From[ Bill Williams 24 May 2004 10:50 AM CST]
[From Bill Powers (2004.05.23.2026 NMDT)]
>Bill Williams 23 May 2004 5:45 PM CST --
> My principle objection is remains that value is not a substance. I
> don't find a materialist argument convincing. Materialism as, I see it,
> is perhaps the most , or at least one of the more naive forms of
> idealism. Since you define PCT in terms of a materialist conception of
> the world, I don't find PCT convincing.
I don't know what all those philosophical "isms" mean, but I'll try to
answer at least one or two of your objections.
My primary axiom is that experience is at the bottom of everything: the
world as it appears to us.
OK.
Another way of saying this, perhaps a bit
slogans, is "It's all perception."
I think slogans, including "It's all perception." can be useful. I am
still encountering people who are caught up in the after math of
behaviorism. So, even though I avoid the use of PCT, or HPCT, it isn't
because I reject _much_ or even _most_ of a PCT or HPCT outlook.
The point of all sciences is to
explain experience, and experience is the totality of what we perceive.
I am OK with this.
My preferred method of explaining experience is to construct models of
what
might exist in reality that would account for the experiences we have. For
explaining properties of the part of this world that appears to be outside
us, I prefer the models of physics, engineering, and (despite considerable
ignorance) chemistry.
For most of what you usually do, I am sure that this makes perfect sense for
your.
These models are highly predictive and mutually
consistent with each other; they have great explanatory power with respect
to interactions in the "external" world. I use quotes because I recognize
that internal and external are themselves perceptual categories. However,
they are useful categories when it comes to physical theories and models.
Of course they are. I wouldn't think of denying this.
>I simply don't find your materialist preconceptions helpful.
I don't see how that applies to me, since I recognized from the start
there
is only the world of experience, which contains the so-called
material world as well as the so-called mental world, as well as all the
things we think and feel about these worlds.
But, then you go to talk about "concrete." I wonder where that came from?
Anyway, you say that you "recognize from the start" but this isn't the way
you frequently talk about this stuff, and I have to go by how you talk about
this stuff until you tell me differently. And, you are telling me, as this
discussion goes on that, you are using words that mean one thing to most
people in a way that is peculiarly your own. Nothing unusual in this, most
of us do it. But, it takes some effort to correct misunderstandings when
words are being used in ways that depart from their usual meaning.
I take reality to be what we experience.
Or is it that you take "reality" to be what _you_ experience? You may
consider this "nit-picking." I have never personal had nit, but if I did, I
would consider "nit-picking" to be important. And, at least in my view
what we have here is a genuinely significant question. However, there seems
to really be only two of here in this discussion. Martin is away doing
something else and not on CSGnet for the time being. So, there are two of
us. You have your habits and opinions and I have somewhat different habits
and opinions. And, we disagree to some extent about the validity of these
habits and opinions. You are making assertions about economic
subject-matter, a field that you distain and refuse to take the time to
learn what the words mean. So, you invent new meanings for familiar terms,
and you often equivocate when you use terms that you have redefined. When
you actually get down to the modeling, I think your habits and opinions
concerning modeling will enforce good practices. However, while we are
discussing this-- just the two of us -- an element creeps in of what you
refer to as "subjectivity." From my point of view, I see a lot of this
"subjectivity" in your exposition of "how economics ought to be done."
Because you are inexperienced in regard to economic subject-matter and
attempting to think things out from scratch, you often repeat mistakes that
have been made long ago. Frequently when you think that you are starting
"from scratch" what you are actually doing is taking up and attempting to
make use of some item of economic folklore that is a part of a larger
culture. Your dad's use of the under-consumptionist Leakages thesis is an
example of this. The reason I am pointing this out-- the element of what
you call "subjectivity" is that often these problems, like the leakages
thesis have already long since been considered and disposed of in a larger
culture-- larger than just the two of us. My point is that by not being
willing to consider this larger experience with economic issues, you have
chosen to take, in your own terms, a radically "subjective" approach to
building an economic model.
When we try to explain the things we observe, we often have to
guess at mechanisms we can't observe (like electrons and quarks). Perhaps
what makes you think of me as a materialist (if I guess correctly what
that
term means) is that I use physical models and neurological models as a
basis for explaining how human beings work. But I recognize that these are
as-if models, not reports on things unseen that somehow, magically, I can
see.
OK. However, the way you talk about what you are doing often provides a
contrary impression. Such as, for example, the talk about doing economics in
"concrete" terms.
My concern is to make all the models we use consistent with each other and
with observations.
We are in agreement in this regard.
That, I think, is the approach that has made all of the
successful sciences work as well as they do.
Sure.
