and wanted to understand what he might be trying to say.
He obviously knows the difference, and I
can’t imagine that he would apply this theory to interaction with
a table or chair or even a rock. The whole process of encoding and
decoding is not something that natural objects or even machines
engage in, to the best of my knowledge. If I want to sit in a
chair, I simply pull it out and sit on it. I do not “interrupt”
it’s on-going process of control.

You might want to have a look at my presentation to CSG'93

http://www.mmtaylor.net/PCT/Movie/TaylorCSG1993.mp4 ,
starting 19 minutes 15 seconds into the talk (Thanks to Dag for
making and archiving it). I just went back and looked at it for the
first time in a long while, and I was surprised at how much of it
addresses exactly the issues we have been talking about in this
thread, including why a “language” is a collectively controlled
artifact in the environment. Obviously we had been discussing that
in the predecessor of CSGnet, as after the talk, Rick said that he
now understood what I had been trying to say in the e-mail exchange.
You might also like the Powerpoint slides of an invited tutorial
lecture I gave in Paris in 1992
http://www.mmtaylor.net/PCT/ParisTutorial.pdf . Clearly,
ideas have moved on in the two decades since these talks, but much
less has changed than I would have expected.

  In the current draft of my LCS IV chapter on protocols (now under

revision following referee’s comments) I actually DO introduce the
theory, or at least its General Protocol Grammar, by applying it
to interaction with a rock (and no, that part of the GPG does not
include an “Interrupt”). I think (at least today I think) that it
is probably the easiest way to get from the simplicity of the
trivial control loop that we frequently diagram on CSGnet to the
complexity of interpersonal interaction at multiple levels of
understanding.

  The rock's "coding-decoding" of the influence of a force on its

location is simple. It is encapsulated in “f=ma” and the various
laws of viscosity. A person’s equivalent from the viewpoint to the
controller is much more variable, but still, if you want to move a
person and act by saying “come here”, the person quite often will
come here. Whether they do depends on just what they are
controlling for at higher levels, and therefore what their control
action is to counter the “come here” disturbance.

  Incidentally, the book I mentioned was originally supposed to be a

development from that CSG’93 talk, but it got much too big to be
just a chapter, and the current LCS IV chapter is a revised
extract from it. The book (provisionally entitled “You Say
Tomayto: Perceptual Control, Language, and Culture”) takes a lot
from Kent’s ideas as expressed in the rest of his e-mail, which I
leave, uncommented, below.

  Martin

… I’ve had the feeling that
this whole discussion about reality might benefit from a
little reality check. Another sociologist, Bob Hintz, in his post a few days ago ( 11-25-16)
raised a crucial point that has this thread has so far
neglected:Â

            BH: How does a conception

of that world out there change if it is composed of
 mothers, children, pets, and mosquitoes. A model of
that world is not supplied by physical sciences. The
interaction between independent control systems is
different from the interaction between a biological
control system and the physical objects that might be
outside the boundaries of one’s skin.Â

Martin
Taylor
(2016.11.25.16.53) dismissed Bob’s question by arguing
that control of perceptions works the same way
whether a person is interacting  with other independent
control systems or only with inanimate objects. While
Martin’s argument is probably correct, his answer
still misses the essential point: that the presence of
other control systems acting upon the environment
encountered by an individual has an enormous impact on
the stability of certain aspects of that environment,
and thus upon the “reality� of the environment as
perceived and experienced. The reality of our everyday
living environments is a socially constructed reality,
not the reality described by physics.

            This

reality in which we conduct our lives is a common-sense
world, and I mean that quite literally. It’s a world
that humans share in common because of their  shared sensory apparatus, their
typical modes of perception. This social reality is a
world of "tables, chairs, lamps, computers, walls,
windows, etc.,� (Rick Marken 2016.11.24.2140) all manufactured and
maintained by human control efforts, as well as a world
of familiar patterns of social
behavior, as the humans around us act in (mostly)
expected ways. It’s also world of shifting visual
patterns on the electronic screens that most of us stare
at for hours every day.Â

The physical
environments in which find ourselves have come
to us at birth already  highly structured by the
control actions of other people. Of course,
in our daily efforts to control our perceptions we ourselves constantly
engage in manipulation of aspects of the physical
environment that correspond to the perceptions we’re
trying to control, but the forms
predominantly taken by those environments are not our
own doing. To a very large extent our environments
have been structured by others, including the people
around us, animals, plants, and other people across
the globe, some still alive and some dead.Â

              The

presence of other living control systems in our
environments has given them a solidity, a stability, a
reliability much different from the random
fluctuations of the nonliving physical world,
because collective control, as I’ve often emphasized
in my publications on PCT, has a far more powerful
stabilizing effect on our shared environment than any
individual can accomplish on his or her own.Â

              Tables and chairs became common features of

our common-sense environments because of the
collective control efforts of generations of our
predecessors, who first recognized the need for tables
and chairs, then built the first examples, named
them, Â refined
and standardized the designs, and organized
manufacturing and distribution systems for these
artifacts, which are now almost universally used.
There isn’t a person in the developed or developing
world (probably 99 of humanity) who doesn’t know about
tables and chairs, and there are precious few
populated places you could go where you wouldn’t find
tables and chairs.Â

              People

growing up in this kind of a world furnished with
plentiful examples of tables and chairs will develop
perceptual control systems through
reorganization for recognizing and using
tables and chairs and all the other culturally
stereotyped objects and patterns of action around
them. Thus, the socially stabilized perceptual world
comes to be built into our perceptions, as the reality
of our redundantly standardized living environments is
internalized within us.

              Of

course, our perception of this standardized,
manufactured world has a lot of limitations.  It’s
obvious that the human sensory apparatus is severely
limited in a great variety of ways, including scale,
scope, and quality. We can’t perceive things that are
too big or too small, that occur too quickly or too
slowly, that are too far away from our physical
bodies, or anything getting news of
which might depend on signals from parts of the
electro-magnetic or sound spectrums that are outside the ranges
that we monitor. The edited version of reality
available through our senses provides only a small
percentage of what we might perceive if our
evolutionary heritage were different.Â

              But our

edited version of reality is based on the bedrock of a
socially imposed stability in our living environments,
and t his
everyday reality is emphatically not "the real world
of the physical sciences,� as Rick would have it.
Physics, after all, is just an abstract  model, a collection of
high-level perceptions, a collection to which most
people have extremely limited access. Even scientists
must usually rely on instruments and computers that
spit out abstract images, graphs, or numbers, in order
for them to control the even more abstract perceptions
that constitute scientific theory.

              In his

most recent post (copied below), Rick presents a
diagram of a person perceiving a kitty to illustrate
the conventional, non-PCT view of perception and then
explains what’s wrong with that view: Â

            What Rick has missed is that there actually

are lots of things in that real world capable of
perceiving kitties—all the other people that populaate
the environment that he shares with the kitty. Those
people’s perceptions and ways of thinking and talking
about kitties have had an enormous, perhaps even
determining influence on how Rick perceives the kitty.
His perceptions, even though he imagines himself to be
as isolated individual suspended in an inchoate world of
numerical variables, are in no way independent of
theirs.Â

              Until PCT

theorists can expand their theories sufficiently come
to grips with the everyday realities of the social
environments in which we live, we’ll be stuck in
fruitless discussions of the how-many-angels-can-dance
variety, discussions that have about zero interest for
anyone outside the PCT fraternity. Just resorting to
the slogan that “it’s all perception� means dismissing
as unreal everything outside the skin of the isolated
individual, even though the socially constructed
stabilities of our living environments have in fact
been built into our perceptions.Â

              We need

to move beyond referring to everything in the physical
and social environment—our everyday reality ”simply as
 undifferentiated “feedback functions.� The coining of
the terms “CEV� and “atenfel� have represented in my
view a couple of useful steps in the direction of
understanding this environment more clearly, and
Martin’s work on “language and culture as malleable
artifacts� for LCS IV contains many more examples of
exciting new ways to think how PCT can apply to the
social reality around us.Â

              PCT has

provided us with an excellent framework for building a
science of human behavior and interaction, but the
edifice left by Bill Powers was unfinished. A complex
scientific theory can never be the work of one person
alone. To be more broadly useful, the theory will
require the collective control of lots of individuals
working together, adding to it, revising it, filling
in the details. It seems to me that we should get to
work on understanding the reality around us through
the lens of PCT, rather than wasting time on esoteric
ontological debates.Â

              Best to

all,

Kent

                      RM: The problem with this point of

view is that it conflicts with the physical
model of reality that is based on science.
That model contains no kitties; just light
waves, masses, forces and such. So a better
way to draw this cartoon would be to have an
array of numbers instead of a kitty out in the
real world; these numbers represent the
intensity of the light rays entering the
persons visual field. Based on the effect of
those light rays on the sensory receptors the
person’s perceptual functions construct the
perception of a kitty. There is no such
perception in the real world outside the
perceiving system. There may be a kitty out
there but there is nothing in that real world
that can perceive it as such.

[Martin Taylor 2016.12.05.16.30]

Unless I mistake your intention, I see these two apparently

contrasting statements as being the same thing.
I do see an interpretation in which they are not, and in case this
alternative interpretation is correct, I’ll address it. It is that
the second (Bob’s) statement refers to a perception for which the
control action is to initiate an interaction – “to originate a
message”, whereas my statement refers to the perception that the
message has been successfully passed. Using Bob’s example below,
Oliver wants Rachel to come to a party. That’s the reference value
for Oliver’s basic controlled perception (Bob’s). Other than
organizing a kidnapping expedition, Oliver’s best means of bringing
this perception to its reference value is to control a perception of
Rachel understanding that he wants her to come to the party. To
bring THAT perception to its reference value, he originates a
message which in this case we would call “issuing an invitation”.
Whether she come or not is up to her. The message has been
successfully passed when Oliver perceives (correctly or wrongly)
that she has understood what he wants.
No, you do not simply want to perceive you as understanding that
you have invited me, but it’s one perception you do want to have,
because without it you are unlikely to learn whether I will control
for perceiving myself at your party.
Yes, exactly. All those considerations will enter into how the
“invitation” protocol is actually executed, as well as what will
happen after it has been understood to actually be an invitation to
a specific party.
A third level of perceptual control, all part of the complex.
I don’t understand this “not”. How else can we perceive perceptions
of relationships than by concrete observable behaviours such as
intonation patterns, slight hesitations, eye-movements, eyebrow
lifts, flickering mouth twitches, contact avoidance or acceptance,
and so forth?
Yes. One of the beauties of LPT that I saw from the beginning (and
still see) is that it treats deceptive and honest interactions in a
consistent framework. A good actor has mastered the slight
hesitations and expressions that create the deception (whether the
audience knows it’s a deception or the actor is running a con game).
I now call these “displays”. I think she might have influenced internal states in Oliver that
would affect how he controls various perceptions in future. Maybe he
will have reorganized, maybe not. But “control”, no. Control implies
feedback, and you can’t get feedback from the future. If she acts in
a way she intends to prevent further invitations, such as saying
“Buzz-off, pipsqueak”, or to ask for future invitations by sying
“I’d love to, but I’ll be out of town. Please do ask me again”, she
might achieve her desired effect, but it’s much the same as firing a
bullet toward a far-off target. If your aim is true, the bullet hits
the target. If not, it doesn’t. But there’s no way you can control
your perception of the bullet-target relationship once the trigger
has been pulled.
I realize this is only a partial response, because I don’t really
know what target you were aiming at.
Martin

···

This is a partial response to

bob hintz 12-5-16

      I have finished reading LPT and GPG papers.  My first

coherent response involves Oliver’s desire to send a message
to Rachel. You suggest, “To originate a message’’ is to
control a perception that the dialogue is bringing the other
partner (the recipient) to some desired condition–a goal.” Â I
would like to suggest that to originate a message is to
control a perception that the dialogue is bringing oneself to
some desired condition – a personal goal.