> In my opinion,
>an adequate economic theory, or any theory of the social process requires
a
>pluralist rather than a monistic conception of the process of valuation.
As
>best I can judge a monistic conception of value theory generates familiar
>and characteristic mistakes in application.
I don't know what "pluralist rather than a monistic conception of the
process of valuation" means.
Consider the following passage:
Nussbum, Martha C and Glover, Jonathan. eds. 1995 _Women, Culture, and
Development: A Study of Human capabilities_ Oxford: Clarendon
Press
Hillary Putnam p. 22O.
maxims
Pragmatists "... insisted that when one human being in
isolation tries to interpret even the best maxims for
himself or herself and does not allow others to criticize
the way in which he or she interprets these maxims, or
the way in which he or she applies them, then the kind
of 'certainty' that results is always fatally
tainted with subjectivity. Even the notion of 'truth'
makes no sense in such a 'moral solitude' for
'truth presupposes a standard external to the thinker'
p. 22O.
Let me start this by saying again, because I think it needs to be said-- for
your sake-- I am not criticizing your very real accomplishment in applying
control theory to the phenomena of human behavior. However, as you
once told me, despite having invested some effort in the project you had
prior to encountering me you had been unable to find a way to develop
economic applications of control theory. I think there is a reason for your
not having been able to do so.
One obvious reason is that you refuse to become acquainted with the
literature of economics. Why? You explain this in terms of constraints
of time and circumstance. I am, however, of the opinion that the
actual reason has to do with your being unwilling, or perhaps unable,
to tolerate an encounter with other persons. So, you are stuck in a
radically monistic, physicalist, solipsistic stance. An explanation of
why you might have adopted such a position is readily available-- your
work hasn't gained anything approaching the recognition that it deserves.
So, what is to be done? You've chosen to strike out in a new direction,
and to take up the task of building an integrated theoretical version of
economics in terms of control theory-- all by yourself.
Consider what Charles Pierce recommends,
"That systems ought to be constructed architechonically has
been preached since Kant, but I do not think the full impact
of the maxim has by any means been appreciated. What I would
recommend that every person who wishes to form an opinion
concerning fundamental problems should first of all make
a complete survey of human knowledge, should take note of all
the valuable ideas in each branch of science, should observe
in just what respect each has been successful and where it
has failed, in order that, in the light of the through
acquaintance so attained of the available materials for
a philosophical theory and the nature and strength of each,
he may proceed to the study of what the problems of
philosophy consists in, and of the proper way of studying
it." p. 319.
Murphey, Murray G. 1961 _The Development of Peirce's Philosophy_
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press
Read from your standpoint, what Peirce is recommending must appear to be
a joke. But, the road you have chosen is a much harder one. You ought to
consider that the success you had in developing the model of human behavior
contained in _B:CP_ was in part due to your fortunate encounter with a
control
system in the anti-aircraft system that you were assigned to in your naval
service. I am not in any way minimizing your personal traits of
intelligence,
energy and persistence-- but you drew upon a social / technical heritage
when
you carried out that work. Your exposure to economic thought, in contrast,
is rather unfortunate. In contrast to the procedure that Peirce recommends
you
refuse to make the effort to familiarize yourself with the rest of
humanities
efforts and the results of these efforts. I've described your approach to
economics as paranoid, and this is an unpleasant word, however, I think the
description is apt. paranoid in the sense that Hillary Putnam in the
passage
argues is the condition of all inquiry that proceeds outside a genuine
community.
A pluralist approach is one that accepts that there are other people in the
world. There is, in my view, a very real sense in which your conceptual
scheme does not appear to adequately recognize the existence of other
people.
> > There is, as you are aware, also a PCT theory of values.
>
>Of course. Not only am I aware that there is such a thing, but I also am
to
>some extent familiar with the errors which it contains. The PCT theory of
>values, isn't one that I need to consider adopting.
I'd appreciate an explanation of that conclusion. It's a bit alarming!
what
errors? I'd like to correct them.
See the extend passage above. Both the Pierce and Putnam passages
contain a message about the character of research that is solitary.
> > I don't know if it's the one you're searching for.
>
>However, to correct a possible misapprehension on your part-- No, a
>monistic theory of value is not what I "am searching for" if, that is, I
was
>in the process of searching . The way you treat values is so
incoherent
>that it really isn't worth my thinking about adopting.
Incoherent? That's even more alarming. Could you explain in what way it's
incoherent? I really would like to avoid being incoherent.
Sure, when you choose to be a solipsistic you become in your terms
"subjective" and the truth seems to lose it meaning. So, you end up
saying lots of stuff that you some times later regret-- in this sense you
have admitted to behaving in a way that is "incoherent." You don't
meet your own standards for behavior.