      Â  Oliver appears to have decided that he wants to have a

party and that he has some list of others whom he would like
to have come to that party. Rachel is on that list. If he
meets with Rachel and remembers that he is planning a party
and she is on the list, then he will try to introduce this
topic into the conversation at some point in the conversation
in a manner that he hopes will be interpreted as an
“invitation”. Most face-to-face invitations require an
acceptance or refusal in order to close or end that topic and
move on to a different topic. I do not simply want to
perceive you as understanding that I have invited you, I want
to understand whether or not you are making a commitment to
come to my party.

      Â  If this invitation is a routine event in their

relationship, then either answer might be OK with each of them
and it is simply a matter of understanding communication. If
it is Oliver’s first ever party, then he might really, really
want a “yes” and will not easily take “no” for an answer. If
it is the first time Oliver has asked Rachel to a party, she
might initially wonder if she is a “date” or just a “guest”
and try to subtly find out with being explicit. It is in each
person’s perception of the their relationship with the other
and their respective hopes regarding the future of that
relationship that the complexity of human communication
evolves.

      Â  I am always trying to control my conception of our

relationship and my output is always an expression of that
conception.Â

      Your output is an expression of your conception of that

same relationship, but its content might be quite different.Â
It is in these interactions or dialogues that we create,
maintain or dissolve our conceptions of our relationships, but
it is not in the concrete observable behaviors as physical
phenomena.

      Â  Each of us uses the observations to support or disconfirm

our immediate conceptions. If each of us in not free to
express ourselves honestly, then we cannot develop shared
conceptions of who each of us is and how we fit together.

      If Rachel says "yes" or "no", Oliver will know more about

the probability of Rachel showing up for the party. If they
end this topic with a “maybe”, he will keep her on the list
and maybe ask again before the party occurs. If she says
“no”, he might never ask her again and that might be fine with
her. Did she control his future behavior anymore than the
fact that he invited her in the first place.

Â

      On Mon, Dec 5, 2016 at 10:47 AM, Martin

Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net
wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2016.12.05.10.41]

From Kent McClelland (2016.11.28.1400)

… I’ve had the feeling that
this whole discussion about reality might
benefit from a little reality check. Another
sociologist, Bob
Hintz, in his  post
a few days ago ( 11-25-16) raised a
crucial point that has this thread has so far
neglected:Â

                        BH: How does a

conception of that world out there change if
it is composed of  mothers, children, pets,
and mosquitoes. A model of that world is
not supplied by physical sciences. The
interaction between independent control
systems is different from the interaction
between a biological control system and the
physical objects that might be outside the
boundaries of one’s skin.Â

Martin Taylor
(2016.11.25.16.53) dismissed Bob’s
question by arguing that control of
perceptions works the same way whether a
person is interacting  with other
independent control systems or only with
inanimate objects. While Martin’s argument
is probably correct, his answer still
misses the essential point: that the
presence of other control systems acting
upon the environment encountered by an
individual has an enormous impact on the
stability of certain aspects of that
environment, and thus upon the “reality�
of the environment as perceived and
experienced. The reality of our everyday
living environments is a socially
constructed reality, not the reality
described by physics.

                          Apart from the fact that I

thought I had done the opposite of “dismissing” Bob
Hintz’z question. I tried to explain why the control of
perception by means of action on the environment was the
same whether or not the environment contained other
control systems, and then went on to discuss how the
process of acting on the sentient environment had to be
different, because your perceptions are influenced by
the actions of the other, which are the outputs of
control systems that your actions disturbed.

                        Kent's point is very important, but unless I

misunderstood Bob, it wasn’t an answer to the question he
asked. It was an extension of an answer to the world in
which every living thing controls its perceptions. The
world is full of collectively controlled stabilities I
call “artifacts”. Here is part of a paragraph from a
current draft of the book on which I am working:
----------------
"…dictionary definitions do not seem to help very much
when we talk about culture and language as artifacts, so
let us try another: * An artifact is perceptible by
humans, is susceptible to influence from humans, and
exists in its current form only as the result of human
perceptual control* . This definition is agnostic as
to whether the artifact is tangible, but it does cover the
essence of the OED definition and all of the Random House
definitions, if we ignore the connotation of “thing� as
necessarily being a tangible object. The definition also
suggests why an artifact, perceptible to and influenced by
humans, is often “malleable� (literally “deformable by
hammering1�). What humans can create, humans may be able
to change.

          ----

          1 Latin “malleus� a hammer.

          ----------------
              bob

hintz 11-28-16 (To Kent, I think)

              This is a wonderful response.  I have spent part of

the weekend studying Martin’s Layered Protocol Theory
papers that he recently made available. I was curious
about his response to my question and wanted to
understand what he might be trying to say.
He obviously knows the
difference, and I can’t imagine that he would apply
this theory to interaction with a table or chair or
even a rock. The whole process of encoding and
decoding is not something that natural objects or even
machines engage in, to the best of my knowledge. If I
want to sit in a chair, I simply pull it out and sit
on it. I do not “interrupt” it’s on-going process of
control.

          You might want to have a look at my presentation to CSG'93

http://www.mmtaylor.net/PCT/Movie/TaylorCSG1993.mp4 ,
starting 19 minutes 15 seconds into the talk (Thanks to
Dag for making and archiving it). I just went back and
looked at it for the first time in a long while, and I was
surprised at how much of it addresses exactly the issues
we have been talking about in this thread, including why a
“language” is a collectively controlled artifact in the
environment. Obviously we had been discussing that in the
predecessor of CSGnet, as after the talk, Rick said that
he now understood what I had been trying to say in the
e-mail exchange. You might also like the Powerpoint slides
of an invited tutorial lecture I gave in Paris in 1992 http://www.mmtaylor.net/PCT/ParisTutorial.pdf .
Clearly, ideas have moved on in the two decades since
these talks, but much less has changed than I would have
expected.

            In the current draft of my LCS IV chapter on protocols

(now under revision following referee’s comments) I
actually DO introduce the theory, or at least its
General Protocol Grammar, by applying it to interaction
with a rock (and no, that part of the GPG does not
include an “Interrupt”). I think (at least today I
think) that it is probably the easiest way to get from
the simplicity of the trivial control loop that we
frequently diagram on CSGnet to the complexity of
interpersonal interaction at multiple levels of
understanding.

            The rock's "coding-decoding" of the influence of a force

on its location is simple. It is encapsulated in “f=ma”
and the various laws of viscosity. A person’s equivalent
from the viewpoint to the controller is much more
variable, but still, if you want to move a person and
act by saying “come here”, the person quite often will
come here. Whether they do depends on just what they are
controlling for at higher levels, and therefore what
their control action is to counter the “come here”
disturbance.

            Incidentally, the book I mentioned was originally

supposed to be a development from that CSG’93 talk, but
it got much too big to be just a chapter, and the
current LCS IV chapter is a revised extract from it. The
book (provisionally entitled “You Say Tomayto:
Perceptual Control, Language, and Culture”) takes a lot
from Kent’s ideas as expressed in the rest of his
e-mail, which I leave, uncommented, below.

                Martin
                        This reality in which we

conduct our lives is a common-sense world,
and I mean that quite literally. It’s a
world that humans share in common  because
of their  shared sensory
apparatus, their typical modes of
perception. This social reality is a world
of "tables, chairs, lamps, computers, walls,
windows, etc.,� (Rick Marken 2016.11.24.2140) all manufactured and
maintained by human control efforts, as well
as a world of familiar patterns of social
behavior, as the humans around us act in
(mostly) expected ways. It’s also world
of shifting visual patterns on the
electronic screens that most of us stare at
for hours every day.Â

The physical
environments in which  find
ourselves have come
to us at birth already  highly
structured by the control actions of other
people. Of
course, in our daily efforts to control
our perceptions we ourselves
constantly engage in manipulation of
aspects of the physical environment that
correspond to the perceptions we’re trying
to control, but the forms
predominantly taken by those environments
are not our own doing. To a very large
extent our environments have been
structured by others, including the people
around us, animals, plants, and other
people across the globe, some still alive
and some dead.Â

                          The presence of

other living control systems in our
environments has given them a solidity, a
stability, a reliability much
different from the random fluctuations of the
nonliving physical world, because
collective control, as I’ve often
emphasized in my publications on PCT, has
a far more powerful stabilizing effect on
our shared environment than any individual
can accomplish on his or her own.Â

                          Tables

and chairs became common features of our
common-sense environments because of the
collective control efforts of generations
of our predecessors, who first recognized
the need for tables and chairs, then built
the first examples, named
them, Â refined
and standardized the designs, and
organized manufacturing and distribution
systems for these artifacts, which are now
almost universally used. There isn’t a
person in the developed or developing
world (probably 99 of humanity) who
doesn’t know about tables and chairs, and
there are precious few populated places
you could go where you wouldn’t find
tables and chairs.Â

                          People growing

up in this kind of a world furnished with
plentiful examples of tables and chairs
will develop perceptual control systems through
reorganization for recognizing and
using tables and chairs and all the other
culturally stereotyped objects and
patterns of action around them. Thus, the
socially stabilized perceptual world comes
to be built into our perceptions, as the
reality of our redundantly standardized
living environments is
internalized within us.

                          Of course, our

perception of this standardized,
manufactured world has a lot of
limitations.  It’s
obvious that the human sensory apparatus
is severely limited in a great variety of
ways, including scale, scope, and quality.
We can’t perceive things that are too big
or too small, that occur too quickly or
too slowly, that are too far away from our
physical bodies, or anything getting news of
which might depend on signals from parts
of the electro-magnetic or sound spectrums
that are outside the
ranges that we monitor. The edited version
of reality available through our senses
provides only a small percentage of what
we might perceive if our evolutionary
heritage were different.Â

                          But our edited

version of reality is based on the bedrock
of a socially imposed stability in our
living environments, and t his everyday reality
is emphatically not "the real world of the
physical sciences,� as Rick would have it.
Physics, after all, is just an abstract  model, a collection
of high-level perceptions, a collection to
which most people have extremely limited
access. Even scientists must usually rely
on instruments and computers that spit out
abstract images, graphs, or numbers, in order
for them to control the even more abstract
perceptions that constitute scientific
theory.

                          In his most

recent post (copied below), Rick presents
a diagram of a person perceiving a kitty
to illustrate the conventional, non-PCT
view of perception and then explains
what’s wrong with that view: Â

                                  RM: The problem with this point

of view is that it conflicts with
the physical model of reality that
is based on science. That model
contains no kitties; just light
waves, masses, forces and such. So
a better way to draw this cartoon
would be to have an array of
numbers instead of a kitty out in
the real world; these numbers
represent the intensity of the
light rays entering the persons
visual field. Based on the effect
of those light rays on the sensory
receptors the person’s perceptual
functions construct the perception
of a kitty. There is no such
perception in the real world
outside the perceiving system.
There may be a kitty out there but
there is nothing in that real
world that can perceive it as
such.