> >
> > There are two ways to consider value.
>
>Actually there are lots more ways of thinking about this than you might
>suppose.
Did I say there were ONLY two ways? Put your glasses on.
Since you only mentioned two ways, I thought I would be helpful and remind
you that there are more ways than you seemed to suppose.
> One is to say that something is
> > valuable if an organism adjusts its reference level for that thing to
a
> > high setting. The other is to say something is valuable if it
objectively
>
>Notice the influence of positivism here. What function "objective
function"
>does the use of "objectively" serve in this sentence?
By "objective" I mean "reliably observable by more than one person." We
can
observe fairly reliably that ingesting arsenic is not good for a person,
so
if the person puts a high value on ingesting arsenic, he is not likely to
survive much longer. This is opposed to things which are less subject to
public agreement -- for example, setting a high reference level for being
"good". Nobody else can see what you mean by "good," so there is no way to
reach consensus.
These matters are not much influenced by positivism or naive realism. They
are simply statements on which people can reach agreement by public means.
Whether they refer to some "real reality" or only to a collection of
subjective perceptions does not have to be settled (a good thing, since it
can't be settled).
> None. The sentence
>would functionally mean the same if the word is removed. So, what
function
>does the word "objectively" serve?
It is a notification that we are using the physics-neurology-chemistry
genre of models, rather than other less well developed models.
Less developed or not, Economics is not physics.
It means we
are talking about observations on which different people can reliably
agree.
Unfortunately, in this impoverished environment in which this discussion
is being carried on we don't have "different people" upon whom we can
"reliably agree" for confirmation or rejection, or just checking up on
stuff. In effect the discussion is being carried on between you in a begin
everything from scratch solipsistic stance and myself. I prefer to
adopt the position that some other people have thought about economics
and make use of their efforts.
>It serves an ideological function of
>announcing that the discussion is being held in terms of an idealistic
>philosophic conception known as "materialism." I can do without
>materialism.
OK, do without it. I've never been particularly attached to it, either,
because it ends in "ism."
Good point. But, among the most deadly of the "isms" is solipsism.
And, you are the most solipsistic person I have encountered.
> > promotes the survival of the organism. Obviously, organisms can set
high
> > reference levels for things that are objectively
>
>Notice the influence of positivism here. What function "objective
function"
>does the use of "objectively" serve in this sentence? None. The
sentence
>would functionally mean the same if the word is removed. So, what
function
>does the word "objectively" serve? It serves an ideological function of
>announcing that the discussion is being held in terms of an idealistic
>philosophic conception known as "materialism." I can do without
>materialism.
If you can keep repeating yourself, so can I. I do not use "objectively"
in
any ideological sense. I merely mean to indicate that more than one person
can observe something,
However, as evidenced by the nature of our discussion, it appears to me
that there is a distinct absence of other people who are in anything like a
position to make the sorts of judgments that you are talking about in terms
of "objectivity." This is an instance of a characteristic feature of the
way you approach issues, and it is an example of what I was saying about
incoherence.
mostly things in the part of experience we agree to
call "outside ourselves." To say that something is objectively bad for an
organism is to say that anyone could observe the evidence, such as the
death of the organism from poisoning. This is in contrast with saying that
something is subjectively bad, meaning that the person who thinks it is
bad
may be the only person who does, and nobody else can see why.
> > I think the general evolutionary position is the one to use here.
>
>I agree, as long as objectivism, materialism, and physicalism are not
>introduced as implicit assumptions.
Fine, I trust that I am not doing so, since I don't know what the official
positions of each point of view would be. Or care.
This "Or, care." is a prime example of what I am talking about in terms
of how you attempt to proceed in solipsistic terms. Read what Putnam
says, your self-description fits her description of the pathology of
thought
that is carried on in an context that is excessively solitary. As you say,
"You don't care." It is all too obvious.
> > We can
> > say that those organisms that have survived are those that learned to
set
> > high reference levels for things that are actually good for them, and
low
> > reference levels for things that are actually bad for them, where good
and
> > bad in the sense intended are defined by survival of a species and
failure
> > to survive. the reference signals specify the values that direct the
> > organism's behavior.
> >
> > This allows us to use reference levels as the operating definition of
> > value,
>
>We part company here. I would define "value" in terms of consequences.
Any
>particular reference level may have good or bad consequences. So, I do
not
>agree with your definition of value.
I also define value in terms of consequences. It is, in fact, the
consequences of acts that are valued, not (most often) the acts
themselves.
And of course those are perceptual consequences.
Sure, and I think that your slogan "Behavior is the control of perception."
makes an important point.