                        What Rick has missed is that there

actually are lots of things in that real
world capable of perceiving kitties—alll the
other people that populate the environment
that he shares with the kitty. Those
people’s perceptions and ways of thinking
and talking about kitties have had an
enormous, perhaps even determining influence
on how Rick perceives the kitty. His
perceptions, even though he imagines himself
to be as isolated individual suspended in an
inchoate world of numerical variables, are
in no way independent of theirs.Â

                          Until PCT

theorists can expand their theories
sufficiently come to grips with the
everyday realities of the social
environments in which we live, we’ll be
stuck in fruitless discussions of the
how-many-angels-can-dance variety,
discussions that have about zero interest
for anyone outside the PCT fraternity.
Just resorting to the slogan that “it’s
all perception� means dismissing as unreal
everything outside the skin of the
isolated individual, even though the
socially constructed stabilities of
our living environments have in fact been
built into our perceptions.Â

                          We need to move

beyond referring to everything in the
physical and social environment—our
everyday reality—simply as
 undifferentiated “feedback functions.�
The coining of the terms “CEV�
and “atenfel� have represented in my view
a couple of useful steps in the direction
of understanding this environment more
clearly, and Martin’s work on “language
and culture as malleable artifacts� for
LCS IV contains many more examples of
exciting new ways to think how PCT can
apply to the social reality around us.Â

                          PCT has

provided us with an excellent framework
for building a science of human behavior
and interaction, but the edifice left by
Bill Powers was unfinished. A complex
scientific theory can never be the work of
one person alone. To be more broadly
useful, the theory will require the
collective control of lots of individuals
working together, adding to it, revising
it, filling in the details. It seems to me
that we should get to work on
understanding the reality around us
through the lens of PCT, rather than
wasting time on esoteric ontological
debates.Â

Best to all,

Kent

[From Rupert Young (2016.12.05 22.45)]

Some quick responses, due to limited time.

(Martin Taylor 2016.12.03.17.14]

That you assumed the former indicates a certain disdain for those who think differently to you, and a dogmatic adherence to your own point of view, that does not bode well for the progression of the discussion.

Maybe it's not a "religious conviction", but more than once you have said that you KNOW that there are "no dots below the line",
which has the kind of dogmatic assertiveness I associate with religion. What I have done is ask where you get that knowledge, if not through perception.

It's not a matter of knowing in the sense of having knowledge of the external world, but that it is a conclusion which follows from my understanding of PCT; particularly of a non-representational view of controlled variables.

I'll go with the latter as you have repeatedly mis-represented my position,

Not deliberately, I assure you. But I have tried to understand your position, and to get you to understand my position, in light of my belief that our only access to the outer world is through our perceptions, and I find that very hard to do.

I agree that only access to the outer world is through our perceptions. But I am saying that those perceptions do not (as a rule) represent variables in the outer world.

To which, it is irrelevant whether or not you know what is in the real world.

I agree with these words, though from the preceding discussion, I don't imagine we mean the same by them. What I mean is that over evolutionary and personal time, control has worked when we treat most of our perceptions as corresponding to something in the real world outside the unit that perceives them. When control has not worked, the perceptions in question have not proved very stable. So we might as well go on working with the assumption that the real world is more or less as we perceive it to be. We have no better.

I don't think it matters whether our (and I include non-conscious creatures) perceptions correspond to things in the real world. What matters is that the variables under control support the acquisition of energy, and our survival.

I don't think we have been (or I have not, at any rate) talking about the qualia of perceptions. The quality labelled "fear", not the "variable" that is designated as the quantity of fear, is what I would include among the qualia of perception. I have instead been talking about the magnitude of perceptions based on the functional relationships of variables external to the perceptual function, some of which may be sourced inside the organism, some derived from sensory experiences. All I say is that there are combinations of hormonal and other chemical internal states, that together with particular sensory combinations, lead us to experience different quantities of a variable we label "fear".

No, I haven't been talking about qualia either. I agree with your last sentence about "fear". I am also saying that the variable only "exists" here, as a perceptual variable, and not as an environmental variable (in the outer world), not because I have (or need) knowledge of the outer world, but because here is where the variable is created. As you say, it is a combination of various other variables, but it is not, in my view, a re-creation of an external variable.

(Martin Taylor 2016.12.04.10.43]

My thought is that all these feelings are not variables such as are the objects of control in PCT. I have been talking about variables that have values that might be influenced by actions, not the qualities that consciousness gives different magnitudes of those variables, such as the one for which a moderately high magnitude give "fear", a very high value "terror", a moderate value "insecurity", and a very low value "serenity" or something like that. One possible interpretation of what you have been saying that I had not previously considered is that you are asserting there is no conscious entity in the external environment experiencing my personal feeling of "fear" when a particular function of internal and external variables produces the numerical value that I consciously experience as "fear".

If that is your position, I would say that I have no knowledge of whether such an entity exists in the external environment. I would also say that whether one does or not, it is totally irrelevant to what I have been talking about, whereas it may possibly be the central point of what you have been talking about. Control works the same way whether such an entity does or does not exist.

Nope, I haven't been talking about conscious entitities, or restricting my point to "feeling" type variables (e.g. my example of the sensor sum varibale in my robot). My point is that it is internal variables that are being controlled, which may or may not have the apperarance of corresponding to variables in the external environment.

Could this be the main reason we have been talking past one another?

No, I don't think so. Perhaps, it is to do with the concept of "representation" with reference to perceptions. If I have time I'll write a post about my perspective on why the controlled variables of PCT are not representative of variables in the outer world.

Rupert

[Martin Taylor 2016.12.06.13.53]

  [From Rupert Young (2016.12.05 22.45)]
Rather than extensively quoting and commenting on your message, I

want to deal with a couple of quotes, which I hope may lead us i the
direction of mutual understanding. I’m not taking them in the order
they occur in yur message (which I leave unedited below), and I hope
I do not select them or their order misleadingly.

Representation (was Re TCV and.jpg

···

http://www.mmtaylor.net/PCT/Mutuality/intrinsic.html

  Some quick responses, due to limited time.




  (Martin Taylor 2016.12.03.17.14]
      That you assumed the former indicates a

certain disdain for those who think differently to you, and a
dogmatic adherence to your own point of view, that does not
bode well for the progression of the discussion.

    Maybe it's not a "religious conviction", but more than once you

have said that you KNOW that there are “no dots below the line”,

    which has the kind of dogmatic assertiveness I associate with

religion. What I have done is ask where you get that knowledge,
if not through perception.

  It's not a matter of knowing in the sense of having knowledge of

the external world, but that it is a conclusion which follows from
my understanding of PCT; particularly of a non-representational
view of controlled variables.

      I'll go with the latter as you have

repeatedly mis-represented my position,

    Not deliberately, I assure you. But I have tried to understand

your position, and to get you to understand my position, in
light of my belief that our only access to the outer world is
through our perceptions, and I find that very hard to do.

  I agree that only access to the outer world is through our

perceptions. But I am saying that those perceptions do not (as a
rule) represent variables in the outer world.

      To which, it is irrelevant whether or

not you know what is in the real world.

    I agree with these words, though from the preceding discussion,

I don’t imagine we mean the same by them. What I mean is that
over evolutionary and personal time, control has worked when we
treat most of our perceptions as corresponding to something in
the real world outside the unit that perceives them. When
control has not worked, the perceptions in question have not
proved very stable. So we might as well go on working with the
assumption that the real world is more or less as we perceive it
to be. We have no better.

  I don't think it matters whether our (and I include non-conscious

creatures) perceptions correspond to things in the real world.
What matters is that the variables under control support the
acquisition of energy, and our survival.

    I don't think we have been (or I have not,

at any rate) talking about the qualia of perceptions. The
quality labelled “fear”, not the “variable” that is designated
as the quantity of fear, is what I would include among the
qualia of perception. I have instead been talking about the
magnitude of perceptions based on the functional relationships
of variables external to the perceptual function, some of which
may be sourced inside the organism, some derived from sensory
experiences. All I say is that there are combinations of
hormonal and other chemical internal states, that together with
particular sensory combinations, lead us to experience different
quantities of a variable we label “fear”.

  No, I haven't been talking about qualia either. I agree with your

last sentence about “fear”. I am also saying that the variable
only “exists” here, as a perceptual variable, and not as an
environmental variable (in the outer world), not because I have
(or need) knowledge of the outer world, but because here is where
the variable is created. As you say, it is a combination of
various other variables, but it is not, in my view, a re-creation
of an external variable.

  (Martin Taylor 2016.12.04.10.43]
    My thought is that all these feelings are not variables such as

are the objects of control in PCT. I have been talking about
variables that have values that might be influenced by actions,
not the qualities that consciousness gives different magnitudes
of those variables, such as the one for which a moderately high
magnitude give “fear”, a very high value “terror”, a moderate
value “insecurity”, and a very low value “serenity” or something
like that. One possible interpretation of what you have been
saying that I had not previously considered is that you are
asserting there is no conscious entity in the external
environment experiencing my personal feeling of “fear” when a
particular function of internal and external variables produces
the numerical value that I consciously experience as “fear”.

    If that is your position, I would say that I have no knowledge

of whether such an entity exists in the external environment. I
would also say that whether one does or not, it is totally
irrelevant to what I have been talking about, whereas it may
possibly be the central point of what you have been talking
about. Control works the same way whether such an entity does or
does not exist.

  Nope, I haven't been talking about conscious entitities, or

restricting my point to “feeling” type variables (e.g. my example
of the sensor sum varibale in my robot). My point is that it is
internal variables that are being controlled, which may or may not
have the apperarance of corresponding to variables in the external
environment.

    Could this be the main reason we have been

talking past one another?

  No, I don't think so. Perhaps, it is to do with the concept of

“representation” with reference to perceptions. If I have time
I’ll write a post about my perspective on why the controlled
variables of PCT are not representative of variables in the outer
world.

  Rupert

Representation (was Re TCV and.jpg

···

[From Rick Marken (2016.12.07.1710)]

Martin Taylor (2016.12.06.13.53) –

[MT] Â I

start with what I take to be the minimalist canonical perceptual
control loop and ask some questions about it.

RM: Here’s a slight revision of your diagram based on Figure 1 in Powers (1973) Feedback: Beyond Behaviorism, Science, 179, 351-356, reprinted in LCS I (figure is on p. 66). Â

RM: The nice thing about this figure is that is shows that q.i, the controlled (or input) quantity is a function of environmental variables, the v’s inside the circle. One function that defines the variable q.i is the perceptual function inside the system controlling q.i. Another could be in an observer (the silhouette to the left of q.i) capable of computing a function of the environmental variables, v’s, that is the same as the perceptual function of the control system.Â

RM: So while the environmental variables, v’s, that are the basis of the controlled quantity, q.i, are in the environment, the controlled quantity itself exists only as a function of those variables: a perception. The controlled quantity, q.i, unlike a CEV, doesn’t exist in the environment; it exists only as the output of a perceptual function.Â

RM: It turns out that this issue has been argued for over at least the last 10 years. And the same players have had the same positions over all that time. Here’s a little snippet where Bill is making exactly the point I’ve been trying to make about the the fact that controlled quantities, q.i, don’t exist as objective entities in the  environment.Â

**Date: Tue, 24 Dec 1996
12:28:58 -0700****From: Bill Powers
powers_w@FRONTIER.NETSubject: Re: Lecture and demo ****[From Bill Powers
(961224.1145 MST)]****Â **Bruce Abbott (961224.1310
EST)—

**Â **Â

**BA: Perceptual variables may
be constructed in various ways from the input,****and the result may have
no direct correspondence to any physical variable. ****However, the particular
combination of physical variables represented in ****the perceptual input
function is an objectively measurable quantity, given ****that one knows the
formula. This is exactly what I expect based on my **conception of how control
systems work.

Â

**BP: The term
“objective” is questionable here, because there’s nothing in the **environment that corresponds
to the formula.

RM: This is the point I was making, in almost the same words. The reason that the controlled quantity is not an objective entity in the environment (and the reason that there is no such thing as a CEV) is that the environment itself cannot compute the function (formula) that defines the controlled quantity; that is, the environment can’t perceive itself.Â

**BP: As long as the control system ****and the observer use the same
formula, they both perceive the same thing, ****but there is nothing
independent of the observer(s) that indicates what **the right formula is.

RM: And here Bill is making another point that I’ve been making, which is that the controlled quantity can be experienced by the control system and an observer of that system if both use the same perceptual function (formula) to compute it. There is nothing independent of the observer (out in the environment) that defines that function (formula) so there is no objective correlate – objective in the sense of independent of the perceptual systems of the observer - of that function in the environment; there is no such thing as a CEV.Â

Â

MT:... my version of logic suggests that

since the value of “p” is strictly determined by the value of “s” or
“q.i”, therefore “perception” is a direct representation of whatever
name you want to give to the variable labelled “s” or “q.i”.Â

RM: As my diagram shows more clearly, I think, the state of a perceptual variable, p, cannot possibly be determined by the state of the controlled quantity, q.i, because q.i is itself a function of the same environmental variables of which p is a function. A perceptual variable cannot be a function of the output of a function – the function that defines q.i – that doesn’t even exist.Â

RM: Later in that same post from Bill is Bill’s reply to another, related argument that never seems to go away. Basically, it was about Martin’s argument that when a perceptual variable is controlled the environmental correlate of the variable (what Martin calls the CEV) is merely stabilized. Bruce Abbott, of course, supported Martin’s position and I, of course, did not. Guess who Bill agreed with: Â

 Â

**BA: Rick’s response was to
deny that the distinction Martin was making between ****“stabilized”
and “controlled” was useful. CV, he said, either is **controlled or is not
controlled.

**Â ****BP:****I would tend to agree with
Rick, because of my definition of control given above. Remember that as far
as the observer is concerned, what is controlled i
s ONLY the CV. The idea that
this CV is represented by a perceptual signal ****inside the other system is
theoretical. We can observe CV, but not p. When ****we apply a disturbance, we
apply it to CV, not to p. The action that opposes ****the effect of the disturbance
acts on CV, not p. The Test does not involve p ****at all. It involves only
observables – i.e., the observer’s perceptions. ****The observations have
priority; the model comes second, and its only reason ****for existence is to explain
the observations. When you fool around with **thought-experiments too much,
you tend to get the priorities reversed.

RM: Note that CV in this discussion refers to the controlled quantity, q.i, not p. Which is clear from context. Also note that wonderful statement: “The observations have priority; the model comes second and its only reason for existence is to explain the observations.” I think all the problems we have on CSGNet are explained by that sentence. The problems result from the fact that for some people the observations come first and the model second; for others the model comes first and the observations come second (if at all). Â

RM: If one is going to be a “model firster” I think they should at least get the model right. And you are definitely not getting the model right if you think the state of perceptual variables are determined by the state of the controlled quantity (or CEV). This incorrect view is a problem because it puts the work of constructing perceptions into the environment – since q.i would have to be computed by the environment itself – rather than into the controller where it belongs. The result is that one ignores the study of the kind of perceptual variables people control  in favor of studying properties of a control system that produce good control of the perceptual variable, as though controlled perceptual variables were fungible. But the kind of perceptual variable that is being controlled makes a big difference in terms of the behavior we observe. And understanding that behavior, according to PCT, is a matter of figuring out what perceptual variables are being  controlled.Â

RM: Anyway, it was fun to look into the CSGNet archive. In some ways it makes it seem like we’re not getting anywhere; but then I realize that much of the research I;ve done has been motivated by and based on discussions on CSGNet. So I still think it’s worth it.Â

BestÂ

Rick.Â

  Some quick responses, due to limited time.




  (Martin Taylor 2016.12.03.17.14]
      That you assumed the former indicates a

certain disdain for those who think differently to you, and a
dogmatic adherence to your own point of view, that does not
bode well for the progression of the discussion.

    Maybe it's not a "religious conviction", but more than once you

have said that you KNOW that there are “no dots below the line”,

    which has the kind of dogmatic assertiveness I associate with

religion. What I have done is ask where you get that knowledge,
if not through perception.

  It's not a matter of knowing in the sense of having knowledge of

the external world, but that it is a conclusion which follows from
my understanding of PCT; particularly of a non-representational
view of controlled variables.

      I'll go with the latter as you have

repeatedly mis-represented my position,

    Not deliberately, I assure you. But I have tried to understand

your position, and to get you to understand my position, in
light of my belief that our only access to the outer world is
through our perceptions, and I find that very hard to do.

  I agree that only access to the outer world is through our

perceptions. But I am saying that those perceptions do not (as a
rule) represent variables in the outer world.

      To which, it is irrelevant whether or

not you know what is in the real world.

    I agree with these words, though from the preceding discussion,

I don’t imagine we mean the same by them. What I mean is that
over evolutionary and personal time, control has worked when we
treat most of our perceptions as corresponding to something in
the real world outside the unit that perceives them. When
control has not worked, the perceptions in question have not
proved very stable. So we might as well go on working with the
assumption that the real world is more or less as we perceive it
to be. We have no better.

  I don't think it matters whether our (and I include non-conscious

creatures) perceptions correspond to things in the real world.
What matters is that the variables under control support the
acquisition of energy, and our survival.

    I don't think we have been (or I have not,

at any rate) talking about the qualia of perceptions. The
quality labelled “fear”, not the “variable” that is designated
as the quantity of fear, is what I would include among the
qualia of perception. I have instead been talking about the
magnitude of perceptions based on the functional relationships
of variables external to the perceptual function, some of which
may be sourced inside the organism, some derived from sensory
experiences. All I say is that there are combinations of
hormonal and other chemical internal states, that together with
particular sensory combinations, lead us to experience different
quantities of a variable we label “fear”.

  No, I haven't been talking about qualia either. I agree with your

last sentence about “fear”. I am also saying that the variable
only “exists” here, as a perceptual variable, and not as an
environmental variable (in the outer world), not because I have
(or need) knowledge of the outer world, but because here is where
the variable is created. As you say, it is a combination of
various other variables, but it is not, in my view, a re-creation
of an external variable.

  (Martin Taylor 2016.12.04.10.43]
    My thought is that all these feelings are not variables such as

are the objects of control in PCT. I have been talking about
variables that have values that might be influenced by actions,
not the qualities that consciousness gives different magnitudes
of those variables, such as the one for which a moderately high
magnitude give “fear”, a very high value “terror”, a moderate
value “insecurity”, and a very low value “serenity” or something
like that. One possible interpretation of what you have been
saying that I had not previously considered is that you are
asserting there is no conscious entity in the external
environment experiencing my personal feeling of “fear” when a
particular function of internal and external variables produces
the numerical value that I consciously experience as “fear”.

    If that is your position, I would say that I have no knowledge

of whether such an entity exists in the external environment. I
would also say that whether one does or not, it is totally
irrelevant to what I have been talking about, whereas it may
possibly be the central point of what you have been talking
about. Control works the same way whether such an entity does or
does not exist.

  Nope, I haven't been talking about conscious entitities, or

restricting my point to “feeling” type variables (e.g. my example
of the sensor sum varibale in my robot). My point is that it is
internal variables that are being controlled, which may or may not
have the apperarance of corresponding to variables in the external
environment.

    Could this be the main reason we have been

talking past one another?

  No, I don't think so. Perhaps, it is to do with the concept of

“representation” with reference to perceptions. If I have time
I’ll write a post about my perspective on why the controlled
variables of PCT are not representative of variables in the outer
world.

  Rupert
That unnamed variable with the value "s" or "q.i" is a "dot below

the line" in my “mirror-world” diagram. The name I give it is
“Complex Environmental Variable” or “CEV”. It is a variable in the
environment of the ECU. I perceive you to be saying it does not
exist, or do you maybe say it exists but is not represented by the
perception with the value “p”?

Your unedited message follows, uncommented.



Martin


Richard S. MarkenÂ

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We
have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for
others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for
themselves.” – William T. Powers

[From Erling Jorgensen (2016.12.08 1150 EST)]

Rick Marken (2016.12.07.1710)

[RM] (referring to your modification of Martin’s diagram, not reproduced here…) One function that defines the variable q.i is the perceptual function inside the system controlling q.i. Another could be in an observer (the silhouette to the left of q.i) capable of computing a function of the environmental variables, v’s, that is the same as the perceptual function of the control system.

[EJ] Rick, I appreciate the archival search you did to find some of Bill Powers’ thoughts on this issue. For one thing, it helps me relax about designating the CV term (Controlled Variable) the Observer’s version of the perception seemingly being controlled. As Bill states:

Bill Powers (961224.1145 MST)

>>BP: Remember that as far as the observer is concerned, what is controlled i****s ONLY the CV. The idea that this CV is represented by a perceptual signal inside the other system is theoretical. We can observe CV, but not p. When we apply a disturbance, we apply it to CV, not to p. The action that opposes the effect of the disturbance acts on CV, not p. The Test does not involve p at all. It involves only observables

[EJ] This says that from the Observer’s point of view, the only thing they have to work with is the CV. In the Test for the Controlled Variable, they build up a hypothesis about the other person’s relation to the CV – attempting to control it or not – based on what happens following the Observer’s disturbance of that variable. If the CV moves as expected, then try something else, because that’s not the variable the other is controlling for. But if the CV does not move as much as expected from their own disturbance, that is a significant finding, seemingly because something or someone is keeping that result from happening. When variables are stabilized in that way, we suspect “control”, with a very useful theoretical model for what might be going on. And indeed, you and Bill developed the notion of a “Stability Factor”, to quantify the degree of that hypothesized control.

[EJ] However, I disagree with an earlier point you (and Bill) make. The relevant context is the two sentences prior to Bill’s quote above:

Bruce Abbott (961224.1310 EST)

**>>>**BA: Rick’s response was to deny that the distinction Martin was making between “stabilized” and “controlled” was useful. CV, he said, either is controlled or is not controlled.

**>>**BP: I would tend to agree with Rick, because of my definition of control given above.

[EJ] I have two reasons for considering the notion of “stabilized-but-not-controlled” to be useful. The first reason derives from Kent McClelland’s modeling of conflictive control situations. When two living control systems are trying to keep the same perceptual variable in two different reference states, the result is often a “virtual reference level” somewhere in between the two preferred states, roughly proportional to the relative contributions of each party’s output gain. While neither party achieves satisfactory “control” of the variable, its value is definitely “stabilized” somewhere in the middle, with each party pulling as hard as they can. In fact, this is how Bill Powers used to talk about such situations – when the output of each party is maxed out in this way, they have lost effective control, and the variable may well drift according to whatever other disturbances are in play.

[EJ] My other reason for considering “stabilized” a useful concept that does not simply overlap with “control” was given in my recent post (Erling Jorgensen (2016.12.01 1430 EST). There I argued that a stabilized niche can be an important part of the Environmental Feedback Function for controlling other variables. Here, the term stability refers to properties of a given control loop, not the values generated by the loop itself. As I said in more detail there, “Stabilized properties, for more effective control.”