Furthermore, a given
perceptual consequence can be given varying values at different times; the
taste of salt is valued highly by a hot thirsty man, but not by a man who
has just eaten a couple of ounces of salt. What PCT does is explain the
process of valuing in terms of comparing a perception with a reference
level: comparing what _is_ being perceived with the amount of that
perception one _wants to be_ perceiving.
Setting a reference level at one level of organization can affect
perceptions at higher levels so as to bring them closer to their reference
levels, or can have the opposite effect. Control systems are organized at
every level to make sure that lower-level reference signals are not set so
as to cause higher-level error -- to the extent possible.
>with the understanding that organisms generally set reference levels
> > as appropriate for survival.
> >
>I would agree that typically this is what organisms in fact do. However,
>typically, isn't good enough to serve as a foundation definition.
Of course it's good enough, you silly man, you just don't have an adequate
grasp of this subject. (I think I'm beginning to catch on to your mode of
argumentation -- how was that?).
Have you by chance heard of a mirror? I think we are getting into multiple
reflections here.
> > >Here is point where we part company-- that is "What is it that is
going
> > >on behind the numbers that are used?" Is there a substance? Or, is
> > >there anything that can be said to be "genuinely real" involved. My
> > >answer would be that there is no "substance" but there might be a
reality.
I don't know whether you consider a neural signal to be a "substance."
I would say that it is a process rather than a substance.
If
you do, then I plead guilty to whatever you're accusing me of. I use the
neurological model in explaining how it is that we seem to have brains
(that is, other people seem to have them -- I've never seen mine), and why
it is that having a well-functioning brain seems to be so important in
human affairs, and so on. This model is consistent with much of experience
and will probably become more so.
I too would expect that parts of the model, large parts of the model, will
become recognized as the most effective way to think about behavior.
However, you attach to the model some ideological quirks that I don't
believe are a necessary part of what in the model is an effective
description
of the process of behavior.
> > I think you are reading more philosophical depth into my statement
than I
> > intended.
>
>Perhaps, however, as I perceive it , you are expounding a view that is
>lacking in sufficient depth to serve as an adequate basis for a viable
>theory of value.
That's so tantalizing -- to be told it lacks sufficient depth, without any
indication of what might amount to sufficient depth.
Ok. Well, take your own case. You've created a really marvelous work that
revolutionizes psychology. But, you don't yourself find that you can behave
yourself in a way that you yourself approves of. You find yourself saying
stuff
that later you wish you hadn't said. Control theory we think ought to
provide
a basis for bettering our lives. Yet, the CSGnet has been the site of what
many people regard to be a lot of unpleasantness. Now, I have obviously
been around and active lately on the CSGnet, but the sort of unpleasantness
that has often been characteristic of the CSGnet has been a feature of the
net during times when I haven't been active. Somehow, the marvelous
psychology doesn't seem to be of much of any help in efforts to correct this
situation. Rather, you end up defending Rick when he calls Michelle, "an
ignorant slut." You tell me that I have not contributed anything to the
CSGnet.
And, then Rick denies that he called Michelle "an ignorant slut." and You
deny have made the claim that I've never contributed anything to CSG.
So, I don't think there is any mystery here. You don't seem to have the
capacity to view your own behavior in a context that, in your phrase is
"objective." And, I believe that this failing is due to a solipsistic
approach
to experience. It is the dark side of the slogan, "Behavior is the control
of
perception." Granted the slogan has its uses, but it also has its dangers.
> When I say there has to be something going on beneath the
> > numbers, I mean that the number representing the output of the control
> > system model has to stand for some actual process by which (in this
case)
> > the consumption control system affects the environment so as to
maintain
>or
> > change the current rate of consumption.
>
>Where we seem to disagree is in part located in the above in which you
say,
>"some actual process." I would agree that there being "some actual
>process." Where I would disagree is a matter of what and how that
"actual
>process" is to be specified. There are I believe good reasons to reject
a
>substance theory of value, and a monistic conception of reality. I will
>return this point below when you argument touches on this point again.
If you refuse to use physical models, I don't know how you manage to say
anything useful about what the rest of us call physical processes, like
controlling.
We both know that these "physical models" are ideas. But, once again
"Economics is not physics."
> >The output action of the system
> > results in executing transactions at a certain rate, entailing
spending
> > money at a certain rate and receiving goods are the corresponding rate
> > (spending rate divided by average price per good).
The "good", however, is not a substance.
The actual output
> > variable can thus be identified as the rate of spending money,
No it can not. Not in the absence of price index. And, the price index is
not a matter that can be treated in terms of physics.
which
takes
> > place in the environment of the control system. This action affects
the
> > environment so as to cause goods to appear in the consumer's
inventory.
> >
> > So far this has nothing to do with value.