All the best,

Erling

bob hintz 12-8-16

···

On Mon, Dec 5, 2016 at 3:59 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2016.12.05.16.30]

I think she might have influenced internal states in Oliver that

would affect how he controls various perceptions in future. Maybe he
will have reorganized, maybe not. But “control”, no. Control implies
feedback, and you can’t get feedback from the future. If she acts in
a way she intends to prevent further invitations, such as saying
“Buzz-off, pipsqueak”, or to ask for future invitations by sying
“I’d love to, but I’ll be out of town. Please do ask me again”, she
might achieve her desired effect, but it’s much the same as firing a
bullet toward a far-off target. If your aim is true, the bullet hits
the target. If not, it doesn’t. But there’s no way you can control
your perception of the bullet-target relationship once the trigger
has been pulled.

I am wrestling with a variety of thoughts. The layered protocol seems very “other” focused. Communication is to inform another about a change in one’s belief about the other’s belief, to command a change in their behavior, or to request a piece of information about their beliefs (Paris tutorial) It also notes that In order for me to do any of these I need a model of this other which includes some sense of their model of me. I am imagining that this model of the other is within my own hierarchy in some fashion. If her response is something along the lines of “Buzz-off”, I will probably revise my model of her is such a fashion that I would be unlikely to invite her again. However, if her response is more ambiguous, (I can’t, I’m busy.) it might still have the same effect, if I interpret her behavior as meaning “buzz-off”. This is what I mean when I say it is not the “concrete observable behavior” that determines the meaning.

new topic???

I am wondering if their model of me is the only model of me that I have or do I also have my very own model of me, which may be constructed by the same processes that construct the model of them and the rest of the world outside the boundaries of my own skin? My “Self” might be constructed using the models of others whose models contain models of me, but it is independent of any one of the those others. Parents are probably the most important as they are typically there at the beginning and are the first humans I might build a model of and they certainly have a model of me. I am imagining that the complexity of my model of objects and others outside myself at any point in time matches in some sense the complexity of my model of myself. I suspect that self consciousness and other consciousness must evolve together. These are clearly very big picture kind of thoughts.

How do I make sense of my own desire, wish, decision, or reference signal to have a party? I may be conscious of the reference/preference/goal of organizing a party at my house. When that is my dominant reference point, the value of every perception of the world outside my skin will be affected. It seems to me that I am reorganizing all of the time in terms of opportunities to begin and/or complete some of the tasks that are organized by that “prime reference” (the source of a prime virtual message when Oliver encounters Rachel).

If this is to be the very first party that I have ever attempted, I may try to find someone who I believe knows how to throw a party to ask for advice. I will be aware of my own lack of knowledge and will be trying to change this aspect of my own state of being. The error signal that initiates all of the lower level protocols will not be connected to any perception of differences outside myself. Lower levels of the protocol will certainly be connected external to the skin at the lowest level. Even if the desire to have this party started with a friend who pointed out that I am the only one in our circle of friends who has never had a party, I still have to arrive at an internal state that activates a reference signal or set of signals that results in activity in relation to objects and others outside myself to create such a gathering.

I guess it is this internal change that often seems to be missing from discussions of PCT. There is the internal dialogue that includes you in my head. There is your internal dialogue that includes me in your head. There is the dialogue that a video recorder could capture that exists only between us and that might be observed by a third party. It would provide a base from which the conversation that each of believes we had might be constructed, but I doubt that any of these three would be an exact match.

I will continue studying the paris tutorial. I also received Glasser’s Stations of the mind today. I suspect that what I have called a Self above is what Glasser will call an “internal world” and that it is separate from hierarchy of control of external variables.

bob

from Kent McClelland (2016.12.09.1400)

Erling Jorgensen (2016.12.08 1150 EST)

Rick Marken (2016.12.07.1710)

Rick and Rupert have argued in this thread that perceptions constructed from clusters of sensory input variables do not necessarily have any counterparts in the physical environment. Therefore, they argue, in Martin Taylor’s “mirror world� diagram (2016.10.16.10.32),
where dots above the dividing line between organism and environment represent perceptions and dots below the line represent complex environmental variables (CEVs), the dots above the line are real, while those below the line aren’t. Thus, Rick concludes, “there’s
no such thing as a CEVâ€? (2016.10.27.1300). Rick’s most recent post in the thread offers a selection of quotes from Bill Powers in which Bill makes similar arguments.

While I appreciate the logic of this argument, which takes as its frame of reference the relationship between the individual actor/perceiver and the individual’s environment, I still think that it’s short-sighted, because it misses the bigger picture that could
be revealed by adopting a sociological frame of reference, which would pay attention the fact that the individual’s environment contains other people.

Bill Powers provided the classic statement of Rick and Rupert’s argument in his lemonade example in Behavior: The Control of Perception. Here’s what he said on p. 112 of the 2005 edition:

This is a good opportunity to emphasize a “philosophical fact” that emerges from this theory: perceptual signals depend on physical events, but what they represent does not necessarily
have any physical significance…. Thhe taste of fresh lemonade, for example, contains an easily recognizable vector, derived from the intensity signals generated by sugar and acid (together with some oil smells). However unitary and real this vector seems, there
is no physical entity corresponding to it….

This means we would be much safer in general to speak of sensation-creating input functions rather than sensation-recognizing functions. To speak of recognition implies tacitly that the environment contains an entity to be recognized, and that all we have to
do is learn to detect it. It seems far more realistic to me to speak instead of functions that construct perceptions with the question of external counterparts to these perceptions being treated with much skepticism.

Bill’s radical skepticism here is fine as far as it goes. Yes, there’s nothing in the environment corresponding to the taste of lemonade. Lemonade is a mixture, not a chemical compound. But how is it that he can talk about the taste of lemonade and be confident
that his readers will know what he’s talking about? It’s because there IS something in their environment, and quite a lot of that something, that has the precise combination of chemical ingredients to allow almost anyone who samples it to experience the perception
of tasting lemonade.

It’s called “lemonade," and it’s a liquid so ubiquitous in the Western world that most people are exposed to it repeatedly over their lives and thus develop by reorganization a dedicated control system somewhere in their perceptual hierarchy for
“recognizing� lemonade when they drink it and saying unequivocally whether any liquid they drink happens to taste like lemonade or not.

So it seems ridiculous to me to say that there’s nothing in the environment of the individual that can compute from that vector of physical variables the perception of the taste of lemonade (or whatever perception you want to talk about that is
based on widespread cultural patterns), when there are millions upon millions of people in the individual’s environment who can do just that. And these millions of people by their collective efforts to control their perceptions of the taste of lemonade end
up creating and drinking billions of gallons of the stuff. The liquid is available in bottled form in every supermarket or convenience store.

Our collective control of the perception of a liquid called lemonade is a “stabilized niche� in the feedback function, as Erling puts it in his latest post, for any individual who may be trying to decide what to drink with lunch. Or you could
call it a collectively controlled “invariance,� one that “can form the basis for a new perceptual category,� as Bill says in his chapter describing reorganization (BCP 2005, p. 204), confronting any child who grows up in the social environment of the Western
world.

[By the way, Rick has asked me repeatedly for an example of something that is collectively controlled with conflict but yet has longterm stability. I offer the perception of the “taste for lemonade.� Everybody knows what lemonade contains: sugar,
water, and lemon juice. But people have very different reference values for what the drink should taste like. Compare the taste of the potent Italian “limonade� to the sickly sweet and watered down drink often served in the USA, or to the vile chemical concoction
that goes by the name of Country Time Lemonade.]

My feeling is that it’s important for us to be able to talk from the PCT perspective about these “stabilized niches in the feedback function� that serve, as Erling notes, as a kind stable platform for effective control of other perceptions. Coining
the term “atenfel� was one attempt to disaggregate feedback functions and pick out those regions of dependably stable, socially produced invariance that facilitate effective control, so that they can become a focus of PCT-informed investigation. The idea
of CEVs is another way to conceptualize the environmental stabilities that are collectively produced.

I had been wondering why Rick has been so hostile to the notion of a CEV, while to me it makes intuitive sense, and it occurred to me that this disagreement may also be a matter of his individual frame of reference vs. my social frame of reference.
If we’re considering a model of how an individual perceives some unknown thing in the environment, there’s no need to postulate a CEV. The model works fine without it. But as soon as we add a second person to the model who is also controlling the same perception
in the same physical environment, that is, we make it into an interactive model of collective control rather than individual behavior, the CEV becomes necessary. The feedback functions of the two actors must converge in some set of environmental variables
for any interaction to take place.

Consider Tom Bourbon’s experiment in collective control, which Rick holds up as an ideal example of PCT-infomed sociology (Bourbon, W. Thomas, Invitation to the dance: Explaining the variance when control systems interact.

American Behavioral Scientist. September/October 1990, vol. 34 no. 1, 95-105. doi: 10.1177/0002764290034001009).

The task in this experiment was to use two joysticks to keep two cursors on a computer screen in line with each other and with a target. A subject could use one joystick for one cursor and one for the other, but the movements of one joystick also
disturbed the other cursor, and vice versa. Bourbon showed that this task could be equally well done by a single person with a joystick in each hand or by two people each running a single joystick. (From my point of view, the two-person experiment is an example
of cooperative collective control, because both subjects control their perceptions of the cursor positions using the same reference values for alignment.)

Here is the diagram that Tom provided to show the PCT model of the two-person experiment.

Notice that the two PCT models for the two experimental subjects (one on the right and the other on the left) meet in the center of the diagram in a set of environmental variables—the CEV for this model. For the experiment to work, the two subjects
have to be looking at the same computer screen. In other words, their feedback functions have to pass through the same “stabilized niche� of computer, screen, and moving cursors. Without that region of invariance in their common environment, the two people
in the experiment would not be interacting at all.

If we want PCT to be perceived as relevant to social sciences like political science, economics, sociology, and anthropology, and to the humanities as well, we need to develop a clear analytic vocabulary for talking about the collectively controlled
stabilities in our common social environments, not just what is going on in people’s heads. Maybe CEV, atenfel, and mirror world aren’t the right words for it, but we need something. To just conceptualize the environment as a pulsating set of unconnected physical
variables or else a mush of undifferentiated individual feedback functions, pretending that every individual constructs from that morass his own independent set of perceptions, will not do.

And even to do the Test for the Controlled Variable with an individual, we need to be able to take seriously the stabilized environments in which social interaction occurs. If it weren’t for the social and cultural stabilities that we’re all exposed
to growing up—”the “boss realitiesâ€? that discipline our reorganizing sets of perceptual control systems into hierarchies that resemble one another’s—we would never be able to identify thee perceptions another person is apparently controlling or or talk about
them in a meaningful way. These social realities are built into our individual psychology. We’ve got to pay some serious attention to them.

Enough of my rant for now!

Best to all,

Kent

PastedGraphic-4.tiff (4.13 MB)

···

On Dec 8, 2016, at 12:01 PM, Erling Jorgensen EJorgensen@riverbendcmhc.org wrote:

[From Erling Jorgensen (2016.12.08 1150 EST)]

Rick Marken (2016.12.07.1710)

[RM] (referring to your modification of Martin’s diagram, not reproduced here…) One function that defines the variable q.i is the perceptual function inside the system controlling q.i. Another could be in an observer (the silhouette to the left of q.i)
capable of computing a function of the environmental variables, v’s, that is the same as the perceptual function of the control system.