>
>You have already introduce the notion of "goods." So, your claim that
>nothing so far has anything to do with value would appear to be
>contradictory.
No, you've simply misunderstood how I use "goods". I could have said
"items".
Well, it isn't really fair to blame me when without warning you use a world
that in a larger community has one meaning with your choice to use the
word in a different way. Communication is, for your information, a
social process. If you wish to communicate it would be better to
acknowledge that there is a world of other people who use these words.
When I read what you have to say about economics, it often strikes me
that I am reading a foreign language that is written using familiar terms.
But, the meanings are all changed about.
The process of obtaining items from a store is a mechanical one
of
paying money and receiving the items. I can do that without valuing the
"good" at all -- if I'm running an errand for someone else, the process of
obtaining the good works the same way as it would if I were buying it for
myself. We can surely describe that part of the control loop separately
from the rest of the loop.
You say, that,
The process of obtaining items from a store is a mechanical one
I would say that this is a control process rather than "a mechanical"
process.
> >The subject of value comes up
> > when we ask why this entity is acquiring goods.
>
>No, you already introduced value before this point. You can not talk
about
>goods, not consistently at least, without getting into the value issue.
Of course I can if I am using the word "good" to indicate items in a
store,
Not, consistently. And, rather than "goods" the preferred term would be
commodities.
without saying what value I personally put on them.
This is a rather obvious resort to the solecism that plagues your efforts
to think about an economic problem that is inherently social.
Let's not confuse that
meaning of "good" with the other meanings.
By all means lets avoid confusion. How, about we avoid equivocation
as well?
>There is much in what you say above that I am in agreement with. I've
been
>aware of this for quite some time. I wasn't as you say "searching" for
such
>a conception. I have been familiar with these conceptions for a
decade
>or two and I continue to find them valuable.
Sorry, I didn't mean to imply that there was some conception with which
you
were not already completely, totally, exhaustively familiar.
Well, what was I supposed to think? Your use of "in search of" was
obviously
intended to suggest that I was in need of something that I hadn't yet found.
You are good a inserting sneers into a discussion. I was merely indicating
that you had misunderstood my position. I am glad we have this straightened
out.
>There are enough of them that if they are all kept close to particular
>values, chances are that the physical organism is working properly in all
>important regards.
>
>"Physical organism" seems redundant to me, and thus seems to me to be
>introducing an ideological twist into the discussion.
Perhaps I should have said "physiological" or "somatic" to show I was
thinking of the states of the organ systems and other things at that
level,
as opposed to the states of the signal-handling systems of the brain.
> >More to the point, any deviations of these basic variables from
> > what we may as well call their "intrinsic reference levels" indicates
that
> > something is going wrong that needs to be fixed.
>
>Usually this is the case.
>
> I have not tried to
> > propose every possible way in which "intrinsic errors" of this kind
might
> > be corrected, but have focused on one basic and especially powerful
method
> > that I call "e. coli reorganization." This process alters the
organization
> > of the brain at random, and ceases to alter it only when all intrinsic
> > variables are once again at their respective intrinsic reference
levels.
> > Those intrinsic reference levels, of course, are a product of the
>evolution
> > of the species.
> >
>Right. And, I think in almost all most all of the above you are making a
>useful point.
>
> > So I have proposed a mechanism by which the actual, objective
>
>Here, in the use of "objective" it appears to me that you are introducing
a
>slant into the argument which is unnecessary.
Don't jump out of your skin every time I happen to use a word that's
loaded for you.
And, don't you exaggerate when someone "objects" to your slipping in a
loaded word. And, I am not as you say, "jumping out of my skin" rather
I am jumping on you for using words that have a meaning that I object
to. There, is for your information a world somewhere out there where
people use words. But, you want the privilege of using words any
which way. And, this is yet another instance of your solipsistic
approach to discussion.
As I said, I use words like "actual" and "objective" to refer to
things observable, reliably, by more than one person.
Unfortunately there seems to be only two of us here, and as you have
said, "You don't care." what other people think. So, we really need
more people here to create the sort of context that you are talking
about where there is a community involved.
We all know, of
course, that we are just comparing perceptions (as best we can through
communication), but it gets very tiresome to keep saying that all the
time.
Even the use of we, as you use it, is problematic. Since as you say "you
don't care" in regard to other people's existences what is the point of
"communication." Solipsism really does seem to me to be the problem.
Not only that, but continually attaching qualifiers to what we say is
paralyzing; we get into deeper and deeper layers until the original
subject
is lost.
I don't regard this as being at all "paralyzing." Rather in my view it
probes
a basic issue-- is solitary inquiry viable.? And, beyond that Is there any
point
to solitary inquiry?
>I am not an "objectivist."
>You could omit "actual" and "objective." Would , or how would, doing so
>change the meaning of the sentence?
Since I was talking about the "actual, objective needs of the organism", I
meant to indicate the needs which, as far as we can ascertain and agree,
must be met for the organism to survive or maintain good health.
Here, you make reference to "we can ascertain and agree" where I have very
real doubts as to your understanding that such a notion is in conflict with
your
basic approach which is "I don't care." That is, You don't care what other
people think. This puts you in danger of the pathology that Putnam
identifies.
This
doesn't mean that we have some magical way of observing directly what is
really needed by an organism. It is a conclusion drawn from applying
whatever model of the organism is appropriate to what we perceive of the
organism. If it's a good model it will hold up to testing.
>There is a sense in which I agree with you about the character and nature
of
>needs. I think your system provides the best explanation of this that
is
>available. I don't think, however, that it is useful to describe this
>structure of behavior in terms of "objective needs." Your talk about
>"objective needs" is in my view a unnecessary injection of a materialist
>ideology.
Only if you insist, over my objections, on interpreting it that way. Or
are
you saying that your interpretation is objectively correct?
No, what I would argue is that there are better ways to proceed than by
discarding, remember the Pierce quotation, what others have found out,
and insisting upon starting from scratch, and going about things from a
solipsistic approach.
I am using the
best models I know about in the best way I can. What is ideological about
that?
The ideology comes in when you take up the solipsistic stance. Then by not
being willing to consider that your approach to issues is one that fails to
meet
even your own criteria for success, you have adopted a Bill Powers
ideology.
Not that a Bill Powers ideology isn't a pretty good ideology, but it isn't
an
ideology that makes for a good start toward a community of inquirers doing
collaborative work applying control theory.
>The term "objective" which you use here is a misnomer. The "needs" are
not
>in fact all needs for objects.
Of course not. A person needs to be in an environment with a temperature
high enough to support life (given the equipment available). Temperature
is
not an object, yet I claim that this is an objective observation: your
"reasonable man" would agree that the person needs a high enough
temperature, and that is what I mean by objective. This is opposed to
subjective needs, which are seldom critical for survival when not met.
> Some of the needs are for relationships.
Yes, and any of the other 10 levels of perception I have defined. But
there
are subjective and objective needs for relationships. I objectively need
you to hold up the other end of the sofa we are moving; I subjectively
need
you to be civil about it. Anyone can tell that we must work together in
the
right geometric relationship to move the sofa, but there could be
substantial disagreement about the need for civility -- what _I_ call
civility. Since it's _all_ perception, any type of experience can be used
for an example.
>One of the reasons that I do not use the caption PCT is that I have been
>aware of how you conceive of PCT in physical terms.
Do you have a better version that is still consistent with the models of
the physical sciences and neurology? Or do you reject physics models,
op-amps and all?
Yes, I like the term "control theory." Then I don't have to explain why I
am
using a theoretical concept developed by this guy, who claimed that
Keynes was a tax cheat. Most of the people that I talk to would agree
with you that poor old Ludwig von Mises is. or was, an asshole so that
apt characterization isn't really a problem for me. However, calling dear
old Ludwig an asshole doesn't seem to me to do much to advance
economic inquiry.
>There is, of course, a physical aspect to control theory, but this
>physical aspect can be thought of without bringing in a monistic,
>objectivist, philosophic world view.
I don't know what these technical terms mean, but I strongly suspect that
they don't apply to me.
Then how about solipsism?
>A reference signal is (if the model is correct) a real physical thing
inside
>a brain, not an abstract concept.
>
>I do not mean to be disrespectful in anyway. However what you are saying
>here does not appear to me to be useful. This statement in my view is
>precisely what a positivist philosophic stance requires. I simply don't
see
>any reason for you to place your work in a positivist context.
I mean, of course, that we should model it as a physical neural signal in
a
brain, and not as some magical or mystical or disembodied ectoplasm
floating in some vague imaginary space.
Yes, better to avoid the ectoplasm.
I am always referring to models,
not to Real Reality.
No. This isn't really true. You equivocate like there is no tomorrow.
If you could accept that once and for all, I could
speak normally without hedging my sentences about with qualifiers and
explanations and exceptions, which not only lengthen sentences
unnecessarily, but bore everyone who already understands the context in
which I speak.
Who is the "everyone" an everyone "who already understand the context in
which I speak." This is a further example of what seems to me to be a
severely solipsistic approach to, per impossible, communication.
>All concepts including "materialism" are concepts.
Well, some perceptions are of other kinds, but I agree that all we can
know
are perceptions.
>Furthermore, all concepts are "abstract."