[EJ] Rick, I appreciate the archival search you did to find some of Bill Powers’ thoughts on this issue. For one thing, it helps me relax about designating the CV term (Controlled Variable) the Observer’s version of the perception seemingly being controlled.
As Bill states:

Bill Powers (961224.1145 MST)

BP: Remember that as far as the observer is concerned, what is controlled is ONLY the CV. The idea that this CV is represented by a perceptual signal inside the other system is theoretical. We can observe CV, but not p. When we apply a disturbance, we apply
it to CV, not to p. The action that opposes the effect of the disturbance acts on CV, not p. The Test does not involve p at all. It involves only observables

[EJ] This says that from the Observer’s point of view, the only thing they have to work with is the CV. In the Test for the Controlled Variable, they build up a hypothesis about the other person’s relation to the CV – attempting to control it or not – based
on what happens following the Observer’s disturbance of that variable. If the CV moves as expected, then try something else, because that’s not the variable the other is controlling for. But if the CV does not move as much as expected from their own disturbance,
that is a significant finding, seemingly because something or someone is keeping that result from happening. When variables are stabilized in that way, we suspect “control”, with a very useful theoretical model for what might be going on. And indeed, you
and Bill developed the notion of a “Stability Factor”, to quantify the degree of that hypothesized control.

[EJ] However, I disagree with an earlier point you (and Bill) make. The relevant context is the two sentences prior to Bill’s quote above:

Bruce Abbott (961224.1310 EST)

BA: Rick’s response was to deny that the distinction Martin was making between “stabilized” and “controlled” was useful. CV, he said, either is controlled or is not controlled.

BP: I would tend to agree with Rick, because of my definition of control given above.

[EJ] I have two reasons for considering the notion of “stabilized-but-not-controlled” to be useful. The first reason derives from Kent McClelland’s modeling of conflictive control situations. When two living control systems are trying to keep the same perceptual
variable in two different reference states, the result is often a “virtual reference level” somewhere in between the two preferred states, roughly proportional to the relative contributions of each party’s output gain. While neither party achieves satisfactory
“control” of the variable, its value is definitely “stabilized” somewhere in the middle, with each party pulling as hard as they can. In fact, this is how Bill Powers used to talk about such situations – when the output of each party is maxed out in this
way, they have lost effective control, and the variable may well drift according to whatever other disturbances are in play.

[EJ] My other reason for considering “stabilized” a useful concept that does not simply overlap with “control” was given in my recent post (Erling Jorgensen (2016.12.01 1430 EST). There I argued that a stabilized niche can be an important part of the Environmental
Feedback Function for controlling other variables. Here, the term stability refers to properties of a given control loop, not the values generated by the loop itself. As I said in more detail there, “Stabilized properties, for more effective control.”

All the best,

Erling

[From Rick Marken (2016.12.10.1245)]

···

Kent McClelland (2016.12.09.1400)–

KM: Bill Powers provided the classic statement of Rick and Rupert’s argument in his lemonade example in Behavior: The Control of Perception. Here’s what he said on p. 112 of the 2005 edition:

This is a good opportunity to emphasize a “philosophical fact” that emerges from this theory: perceptual signals depend on physical events, but what they represent does not necessarily
have any physical significance…. The taste of fresh lemonade, for example, contains an easily recognizable vector, derived from the intensity signals generated by sugar and acid (together with some oil smells). However unitary and real this vector seems, there
is no physical entity corresponding to it….

This means we would be much safer in general to speak of sensation-creating input functions rather than sensation-recognizing function s. To speak of recognition implies tacitly that the environment contains an entity to be recognized, and that all we have to
do is learn to detect it. It seems far more realistic to me to speak instead of functions that construct perceptions with the question of external counterparts to these perceptions being treated with much skepticism.Â

RM: Thanks for copying this.Â

Â

KM: Bill’s radical skepticism here is fine as far as it goes. Yes, there’s nothing in the environment corresponding to the taste of lemonade. Lemonade is a mixture, not a chemical compound. But how is it that he can talk about the taste of lemonade and be confident
that his readers will know what he’s talking about? It’s because there IS something in their environment, and quite a lot of that something, that has the precise combination of chemical ingredients to allow almost anyone who samples it to experience the perception
of tasting lemonade.Â

RM: No, it’s because his readers have developed the same perceptual function that constructs the perception of the taste of lemonade from the sensory effects of the physical variables – the chemicals – in the liquid being tasted.Â

KM: So it seems ridiculous to me to say that there’s nothing in the environment of the individual that can compute from that vector of physical variables the perception of the taste of lemonade

RM: Good point. There is indeed something in the environment that can compute the function of physical variables that produces the perception of the taste of lemonade: other people. But, of course, the output of one person’s perceptual function can’t be the input to another person’s perceptual function. So the fact that other people in your environment can perceive lemonade doesn’t explain how you perceive it.Â

Â

KM: [By the way, Rick has asked me repeatedly for an example of something that is collectively controlled with conflict but yet has longterm stability. I offer the perception of the “taste for lemonade.� Everybody knows what lemonade contains: sugar,
water, and lemon juice. But people have very different reference values for what the drink should taste like. Compare the taste of the potent Italian “limonade� to the sickly sweet and watered down drink often served in the USA, or to the vile chemical concoction
that goes by the name of Country Time Lemonade.]Â

RM: Sorry, I don’t understand this at all. Your example says that there are different references for the taste of lemonade. How is this an example of the taste of lemonade being stabilized? You’ve named references for three different tastes-- different states of the perceptual variable “taste of lemonade”:  “limonadeâ€?, USA lemonade and Country Time Lemonade. All three are based on different combinations of physical variables – water, sugar and lemon juice. Your model of stability arising from conflict over the same perceptual variable seems to predict that there would be only one kind of lemonade in a society – the one that is at the virtual reference of people controlling for different reference levels of the perception of lemonade. It seems to me that your example shows that there are sufficient degrees of freedom in the environment for people to control for the perception of the taste of lemonade they want, with no conflict with others who prefer a different taste. See Bill’s paper “Degrees of freedom in social interaction” for a nice theoretical discussion of what you are calling “collective control” (LCS I, p 221)

KM: My feeling is that it’s important for us to be able to talk from the PCT perspective about these “stabilized niches in the feedback function� that serve, as Erling notes, as a kind stable platform for effective control of other perceptions.

RM: My feeling is that your theorizing would go in a lot better if you started with the observations to be explained and then developed the models (theories) to explain them. You get into difficulties when you start with the theory and then search for observations that seem to be explained by it. This is understanding based on ideology and its what has gotten the US (and much of Europe, apparently), into the ugly state that it is in today.

KM: I had been wondering why Rick has been so hostile to the notion of a CEV,

RM: Wonder no more. I am hostile to the notion of a CEV because it is an unnecessary and misleading addition of the PCT model of behavior. But most importantly, I am hostile to it because, as I said in an earlier post, it makes it possible to treat all perceptual variables as fungible; that control is all about controlling this variable called p. The fact that this variable p represents many different perceptual aspects of the environment is ignored. Thus, understanding behavior from a PCT perspective becomes a matter of understanding how p is controlled when, in fact, understanding behavior from a PCT perspective should be about figuring out what aspects of the environment  p represents; that is, it’s about what perceptual variables the system is controlling.Â

RM: So the big problem with the CEV is that it conceals the most important insight of the PCT approach to understanding behavior; the fact that behavior is organized around the control of different types of perceptual variables and that the main goal of research aimed at understanding behavior from a PCT perspective – i.e., research aimed at testing the PCT model of behavior – should be determining what perceptual variables organisms actually control, whether these variables can be categorized in terms of the types that Powers has proposed and whether they are organized hierarchically as Powers has also proposed.Â

KM: If we want PCT to be perceived as relevant to social sciences like political science, economics, sociology, and anthropology, and to the humanities as well, we need to develop a clear analytic vocabulary for talking about the collectively controlled
stabilities in our common social environments, not just what is going on in people’s heads.

RM: I think Powers has already provided that vocabulary. But I don’t think improving the vocabulary (which is surely possible) will get social scientists to take PCT seriously (behavioral scientists don’t take it seriously either, by the way). I think the best approach to getting PCT taken seriously is to show how PCT can explain things. And this must be done by starting with observations and showing how well the theory explains them, not vice versa. Phenomena phirst!

Best

Rick

Â

Maybe CEV, atenfel, and mirror world aren’t the right words for it, but we need something. To just conceptualize the environment as a pulsating set of unconnected physical
variables or else a mush of undifferentiated individual feedback functions, pretending that every individual constructs from that morass his own independent set of perceptions, will not do.Â

And even to do the Test for the Controlled Variable with an individual, we need to be able to take seriously the stabilized environments in which social interaction occurs. If it weren’t for the social and cultural stabilities that we’re all exposed
to growing up—the “boss realitiesâ€? that disciplinee our reorganizing sets of perceptual control systems into hierarchies that resemble one another’s—we would never be able to identify tthe perceptions another person is apparently controlling or or talk about
them in a meaningful way. These social realities are built into our individual psychology. We’ve got to pay some serious attention to them.

Enough of my rant for now!

Best to all,

Kent

On Dec 8, 2016, at 12:01 PM, Erling Jorgensen EJorgensen@riverbendcmhc.org wrote:

[From Erling Jorgensen (2016.12.08 1150 EST)]

Â

Rick Marken (2016.12.07.1710)Â

[RM]  (referring to your modification of Martin’s diagram, not reproduced here…)  One function that defines the variable q.i is the perceptual function inside the system controlling q.i. Another could be in an observer (the silhouette to the left of q.i)
capable of computing a function of the environmental variables, v’s, that is the same as the perceptual function of the control system.

Â

[EJ]  Rick, I appreciate the archival search you did to find some of Bill Powers’ thoughts on this issue. For one thing, it helps me relax about designating the CV term (Controlled Variable) the Observer’s version of the perception seemingly being controlled.
 As Bill states:

Bill Powers (961224.1145 MST)

BP:  Remember that as far as the observer is concerned, what is controlled is ONLY the CV. The idea that this CV is represented by a perceptual signal inside the other system is theoretical. We can observe CV, but not p. When we apply a disturbance, we apply
it to CV, not to p. The action that opposes the effect of the disturbance acts on CV, not p. The Test does not involve p at all. It involves only observables

Â

[EJ]  This says that from the Observer’s point of view, the only thing they have to work with is the CV. In the Test for the Controlled Variable, they build up a hypothesis about the other person’s relation to the CV – attempting to control it or not – based
on what happens following the Observer’s disturbance of that variable. If the CV moves as expected, then try something else, because that’s not the variable the other is controlling for. But if the CV does not move as much as expected from their own disturbance,
that is a significant finding, seemingly because something or someone is keeping that result from happening. When variables are stabilized in that way, we suspect “control”, with a very useful theoretical model for what might be going on. And indeed, you
and Bill developed the notion of a “Stability Factor”, to quantify the degree of that hypothesized control.Â

Â

[EJ]  However, I disagree with an earlier point you (and Bill) make. The relevant context is the two sentences prior to Bill’s quote above:

Bruce Abbott (961224.1310 EST)

BA: Rick’s response was to deny that the distinction Martin was making between “stabilized” and "controlled" was useful. CV, he said, either is controlled or is not controlled.