I don't think we need to keep going over this ground. We agree.
Good. I think we agree more than you suspect.
> >The actions by which we make the environment
> > change to move our perceptions closer to their reference levels are
not
> > abstract, but ordinary physical actions
>
>Ordinary Perhaps. But, there is no need for me to think about this is
>positivistic terms.
Which model do you use to refer to what we call actions, if not the models
of physics (with some physiology)?
How about models in which there are other people?
>They consist of such simple processes as getting out
> > a wallet and passing money across a counter,
>
>Here is where I think your positivism gets you in trouble. "Passing money
>across a counter" isn't simple. Thinking that it is simple when it is
not,
>creates a problem.
No it doesn't.
Yes it does.
Nit-picking creates the problem.
No, it is the "nits" that create the need for "nit-picking." I can't
imagine why
"nit-picking" got a bad name. If you have nits, not that I have ever had
nits,
you'd want them "picked." Now, Ideologically you have "nits." You say my
"nit-picking" creates the problem. I say that it is your solipicism that
creates
a big problem.
Are you trying to tell me
that there are many higher orders of perception from which you can view
the
act of passing money across the counter? Gee whiz, Bill, why didn't I
think
of that?
The reason you didn't think of it is that you are basically a solipsist.
The fact
that there are other people is a fact that seems, in some respects, to have
escaped you.
>I can agree in part to this. But, my agreement does not extend to the
point
>where the description takes on a positivistic interpretation.
I think you're hypersentive on this subject, as well as somewhat
hypocritical. There is no such thing as a description taking on a
positivistic interpretation, except to a positivist.
Not at all. You don't have to be a positivist to recognize one.
That is a
positivistic
idea in itself -- the idea that descriptions take on interpretations all
by
themselves, in some Real Reality.
From a pragmatic interpretation, positivists are a problem. Pragmatists
are not positivists.
You are speaking of things you infer
from
what you read, using your private logic and private experiences.
I also, some of the time talk, about what others have communicated to me.
How can
you object to what you see as hints of positivism when your own opinions
are usually stated as objective facts?
Don't recall ever having described my assertions as "objective facts."
>I don't disagree with you that PCT provides a description of behavior in
>causal terms or physical terms. What I am arguing is that the category
>"value" is not a substance.
All depends on what you mean by substance.
If I may correct you, what I and other people, mean by substance.
If you mean solid, liquid, or
gas, value is not a substance. Wrong model. If you mean that a neural
reference signal is a substance, using the neurological model, then yes, a
value is a substance -- but only _that_ kind of substance.
This gets back to an old argument between us. Economic Value according
to me is not a property that is assigned to an individual organism. The way
you are going about this definition is, for me, an indication of a basic
mistake
that you consistently make. We've argued about this for years, you've never
seen my point-- but that is not at all hard to do if you are a solipsist.
>Economics is not physics.
No, but it is describable within the same laws of physics that apply
everywhere else, to the extent it entails interactions in the part of
experience we call the physical world. Unless, of course, you have a model
that works better..
If you are going to attempt to consider problems that are social in
character
then it might be helpful to adopt a point of view that recognizes the social
character of human experience.
>If the only world that you recognize is a positivist one ( I am not sure
at
>this point if you think of yourself as a positivist but it appears
likely )
>and the only world is a materialistic one then it would appear that you
deny
>the reality of values.
If you think that, you have not followed my reasoning at all.
This is another example of a solipsistic approach. Because I do not agree
in your terms that seems to you to mean that I have not understood your
reasoning. And, you phrase it in terms of my not understanding your
"reasoning at all."
I think
values are completely real, and I have developed the model that gives them
a real place to exist, and a real mode of functioning that works with all
the other models I know about (that is, the models I believe).
Again, how about a model that includes other people?
But of
course all of that is part of a _model_ of reality.
Yes, But, it would help if it was a model in which other people exist.
> You seem to be a monist. I think I prefer to be a
>pluralist in the sense that it appears useful to me to think in terms of
a
>world view in which there are different kinds of values.
I think that there are as many different values as there are controlled
perceptions and people to control them. Reference signals, in my model,
establish and define values.
Values in my conception are social rather than substantial.
>The accusation of "insubstantiality" doesn't frighten me. I don't think
of
>experience including values within the category of experience, in terms
of a
>monistic materialism. And, as far as I know all "conceptual spaces" are
>imaginary.
Including yours?
Sure. But, some imaginations are better than others.
I agree, all models create an imaginary picture of
reality. That makes it even more astonishing when some models, like
physics
and PCT, manage to make predictions of future experiences with detailed
accuracy.
I think it is neat. But, I don't see why it should be "astonishing."
>There is, however, no place in your world for values-- not at least I as
>think of values.
Maybe that's the issue right there. How _do_ you think of values?
In my, and by the way some other people too, values are social in character.
In your
conception, do they have some property that is not explained by modeling
them as reference signals (with the associated control system to give them
an effect)? What is missing from the idea or the experience of values that
is not captured in the concept of a reference signal with respect to which
perceptions are evaluated?
That other people have values too. But, then you "don't care."
I hope we are not talking here about "objectively correct" values.
Well, some conceptions of value theory _are_ better than others.
>What you say has an appealing plausibility. I would agree that
"experience"
>is connected to a reality or realities.
That is unnecessary in PCT,
You may think that it is, but that doesn't mean that it actually is
as you say, "unnecessary."
but of course we like to think that there is
some sort of reality Out There. I decided long ago that even if there is,
we have no way of comparing what we experience with that reality.
Well, what ever is the case for PCT, the control theory position doesn't
seem to me to be intelligible without a provision for an environment.
All we
have is perception.
Not really, we have a model of control in which there is an environment.
That is why we have to use models as a way of trying
to
understand what is likely to be Out There.
However, I think we would agree that the "Out There" where ever that might
be is really in here. Now you seem to be of the opinion that the "in here"
only
has one person in it. I think there are some other folks around.
"If the world were really
structured as this model is structured, then it would have to behave as we
observe it behaving." That is the Holy Grail that the modeler seeks: a
model that predicts exactly the relationships among observations that we
do
in fact observe, neither more nor less.
Well, if we think about reality in terms of CSGnet, then the reality isn't
all that
Holy. And, I think it is due in part to this notion of solipsism that comes
in with
the slogan "It is all perception."
> But, experience is not a substance.
True, but "substance" could be an element of a model with which we attempt
to explain experience. Not all models work out equally well, especially
those that use terms as vague as "substance."
OK. How about your use of "concrete?"
>What experience is has yet to be worked out with any adequacy, but I
think
>control theory can be helpful. Experience has an unavoidably economic
>aspect to it. The orthodox conception of the economy has some problems--
>such as the persistent problem of the Giffen paradox. And, control theory
>provides what think is a good explanation for the behavior that is
>considered paradoxical in the orthodox context. One of the things that
>attracted me to the paradox-- besides its being a fundamental issue in
>economics-- is that the behavior of an economic agent was obviously tied
to
>the calorie.
Yes,and one reason this is so satisfying is that it forms a link between
models that are otherwise mostly independent -- physiology, physics, and
neurology, as well as models in economics.
We really do agree upon this.
> > my remarks concerning numbers had merely
>
>"Merely?" Come on, it was a hard sell for stale snake oil. Fess up to
>ideological credo as a monistic materialist.
Nonsense.
Then how about a solipsistic individualist? Not, that your "Nonsense"
means that
I am mistaken.
You are as objectively wrong as you think you are objectively
right.
I can't remember having thought about being "objectively right" for decades.
Positivism, materialism, objectivism are all "isms."
>I acknowledge that when modeling it is necessary to be explicit about
what
>it is that is being modeled and that I should be more careful in
attaching
>dimensions to the terms being modeled. However, "Economics is not
>Physics." Positivism, objectivism, materialism have not provided an
>adequate basis for economic theory.
Why don't we just forget about those isms and just go on with the
modeling?
Because you insist upon a conception of inquiry that doesn't work in the
context of economic theory.
We're flirting with angels on pinheads, and won't get anywhere with that.
You can speak for yourself about "not getting anywhere." This is a
characteristic
positivist dismissal of the issues involved at the foundation of economic
theory.
>I have found this discussion most informative. Not that I learned
anything
>new about control theory in the course of it. But, I never would have
>suspected that you take a monistic materialism so seriously. I don't
think
>there is much of any chance of your converting me to your old time
religion.
>And, I am quite sure that you are not interested in considering switching
to
>what I view as a more adequate set of preconceptions.
Bill, for crying out loud, do you have to be so persistently superior and
offensive?
Well, its all true. Your position really does have some severe defects--
like
you "don't care" about what other people think.
Lay off. Let's get back to something productive.
Again, this is a typical positivist twist. You know what value is. That's
all
settled. Well it isn't. Your conception of these issues, I am convinced is
vitally important if you are going to understand economic issues. It would
also be helpful for understanding questions such as why things happen
the way they do on the CSGnet. I don't accept your conception of what is
and what is not productive.
You don't need
to worry about isms when you focus on constructing a good clear model.
This is more positivist dogma. The Isms are always a worry.
Don't you think you have anything to learn about that, either?
This is another of the are you still fucking pigs arguments.
Bill Williams