BP: I would tend to agree with Rick, because of my definition of control given above.Â

[EJ]  I have two reasons for considering the notion of "stabilized-but-not-controlled " to be useful. The first reason derives from Kent McClelland’s modeling of conflictive control situations. When two living control systems are trying to keep the same perceptual
variable in two different reference states, the result is often a “virtual reference level” somewhere in between the two preferred states, roughly proportional to the relative contributions of each party’s output gain. While neither party achieves satisfactory
“control” of the variable, its value is definitely “stabilized” somewhere in the middle, with each party pulling as hard as they can. In fact, this is how Bill Powers used to talk about such situations – when the output of each party is maxed out in this
way, they have lost effective control, and the variable may well drift according to whatever other disturbances are in play.Â

Â

[EJ]  My other reason for considering “stabilized” a useful concept that does not simply overlap with “control” was given in my recent post (Erling Jorgensen (2016.12.01 1430 EST). There I argued that a stabilized niche can be an important part of the Environmental
Feedback Function for controlling other variables. Here, the term stability refers to properties of a given control loop, not the values generated by the loop itself. As I said in more detail there, "Stabilized properties, for more effective control."Â

Â

All the best,

Erling

Â


Richard S. MarkenÂ

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We
have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for
others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for
themselves.” – William T. Powers

[From Fred Nickols (2016.12.10.1708 ET)]

Hmm. With respect to vocabulary and to controlled variables and to action and to control and to a whole bunch of other stuff, it is often the case that the variable we wish to control is not accessible to us via direct, immediate action, and so we have to effect change “over here� in order to realize change “over there.� This introduces the notion of proximate, intermediate and ultimate variables. I introduced this same notion to CSG several years ago and Bill Powers complimented me for it. I think there is still room for some additional terms, concepts and ideas in PCT. If not, then, its set in concrete and I can’t imagine that being the case; it is, after all, a theory.

Fred Nickols

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, December 10, 2016 3:47 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: TCV and Collective Control …

[From Rick Marken (2016.12.10.1245)]

Kent McClelland (2016.12.09.1400)–

KM: Bill Powers provided the classic statement of Rick and Rupert’s argument in his lemonade example in Behavior: The Control of Perception. Here’s what he said on p. 112 of the 2005 edition:

This is a good opportunity to emphasize a “philosophical fact” that emerges from this theory: perceptual signals depend on physical events, but what they represent does not necessarily have any physical significance…. The taste of fresh lemonade, for example, contaains an easily recognizable vector, derived from the intensity signals generated by sugar and acid (together with some oil smells). However unitary and real this vector seems, there is no physical entity corresponding to it….

This means we would be much safer in general to speak of sensation-creating input functions rather than sensation-recognizing functions. To speak of recognition implies tacitly that the environment contains an entity to be recognized, and that all we have to do is learn to detect it. It seems far more realistic to me to speak instead of functions that construct perceptions with the question of external counterparts to these perceptions being treated with much skepticism.

RM: Thanks for copying this.

KM: Bill’s radical skepticism here is fine as far as it goes. Yes, there’s nothing in the environment corresponding to the taste of lemonade. Lemonade is a mixture, not a chemical compound. But how is it that he can talk about the taste of lemonade and be confident that his readers will know what he’s talking about? It’s because there IS something in their environment, and quite a lot of that something, that has the precise combination of chemical ingredients to allow almost anyone who samples it to experience the perception of tasting lemonade.

RM: No, it’s because his readers have developed the same perceptual function that constructs the perception of the taste of lemonade from the sensory effects of the physical variables – the chemicals – in the liquid being tasted.

KM: So it seems ridiculous to me to say that there’s nothing in the environment of the individual that can compute from that vector of physical variables the perception of the taste of lemonade

RM: Good point. There is indeed something in the environment that can compute the function of physical variables that produces the perception of the taste of lemonade: other people. But, of course, the output of one person’s perceptual function can’t be the input to another person’s perceptual function. So the fact that other people in your environment can perceive lemonade doesn’t explain how you perceive it.

KM: [By the way, Rick has asked me repeatedly for an example of something that is collectively controlled with conflict but yet has longterm stability. I offer the perception of the “taste for lemonade.� Everybody knows what lemonade contains: sugar, water, and lemon juice. But people have very different reference values for what the drink should taste like. Compare the taste of the potent Italian “limonade� to the sickly sweet and watered down drink often served in the USA, or to the vile chemical concoction that goes by the name of Country Time Lemonade.]

RM: Sorry, I don’t understand this at all. Your example says that there are different references for the taste of lemonade. How is this an example of the taste of lemonade being stabilized? You’ve named references for three different tastes-- different states of the perceptual variable “taste of lemonade”: “limonadeâ€?, USA lemonade and Country Time Lemonade. All three are based on different combinations of physical variables – water, sugar and lemon juice. Your model of stability arising from conflict over the same perceptual variable seems to predict that there would be only one kind of lemonade in a society – the one that is at the virtual reference of people controlling for different reference levels of the perception of lemonade. It seems to me that your example shows that there are sufficient degrees of freedom in the environment for people to control for the perception of the taste of lemonade they want, with no conflict with others who prefer a different taste. See Bill’s paper “Degrees of freedom in social interaction” for a nice theoretical discussion of what you are calling “collective control” (LCS I, p 221)

KM: My feeling is that it’s important for us to be able to talk from the PCT perspective about these “stabilized niches in the feedback function� that serve, as Erling notes, as a kind stable platform for effective control of other perceptions.

RM: My feeling is that your theorizing would go in a lot better if you started with the observations to be explained and then developed the models (theories) to explain them. You get into difficulties when you start with the theory and then search for observations that seem to be explained by it. This is understanding based on ideology and its what has gotten the US (and much of Europe, apparently), into the ugly state that it is in today.

KM: I had been wondering why Rick has been so hostile to the notion of a CEV,

RM: Wonder no more. I am hostile to the notion of a CEV because it is an unnecessary and misleading addition of the PCT model of behavior. But most importantly, I am hostile to it because, as I said in an earlier post, it makes it possible to treat all perceptual variables as fungible; that control is all about controlling this variable called p. The fact that this variable p represents many different perceptual aspects of the environment is ignored. Thus, understanding behavior from a PCT perspective becomes a matter of understanding how p is controlled when, in fact, understanding behavior from a PCT perspective should be about figuring out what aspects of the environment p represents; that is, it’s about what perceptual variables the system is controlling.

RM: So the big problem with the CEV is that it conceals the most important insight of the PCT approach to understanding behavior; the fact that behavior is organized around the control of different types of perceptual variables and that the main goal of research aimed at understanding behavior from a PCT perspective – i.e., research aimed at testing the PCT model of behavior – should be determining what perceptual variables organisms actually control, whether these variables can be categorized in terms of the types that Powers has proposed and whether they are organized hierarchically as Powers has also proposed.

KM: If we want PCT to be perceived as relevant to social sciences like political science, economics, sociology, and anthropology, and to the humanities as well, we need to develop a clear analytic vocabulary for talking about the collectively controlled stabilities in our common social environments, not just what is going on in people’s heads.

RM: I think Powers has already provided that vocabulary. But I don’t think improving the vocabulary (which is surely possible) will get social scientists to take PCT seriously (behavioral scientists don’t take it seriously either, by the way). I think the best approach to getting PCT taken seriously is to show how PCT can explain things. And this must be done by starting with observations and showing how well the theory explains them, not vice versa. Phenomena phirst!

Best

Rick

Maybe CEV, atenfel, and mirror world aren’t the right words for it, but we need something. To just conceptualize the environment as a pulsating set of unconnected physical variables or else a mush of undifferentiated individual feedback functions, pretending that every individual constructs from that morass his own independent set of perceptions, will not do.

And even to do the Test for the Controlled Variable with an individual, we need to be able to take seriously the stabilized environments in which social interaction occurs. If it weren’t for the social and cultural stabilities that we’re all exposed to growing up—the “boss realitiessâ€? that discipline our reorganizing sets of perceptual control systems into hierarchies that resemble one another’s—we would neever be able to identify the perceptions another person is apparently controlling or or talk about them in a meaningful way. These social realities are built into our individual psychology. We’ve got to pay some serious attention to them.

Enough of my rant for now!

Best to all,

Kent

On Dec 8, 2016, at 12:01 PM, Erling Jorgensen EJorgensen@riverbendcmhc.org wrote:

[From Erling Jorgensen (2016.12.08 1150 EST)]

Rick Marken (2016.12.07.1710)

[RM] (referring to your modification of Martin’s diagram, not reproduced here…) One function that defines the variable q.i is the perceptual function inside the system controlling q.i. Another could be in an observer (the silhouette to the left of q.i) capable of computing a function of the environmental variables, v’s, that is the same as the perceptual function of the control system.

[EJ] Rick, I appreciate the archival search you did to find some of Bill Powers’ thoughts on this issue. For one thing, it helps me relax about designating the CV term (Controlled Variable) the Observer’s version of the perception seemingly being controlled. As Bill states:

Bill Powers (961224.1145 MST)
BP: Remember that as far as the observer is concerned, what is controlled is ONLY the CV. The idea that this CV is represented by a perceptual signal inside the other system is theoretical. We can observe CV, but not p. When we apply a disturbance, we apply it to CV, not to p. The action that opposes the effect of the disturbance acts on CV, not p. The Test does not involve p at all. It involves only observables

[EJ] This says that from the Observer’s point of view, the only thing they have to work with is the CV. In the Test for the Controlled Variable, they build up a hypothesis about the other person’s relation to the CV – attempting to control it or not – based on what happens following the Observer’s disturbance of that variable. If the CV moves as expected, then try something else, because that’s not the variable the other is controlling for. But if the CV does not move as much as expected from their own disturbance, that is a significant finding, seemingly because something or someone is keeping that result from happening. When variables are stabilized in that way, we suspect “control”, with a very useful theoretical model for what might be going on. And indeed, you and Bill developed the notion of a “Stability Factor”, to quantify the degree of that hypothesized control.

[EJ] However, I disagree with an earlier point you (and Bill) make. The relevant context is the two sentences prior to Bill’s quote above:

Bruce Abbott (961224.1310 EST)
BA: Rick’s response was to deny that the distinction Martin was making between “stabilized” and “controlled” was useful. CV, he said, either is controlled or is not controlled.
BP: I would tend to agree with Rick, because of my definition of control given above.
[EJ] I have two reasons for considering the notion of “stabilized-but-not-controlled” to be useful. The first reason derives from Kent McClelland’s modeling of conflictive control situations. When two living control systems are trying to keep the same perceptual variable in two different reference states, the result is often a “virtual reference level” somewhere in between the two preferred states, roughly proportional to the relative contributions of each party’s output gain. While neither party achieves satisfactory “control” of the variable, its value is definitely “stabilized” somewhere in the middle, with each party pulling as hard as they can. In fact, this is how Bill Powers used to talk about such situations – when the output of each party is maxed out in this way, they have lost effective control, and the variable may well drift according to whatever other disturbances are in play.

[EJ] My other reason for considering “stabilized” a useful concept that does not simply overlap with “control” was given in my recent post (Erling Jorgensen (2016.12.01 1430 EST). There I argued that a stabilized niche can be an important part of the Environmental Feedback Function for controlling other variables. Here, the term stability refers to properties of a given control loop, not the values generated by the loop itself. As I said in more detail there, “Stabilized properties, for more effective control.”

All the best,
Erling

Richard S. Marken

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers

[From Rick Marken (2016.12.11. 0745)]

···

Fred Nickols (2016.12.10.1708 ET)–

Â

FN: Hmm. With respect to vocabulary and to controlled variables and to action and to control and to a whole bunch of other stuff, it is often the case that the variable we wish to control is not accessible to us via direct, immediate action, and so we have to effect change “over hereâ€? in order to realize change “over there.â€? This introduces the notion of proximate, intermediate and ultimate variables. I introduced this same notion to CSG several years ago and Bill Powers complimented me for it.Â

RM: Yes, that was a fine observation. But it’s possible to deal with these kinds of facts without adding new vocabulary to the theory. For example, you observation control via indirect effects on the controlled variable was already nicely described by Bill in his Demo set that is now available on-line as javascript programs written by Adam Matic. The relevant demo is at http://www.pct-labs.com/tutorial1/index.html – see Step K: Control of Remote Effect. There are many ways to describe this phenomenon; you like describing it in terms of “proximate, intermediate and ultimate variables”; Kent and Martin describe it using the term newly minted term “atenfels”; Bill calls it control of a “remote effect”. What’s nice about the demo is that it makes vocabulary moot; you can see exactly what phenomenon is being described, regardless of how it’s described.Â

RM: I certainly agree that speaking and writing clearly is extremely important. But words are just a way of pointing to phenomena. The best way to understand a phenomenon is to see it in action. That’s why its the demos, more than the vocabulary, are what what make PCT understandable.Â

Â

FN: I think there is still room for some additional terms, concepts and ideas in PCT. If not, then, its set in concrete and I can’t imagine that being the case; it is, after all, a theory.

RM: Of course the theory is not set in concrete. But I don’t see developing additional terms, concepts and ideas as a way to improve PCT. The way to improve PCT Is to test it to see how well it accounts for actual observations! Phenomena phirst!Â

BestÂ

Rick

Â

Â

Fred Nickols

Â

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, December 10, 2016 3:47 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: TCV and Collective Control …

Â

[From Rick Marken (2016.12.10.1245)]

Â

Kent McClelland (2016.12.09.1400)–

KM: Bill Powers provided the classic statement of Rick and Rupert’s argument in his lemonade example in Behavior: The Control of Perception. Here’s what he said on p. 112 of the 2005 edition:

This is a good opportunity to emphasize a “philosophical fact” that emerges from this theory: perceptual signals depend on physical events, but what they represent does not necessarily have any physical significance…. Thhe taste of fresh lemonade, for example, contains an easily recognizable vector, derived from the intensity signals generated by sugar and acid (together with some oil smells). However unitary and real this vector seems, there is no physical entity corresponding to it….

This means we would be much safer in general to speak of sensation-creating input functions rather than sensation-recognizing functions. To speak of recognition implies tacitly that the environment contains an entity to be recognized, and that all we have to do is learn to detect it. It seems far more realistic to me to speak instead of functions that construct perceptions with the question of external counterparts to these perceptions being treated with much skepticism.Â

Â

RM: Thanks for copying this.Â

Â

KM: Bill’s radical skepticism here is fine as far as it goes. Yes, there’s nothing in the environment corresponding to the taste of lemonade. Lemonade is a mixture, not a chemical compound. But how is it that he can talk about the taste of lemonade and be confident that his readers will know what he’s talking about? It’s because there IS something in their environment, and quite a lot of that something, that has the precise combination of chemical ingredients to allow almost anyone who samples it to experience the perception of tasting lemonade.Â

Â

RM: No, it’s because his readers have developed the same perceptual function that constructs the perception of the taste of lemonade from the sensory effects of the physical variables – the chemicals – in the liquid being tasted.Â

Â

KM: So it seems ridiculous to me to say that there’s nothing in the environment of the individual that can compute from that vector of physical variables the perception of the taste of lemonade

Â

RM: Good point. There is indeed something in the environment that can compute the function of physical variables that produces the perception of the taste of lemonade: other people. But, of course, the output of one person’s perceptual function can’t be the input to another person’s perceptual function. So the fact that other people in your environment can perceive lemonade doesn’t explain how you perceive it.Â

Â

KM: [By the way, Rick has asked me repeatedly for an example of something that is collectively controlled with conflict but yet has longterm stability. I offer the perception of the “taste for lemonade.â€? Everybody knows what lemonade contains: sugar, water, and lemon juice. But people have very different reference values for what the drink should taste like. Compare the taste of the potent Italian “limonadeâ€? to the sickly sweet and watered down drink often served in the USA, or to the vile chemical concoction that goes by the name of Country Time Lemonade.]Â

Â

RM: Sorry, I don’t understand this at all. Your example says that there are different references for the taste of lemonade. How is this an example of the taste of lemonade being stabilized? You’ve named references for three different tastes-- different states of the perceptual variable “taste of lemonade”:  “limonadeâ€?, USA lemonade and Country Time Lemonade. All three are based on different combinations of physical variables – water, sugar and lemon juice. Your model of stability arising from conflict over the same perceptual variable seems to predict that there would be only one kind of lemonade in a society – the one that is at the virtual reference of people controlling for different reference levels of the perception of lemonade. It seems to me that your example shows that there are sufficient degrees of freedom in the environment for people to control for the perception of the taste of lemonade they want, with no conflict with others who prefer a different taste. See Bill’s paper “Degrees of freedom in social interaction” for a nice theoretical discussion of what you are calling “collective control” (LCS I, p 221)

Â

KM: My feeling is that it’s important for us to be able to talk from the PCT perspective about these “stabilized niches in the feedback functionâ€? that serve, as Erling notes, as a kind stable platform for effective control of other perceptions.

Â

RM: My feeling is that your theorizing would go in a lot better if you started with the observations to be explained and then developed the models (theories) to explain them. You get into difficulties when you start with the theory and then search for observations that seem to be explained by it. This is understanding based on ideology and its what has gotten the US (and much of Europe, apparently), into the ugly state that it is in today.

Â

KM: I had been wondering why Rick has been so hostile to the notion of a CEV,

Â

RM: Wonder no more. I am hostile to the notion of a CEV because it is an unnecessary and misleading addition of the PCT model of behavior. But most importantly, I am hostile to it because, as I said in an earlier post, it makes it possible to treat all perceptual variables as fungible; that control is all about controlling this variable called p. The fact that this variable p represents many different perceptual aspects of the environment is ignored. Thus, understanding behavior from a PCT perspective becomes a matter of understanding how p is controlled when, in fact, understanding behavior from a PCT perspective should be about figuring out what aspects of the environment  p represents; that is, it’s about what perceptual variables the system is controlling.Â

Â

RM: So the big problem with the CEV is that it conceals the most important insight of the PCT approach to understanding behavior; the fact that behavior is organized around the control of different types of perceptual variables and that the main goal of research aimed at understanding behavior from a PCT perspective – i.e., research aimed at testing the PCT model of behavior – should be determining what perceptual variables organisms actually control, whether these variables can be categorized in terms of the types that Powers has proposed and whether they are organized hierarchically as Powers has also proposed.Â

Â

KM: If we want PCT to be perceived as relevant to social sciences like political science, economics, sociology, and anthropology, and to the humanities as well, we need to develop a clear analytic vocabulary for talking about the collectively controlled stabilities in our common social environments, not just what is going on in people’s heads.

Â

RM: I think Powers has already provided that vocabulary. But I don’t think improving the vocabulary (which is surely possible) will get social scientists to take PCT seriously (behavioral scientists don’t take it seriously either, by the way). I think the best approach to getting PCT taken seriously is to show how PCT can explain things. And this must be done by starting with observations and showing how well the theory explains them, not vice versa. Phenomena phirst!

Â

Best

Â

Rick

Â

Maybe CEV, atenfel, and mirror world aren’t the right words for it, but we need something. To just conceptualize the environment as a pulsating set of unconnected physical variables or else a mush of undifferentiated individual feedback functions, pretending that every individual constructs from that morass his own independent set of perceptions, will not do.Â

Â

And even to do the Test for the Controlled Variable with an individual, we need to be able to take seriously the stabilized environments in which social interaction occurs. If it weren’t for the social and cultural stabilities that we’re all exposed to growing up—the “boss realitiessâ€? that discipline our reorganizing sets of perceptual control systems into hierarchies that resemble one another’s—we would neever be able to identify the perceptions another person is apparently controlling or or talk about them in a meaningful way. These social realities are built into our individual psychology. We’ve got to pay some serious attention to them.

Â

Enough of my rant for now!

Â

Best to all,

Â

Kent

Â

Â

On Dec 8, 2016, at 12:01 PM, Erling Jorgensen EJorgensen@riverbendcmhc.org wrote:

[From Erling Jorgensen (2016.12.08 1150 EST)]
Â

Rick Marken (2016.12.07.1710)Â

[RM]  (referring to your modification of Martin’s diagram, not reproduced here…)  One function that defines the variable q.i is the perceptual function inside the system controlling q.i. Another could be in an observer (the silhouette to the left of q.i) capable of computing a function of the environmental variables, v’s, that is the same as the perceptual function of the control system.
Â
[EJ]  Rick, I appreciate the archival search you did to find some of Bill Powers’ thoughts on this issue. For one thing, it helps me relax about designating the CV term (Controlled Variable) the Observer’s version of the perception seemingly being controlled. As Bill states:

Bill Powers (961224.1145 MST)
BP:  Remember that as far as the observer is concerned, what is controlled is ONLY the CV. The idea that this CV is represented by a perceptual signal inside the other system is theoretical. We can observe CV, but not p. When we apply a disturbance, we apply it to CV, not to p. The action that opposes the effect of the disturbance acts on CV, not p. The Test does not involve p at all. It involves only observables
Â
[EJ]  This says that from the Observer’s point of view, the only thing they have to work with is the CV. In the Test for the Controlled Variable, they build up a hypothesis about the other person’s relation to the CV – attempting to control it or not – based on what happens following the Observer’s disturbance of that variable. If the CV moves as expected, then try something else, because that’s not the variable the other is controlling for. But if the CV does not move as much as expected from their own disturbance, that is a significant finding, seemingly because something or someone is keeping that result from happening. When variables are stabilized in that way, we suspect “control”, with a very useful theoretical model for what might be going on. And indeed, you and Bill developed the notion of a “Stability Factor”, to quantify the degree of that hypothesized control.Â
Â
[EJ]  However, I disagree with an earlier point you (and Bill) make. The relevant context is the two sentences prior to Bill’s quote above:

Bruce Abbott (961224.1310 EST)
BA: Rick’s response was to deny that the distinction Martin was making between “stabilized” and "controlled" was useful. CV, he said, either is controlled or is not controlled.
BP: I would tend to agree with Rick, because of my definition of control given above.Â
[EJ]  I have two reasons for considering the notion of “stabilized-but-not-controlled” to be useful. The first reason derives from Kent McClelland’s modeling of conflictive control situations. When two living control systems are trying to keep the same perceptual variable in two different reference states, the result is often a “virtual reference level” somewhere in between the two preferred states, roughly proportional to the relative contributions of each party’s output gain. While neither party achieves satisfactory “control” of the variable, its value is definitely “stabilized” somewhere in the middle, with each party pulling as hard as they can. In fact, this is how Bill Powers used to talk about such situations – when the output of each party is maxed out in this way, they have lost effective control, and the variable may well drift according to whatever other disturbances are in play.Â
Â
[EJ]  My other reason for considering “stabilized” a useful concept that does not simply overlap with “control” was given in my recent post (Erling Jorgensen (2016.12.01 1430 EST). There I argued that a stabilized niche can be an important part of the Environmental Feedback Function for controlling other variables. Here, the term stability refers to properties of a given control loop, not the values generated by the loop itself. As I said in more detail there, "Stabilized properties, for more effective control."Â
Â
All the best,
Erling
Â

Â

Â

Richard S. MarkenÂ

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for themselves.” – William T. Powers


Richard S. MarkenÂ

“The childhood of the human race is far from over. We
have a long way to go before most people will understand that what they do for
others is just as important to their well-being as what they do for
themselves.” – William T. Powers